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Abstract
Chapter 1 studies the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide
anti tax evasion policy in Italy which used innovative monitoring technologies to target
buildings hidden from tax authorities. The difference-in-differences identiﬁcation strategy
exploits both variation across towns in the ex ante program scope to increase enforcement
as well as administrative data on actual building registrations. Local incumbents experience
an increase in their reelection likelihood as a consequence of the policy. In addition,
these political returns are higher in areas with higher speed of public good provision and
with lower tax evasion tolerance, implying complementarity among enforcement policies,
government efﬁciency, and the underlying tax culture. Chapter 2 uses a road-level regression
discontinuity design in Sierra Leone to study the impact of improvements in rural road
infrastructure on agricultural markets. We show that the improved roads reduced the
market prices of local crops. These price effects are stronger in markets that are further
from major urban centers and in less productive areas. We also ﬁnd that these price effects
are reversed in areas with better cell phone penetration. We show that our empirical
ﬁndings are consistent with a search cost framework à la Mortensen, but inconsistent with
other models, such as Bertrand competition, bilateral bargaining, and Cournot oligopsony.
Chapter 3 present results from a randomized controlled experiment designed to study the
multiple margins through which value is passed from traders to agricultural producers
in the presence of interlinked transactions. Consistent with other studies, we ﬁnd limited
price pass-through in response to an increase in the trader resale price. However, there is
a large response in credit provision. We develop a model of interlinked transactions that
iiihighlights the substitutability of price and credit pass-through across markets, and verify its
predictions empirically. Calibration suggests that to ignore margins of pass-through other
than price has substantial implications for welfare analysis.
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xiiChapter 1
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral
Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion
Program 1
1.1 Introduction
Government ability to enforce tax collection efﬁciently is one of the fundamental compo-
nents of state capacity and, in turn, an important driver of historical economic development.
Tax evasion generates both large losses in government revenues and large distortions.2 The
literature (e.g., Slemrod (2007); Besley and Persson (2012)) describes three main determinants
of tax compliance: enforcement technology, political incentives, and cultural norms. This pa-
per illustrates the interaction among these three factors. We estimate the electoral returns —
the change in reelection likelihood — that local policymakers obtain from a nationwide anti
tax evasion policy in Italy, based on an innovation in tax-payers monitoring technology. In
1Co-authored with Ugo Troiano
2Slemrod (2007) estimates overall noncompliance in the United States at 14 percent. Estimates from other
developed countries deliver similar ﬁgures (for Italy, Marino and Zizza (2008)). In developing countries, where
the share of the informal economy is typically larger, the ﬁgures are much higher (Gordon and Li (2009);
Schneider, Buehn, and Enste (2010)).
1addition, we study how these electoral returns depend on underlying social preferences for
tax compliance and on the local government efﬁciency in public good provision. The paper
provides, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical evidence on voters’ responses to
anti tax evasion policies.
Measures to reduce tax evasion generate a conﬂict between voters. They hurt tax evaders,
typically a minority of voters, while the majority of the population is likely to beneﬁt from
additional government expenditures, lower tax rates, or even directly from the punishment
of former shirkers.3 However, the magnitude of the individual costs tax evaders incur is
potentially higher than the individual beneﬁts non evaders derive. Anti tax evasion policies
are thus canonical examples of policies that have an asymmetry in the concentration of costs
and beneﬁts (Tullock (1959); Olson (1965)). Depending on which of the two types of voters
is more likely to change its voting behavior in response to changes in enforcement, ﬁghting
tax evasion might either beneﬁt or harm politicians who seek reelection. The sign of this
impact is ex ante ambiguous and, therefore, an empirical question.
In 2007, the Italian government instituted a nationwide anti tax evasion policy, the Ghost
Buildings program. The program identiﬁed ghost buildings — properties not included in
the land registry and thus hidden from tax authorities4 — by overlaying aerial photographs
and digital land registry maps.5 The intervention detected more than two million land
registry parcels with ghost buildings.6 Following the completion of the mapping exercise,
the government commenced a large registration program that targeted the identiﬁed ghost
buildings. While the central government began the program and coordinated registration
activities, municipality administrations circulated information about the program, collab-
3For experimental evidence on this channel, see Carpenter et al. (2009); Casari and Luini (2009); Ouss and
Peysakhovich (2012).
4The value of registered buildings enters the tax base for personal income tax and property taxes, among
other taxes.
5Other countries, such as Greece and Rwanda, have recently implemented policies using similar technologies.
6The unit of the Italian land registry maps is the parcel (parcella), which is deﬁned as a portion of land
belonging to a given physical or legal person. In the case where the land is shared across several owners, the
parcel is split into several sub-parcels (subalterni).
2orated with follow-up inspections, and enforced payment of overdue local taxes. Media
reports highlight both the importance of local administrations in the registration process7
and the heterogeneity in their actions in response to the program.8
The policy induced a large shift in tax enforcement, the intensity of which varied
signiﬁcantly across towns. In towns with a higher prevalence of detected ghost buildings,
the program had larger scope to affect the level of building registration. We use a measure
of Ghost Building Intensity — the ratio of the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings identiﬁed by the program to the total number of land registry parcels in the
town — to proxy for the scope of the program. Using a difference-in-differences approach,
we test the impact of the anti evasion policy on local incumbent reelection by exploiting
variations across municipalities in this intensity.9 This strategy, under plausible assumptions,
isolates the causal effect on electoral outcomes of the policy scope to increase enforcement
from other mayor or voter characteristics that might have affected the actual levels of ghost
building registration in the town.10
In local elections occurring after the beginning of the program, an increase of one
standard deviation in the ghost building intensity raises the likelihood of reelection of the
local incumbent relative to pre-program elections by approximately 2.5 percentage points,
about 5.5% of the average reelection rate. Higher town-level ghost building intensity also
lowers several measures of competitiveness of local elections. In particular, it reduces the
number of candidates running for election, increases the margin of victory for the winner,
and reduces the likelihood of a runoff. Guiding our empirical models is a retrospective
voting framework of political agency. Such a theoretical framework helps us predict how a
change in tax enforcement can impact voter choices and which factors affect this response.
7For example, Dell’Oste and Trovati (2011).
8Among many others, Bernardini (2011) and Barca (2008) discuss the particular way in which the city of
Montecatini and some cities in the Reggio Emilia province implemented the program, respectively.
9In a recent contribution, Mian and Suﬁ (2012) adopted a similar empirical approach to study the effects of
the ﬁscal stimulus in the US.
10We verify that the assumptions required by the identiﬁcation strategy hold (i.e., no contemporary differential
changes and no differential pre-trends in the outcome variable by treatment intensity).
3Additional analysis of the actual building registrations induced by the program comple-
ments the reduced form analysis described above. For a given town-level program scope,
a higher registration rate of ghost buildings under the incumbent local administration
(i.e., the share of ghost buildings that gets registered prior to the local election date) has a
positive effect on the likelihood of reelection. The result is robust to the inclusion of mayors’
characteristics as controls and to an instrumental variable approach, based on the time
elapsed between the program start date and the town election date.
We provide evidence for two channels that could drive the observed electoral response.
First, towns where the government is more efﬁcient in delivering public goods show a larger
electoral response to the program. We also verify that towns with higher ghost building
intensity experienced a differential increase in local government expenditures following
the program inception. Second, using survey data on the self-reported tolerance for tax
evasion among voters, we show that the program’s positive impact on incumbent reelection
is signiﬁcantly higher in areas with lower tolerance for tax evasion. Finally, the empirical
ﬁndings are inconsistent with two potential alternative interpretations on the impact of the
program on voter support for incumbents. In the ﬁrst, the program changes voter behavior
by providing information on the existing stock of ghost buildings. In the second, it gives
an electoral rent to the incumbent by giving her the option to not register identiﬁed ghost
buildings.
Our approach can potentially be applied in different settings to study the political
feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the world using new electronic data,
cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices (Bird and Zolt (2008)). Addi-
tionally, our analysis points at complementarity between technological innovations in tax
enforcement and political incentives. When exposed to a reduction in monitoring costs,
politicians exploit the new technologies and experience political gains. These ﬁndings have
a direct bearing on the political feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the
world using new electronic data, cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices
(Bird and Zolt (2008)). In addition, our study provides evidence that the underlying tax
4culture shapes the political incentives for tax enforcement and the political returns to these
innovations (Torgler (2007); Rothstein (2000)). We discuss several policy implications arising
from these ﬁndings. Finally, access to town-level nationwide administrative data from
the program allows us to provide evidence on two additional fronts. First, we study the
correlates of tax evasion at the town level. We ﬁnd that geographical features, such as town
size, are important determinants of tax evasion, consistent with Saiz (2010), and that social
capital is negatively correlated with tax evasion (Putnam (2001)). Second, we document that
mayor characteristics, such as education, gender, and age, do affect the extent to which the
Ghost Buildings program increased tax enforcement (consistent with Alesina (1988); Besley
and Coate (1997); Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2012)).
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, a recent set of studies uses
microdata to shed light on enforcement technologies such as third-party reporting (Slemrod,
Blumenthal, and Christian (2001); Saez (2010); Kleven et al (2011); Chetty, Friedman,
and Saez (2012)), paper trails (Pomeranz (2012); Kumler, Verhoogen, and Frías (2011)),
cross-checking (Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2012)), and targeted auditing strategies
(Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2012); Aparicio (2012)).11 By studying how technology-
driven enforcement policies affect policymakers, we bridge this work with the one estimating
the political returns to ﬁscal policies (Brender and Drazen (2008); Alesina, Carloni, and
Lecce (2011)). In addition, by delving into the relation between incentives of political agents
and tax evasion, our paper is related to Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2012), who ﬁnd
that tax evasion is higher in industries supported by parliamentarians. Finally, our results
provide support to the existing literature that highlights the role of culture and social norms
as determinants of tax evasion, either via cross-country analysis (Torgler (2003); Slemrod
(2003)) or lab experiments (Spicer and Becker (1980); Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as it follows. Section 1.2 describes the Ghost
Buildings program. Section 1.3 presents a simple framework that guides our empirical
analysis. Section 1.4 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 1.5
11For a review of the literature, see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhakil (2002).
5lays out our empirical strategy to estimate the electoral response to the policy. Section 1.6
presents the results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Ghost Buildings Program
The value of the buildings registered in the land registry enters the tax base for several
national and local taxes, including “ICI", the local property tax, “IRPEF", the personal
income tax,12 and the local waste management tax. Italian legislation13 requires that owners
register new buildings at the local ofﬁce of the Agenzia del Territorio, the agency managing
the land registry, within thirty days after their completion.14
In 2006, the national government approved new anti tax evasion legislation, the Ghost
Buildings program,15 aimed at detecting buildings not registered in the land registry maps.16
The Agenzia del Territorio, the national agency managing the land registry, coordinated the
effort. The Agenzia del Territorio ﬁrst juxtaposed the land and building registry maps to
obtain the “Ofﬁcial Building Map". It subsequently compiled high-resolution (50cm) aerial
photographs of the entire country in order to identify the ghost buildings. Figures 1.1a-1.1c
summarize the steps of the identiﬁcation. First, the aerial photograph for a particular
location was created (Figure 1.1a). Second, the pictures were matched with the ofﬁcial
building map for the corresponding area (Figure 1.1b). Finally, the ghost buildings were
identiﬁed (Figure 1.1c)17. Ghost buildings include commercial, industrial, and residential
12“IRPEF” includes the inferred opportunity cost of living in the house, with both a local and a national
component.
13Legge 9 Marzo 2006 n.80 - Art. 34-quinquies.
14All buildings in Italy need a building permit before their construction starts. Obtaining a building
permit makes the building part of the City Plan. The process of obtaining building permits is administered
independently from the registration in the land registry maps. Buildings not in the City Plan are required to be
demolished.
15Legge 24 novembre 2006, n. 286 subsequently modiﬁed by Legge 30 Luglio 2010, n. 122.
16The exercise did not cover one of the semi-autonomous regions, Trentino Alto-Adige, because in that
region land registry maps are autonomously administered. The region contains less than two percent of the
total population of Italy.
17According to the Law Decreto Ministero delle Finanze 2 gennaio 1998, n.28.Art. 3 the following buildings do
6stand-alone buildings, and also substantial extensions of previously registered buildings
that should have been reported to the land registry.
Through this process, the Agenzia del Territorio identiﬁed approximately two million
land registry parcels with unregistered buildings. Beginning in August 2007, the Agenzia
del Territorio started to publish parcel-level data on unregistered properties in the Gazzetta
Ufﬁciale, the ofﬁcial bulletin promulgating Italian laws and decrees, in order to induce
registrations of the ghost buildings. Within three years, it coded detailed information on the
number of ghost buildings in the universe of Italian municipalities (with the exception of
Trentino Alto-Adige). The order of publication relied on the availability of digitized land
registry maps at the time when the program started. The Agenzia del Territorio had 60% of
the land registry maps of the Italian territory in digitized form before the Ghost Buildings
program was approved. After 2006, the Agenzia del Territorio began digitizing the remaining
land registry maps, proceeding by province (i.e., they simultaneously coded municipalities
in the same province). It completed the identiﬁcation exercise by the end of 2010.18
According to the initial legislation, owners could register the detected ghost building with
the land registry by April 30, 2011.19 Widespread media campaigns and local administration
efforts helped the program achieve high registration rates. In particular, local administrators
a) disseminated information about targeted parcels; b) collaborated on follow-up building
inspections; c) proceeded with the collection of overdue local taxes up to ﬁve years before
the program began; and d) veriﬁed the conformity of ghost buildings to the city plan and
local zoning restrictions. Local administrations received a large share of the additional
tax revenues generated by the program. Owners of ghost buildings that registered prior
to the April 2011 deadline were required to pay overdue taxes dating back to 2007, or to
not increase the tax base of their owners and thus are not subject to registration requirements: (i) buildings that
are not completed (ii) buildings particularly degraded (iii) solar collectors (iv) greenhouses (v) henhouses or
others reserved for animals.
18Publication on the Gazzetta Ufﬁciale occurred in the following waves: August 2007, October 2007, December
2007, December 2008, December 2009, December 2010.
19This was the result of two previous deadlines of ninety days and seven months since the publication on
the Gazzetta Ufﬁciale.
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Figure 1.1A: Aerial Picture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1B: Digital Land Registry Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1C: Overlay 
Source: Agenzia del Territorio
Figure 1.1: The Ghost Building Identiﬁcation Process
8the construction date for post-2007 cases, and to pay penalties for delayed payments.20
After April 2011, the Agenzia del Territorio, with the support of local administrations and
local contractors, proceeded with follow-up inspections21 to impute the tax base for the
remaining unregistered buildings.22 Additional penalties and a fee for the extra inspection
were assessed on owners of buildings for which the Agenzia del Territorio imputed the tax
base after April 2011.
The Agenzia del Territorio published the detailed economic impact of the program for
the year 2011. The program led to a substantial wave of registrations. According to the
administrative data, roughly 40 percent of the ghost buildings were registered as of 30th of
December 2011. According to the ﬁgures provided, the program increased total tax revenues
by 472 million euros in that year.23 We estimate that approximately 65 percent of those
revenues come from local taxes. We run a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation using ﬁgures
on the number of land parcels with ghost buildings, the registration rates, and the total
additional tax revenues from the program. A one standard deviation increase in ghost
buildings targeted by the program increased the tax revenues by around 3.5% of the median
value. Using the same information, we ﬁnd that, on average, the owner of a registered ghost
building now faces an additional yearly tax burden of approximately 528 Euros.
1.3 Tax Enforcement and Retrospective Voting: A Conceptual Frame-
work
This section outlines the impact of a change in tax enforcement on voters’ electoral
choices. We provide a simple framework based on modeling of retrospective voting (Barro
20Penalties were determined by Legge 29 Dicembre 1990, n. 408, subsequently modiﬁed by Decreto Legislativo.
18 Dicembre 1997.
21To increase incentives for the local administrations further, an additional bonus was introduced in 2011 for
each registered ghost building.
22Decreto Legge 79/2010, art. 10, 11.
23This ﬁgure does not include payment for overdue taxes from previous years.
9(1973); Ferejohn (1986)) and of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). The main
intuition of retrospective voting models is that citizens examine whether their welfare has
increased under a politician’s ofﬁce, and vote accordingly.24 While the speciﬁc application
to tax evasion is novel, the discussion in this section heavily relies on the intuition from
existing models.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of voters and by politicians. Voters are
heterogeneous in their ability to evade. This ability could be a function of occupation type
(employed vs. self-dependent) or evasion costs (economic and psychological). We consider
a simple case with two ﬁxed types of voters: evaders and non evaders. Evaders pay taxes
only if enforcement occurs, while non-evaders always pay taxes.25 The population share
of evaders is l. Enforcement of tax collection for each evader occurs with probability p.
Enforcement draws are independent across evaders, and thus p is the share of evaders for
which enforcement occurs. This is assumed to be a function of the politician type (a) and of
an idiosyncratic component (u), whose distributions are G(a) and G(u), respectively. Voters
do not observe the two components and are uncertain over the politician type (Banks and
Sundaram (1998)). They use previous realizations to form expectations ˆ a and ˆ p (in the spirit
of Holmstrom, 1982).
We assume an exogenous income level (normalized to 1) and tax rate (t), constant
across the population. Voters derive utility from disposable income and from the overall
level of enforcement, for instance through increased public good provision and deﬁcit
reduction. This implies that enforcement has two effects on evaders’ utility, which go
in opposite directions. First, enforcement decreases the disposable income for evaders.
However, cracking down on tax evasion increases the size of government, which beneﬁts all
24This implies that incumbent’s reelection is the main outcome to analyze when testing the empirical
predictions of retrospective voting models. Retrospective voting models have received considerable empirical
support in the context of government corruption or ﬁscal stabilization (Brender, 2003; Besley and Pratt, 2006;
Ferraz and Finan, 2008, Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano, 2012).
25For simplicity, we ignore the extra ﬁnes evaders pay when audited and, thus, the optimal individual
evasion level they choose.
10citizens, including evaders. The expected utility for evaders, VE is deﬁned as:
VE( ˆ p) = ˆ p(U(1  t)) + (1  ˆ p)U(1) + ˆ pWE(l,e), (1.1)
where we highlight that VE depends on the expected level of enforcement, ˆ p. In Equation
1.1, U() is the monetary utility from disposable income and WE() is the utility from tax
collection enforcement.26 WE is increasing in l, the share of evaders in the population, and
e, the government efﬁciency in using tax revenues to produce public good.
We allow non-evaders to obtain an additional non-monetary beneﬁt from enforcement.
One example is the case where, because of fairness concerns, non-evaders derive direct
utility from the enforcement of evaders’ tax payments, independently from their monetary
returns. Thus, the expected utility function for the non-evaders is:
VN( ˆ p) = ˆ pWN(l,e,n) + U(1  t) (1.2)
We notice that, in addition to l and e, VN also depends on n, a shifter that affects the
non-monetary beneﬁts from increases in enforcement. For instance, n captures the extent to
which voters are averse to tax evasion (“tax culture”). In the model, we abstract from the
utility arising from government services ﬁnanced by the tax payments of the non-evaders
since that does not depend on ˆ p, the core variable of interest for our argument.
We now consider the voters’ choice between an incumbent and a contender. We adopt a
standard probabilistic voting approach (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In the text below, ˆ a
and ˆ p denote the voters’ beliefs about incumbent type and enforcement, respectively. On
the other hand a and p capture the expectations about the contender. In deciding whether
to reelected the incumbent, the two groups of voters compare the utility under the expected
incumbent’s type with an average opponent. Voter i in group j = fE, Ng will reelect the
incumbent if Vj( ˆ p) > Vj(p) + eij + d. The parameter eij is an individual ideological bias
26In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that the utility from enforcement is proportional to the
expected level of enforcement.
11toward the contender, distributed uniformly over [  1
2fj, 1
2fj].27 The parameter d measures
the average popularity of the contender in the population and is distributed uniformly over
U[ 1
2, 1
2].
Under the above assumptions, the ex-ante incumbent reelection probability (i.e., before
the realization of d) is:
p = ( ˆ p   p)[lfE( U(1) + U(1  t) + WE) + (1  l)fNWN] (1.3)
The following equation presents the electoral impact of an increase in the expected
enforcement level under the incumbent, ˆ p:
¶p
¶ ˆ p
= lfE
 
  U(1) + U(1  t) + WE

+ (1  l)fNWN (1.4)
The ﬁrst term of the outer sum represents the net electoral gains coming from evaders
voting. These will be negative whenever the utility cost of the expected loss in disposable
income, U(1)   U(1  t), more than offsets the beneﬁts from enforcement, WE. The second
term is the electoral gain from non-evaders (always positive). This duality is consistent with
the discussion in Section 1.1: an increase in the perception of the enforcement type of the
incumbent has ambiguous effects. The change generates a conﬂict across voters and the
model parameters determine which channel prevails.
In addition, the model delivers intuitive comparative statics on the heterogeneity of the
electoral impact arising from an increase in expected enforcement under the incumbent.
Intuitively, both governmental efﬁciency in public good provision and the intensity of
non-monetary beneﬁts from the additional enforcement matter play a role. Speciﬁcally:
¶2p
¶ ˆ p¶e
= lfE
¶WE
¶e
+ (1  l)fN
¶WN
¶e
(1.5)
and
¶2p
¶ ˆ p¶n
= (1  l)fN
¶WN
¶n
, (1.6)
27The parameters fE and fN should be interpreted as proxies for the responsiveness of voters in each group
to tax evasion enforcement. They might reﬂect for example the fact that the political power of a group can
change depending on its size or ability to self-organize (Olson(1965)).
12which are both positive.
To summarize, the simple model predicts that an increase in the expected level of
enforcement under the incumbent:
i) Has an ambiguous impact on the incumbent reelection likelihood
ii) Is larger when government is more efﬁcient in public good provision
iii) Is larger when the non-monetary returns from enforcement are larger
The Ghost Buildings program allows us to shed light on these predictions. The, program
initiated by the central government, can be considered as a positive shock to enforcement.
We argue that voters observe the increase in the building registration but have limited
information about the speciﬁc “production function" of enforcement (i.e., information
collected by the central government, local administration effort, and complementarity
between the two sources) This in turn increases the belief voters hold about the local
incumbent type, ˆ a (and thus on ˆ p), and, according to the model, generates an ambiguous
effect on the incumbent reelection probability.
Crucially, this result relies on the assumption that voters have limited information about
the details of the Ghost Buildings program. They observe the change in enforcement and
still attribute a part of it to the incumbent, thus extracting signal on her type. Models with
rational but poorly informed voters have received growing attention in the literature. They
can provide theoretical support for the empirical ﬁndings that voters’ electoral choices
respond to economic conditions (Wolfers (2009)), natural disasters (Cole, Healy, and Werker
(2012)), corruption (Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano, (2012)) and quasi-random
targeted transfers (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011)). In addition, a recent wave of
randomized experiments shows that information provision can signiﬁcantly affect voter
choices and political outcomes (for a review, see Pande (2011)). For the Ghost Buildings
program, it is likely that inference about who exactly was causing the extra enforcement
was difﬁcult. Local administration efforts complemented the initial identiﬁcation process.
In addition, evidence from media reports and town bulletins suggest that at least some
13mayors claimed a role throughout the program, including the initial stages of building
identiﬁcation through aerial pictures (Cavallaro (2011), Corriere della Citta’ (2012), Gazzetta
del Mezzogiorno (2012)).
Finally, we notice that it is also possible to predict an impact on support for the incumbent
in an alternative model where voters perfectly observe the nature of the Ghost Buildings
program (while they are still uncertain about the type of mayor). In this alternative setting,
the program provides an opportunity for voters to extract a more precise signal about the
incumbent type, as in Bubb (2008). This can in turn either beneﬁt or hurt the incumbent,
depending for instance on voter risk preferences (Quattrone and Tversky (1988)) or on the
skewness of the distribution of incumbent types (Caselli et al, (2013)). In the rest of the
paper, we do not aim to differentiate the two classes of models in the data analysis. Rather,
the insight that the net voter response to an enforcement policy is theoretically ambiguous,
which is common to both models, motivates our empirical investigation.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
1.4.1 Data
The main database for the analysis includes information on the number of parcels
containing Ghost Buildings in each town. The aerial photographs detected more than two
million such parcels. We target the population of 7,720 of the 8,092 Italian towns (Comuni)
for which we can deﬁne the measure of ghost building intensity. Additionally, we obtain
data on registered ghost buildings up to the deadline of April 30, 2011. In order to analyze
the electoral response to ghost building registration, we construct a measure of registration
imputable to the incumbent administration. Speciﬁcally, we multiply the registration rate by
the ratio between a) the time elapsed between program start date and election date and b)
the time elapsed between program start date and April 2011.28
28In one of our robustness checks, we also compute a second measure of registration imputable to the
incumbent under the assumption of a constant growth rate of 50% in the registration levels over years.
14We complement this information with data from the Italian Deparment of the Interior
(Ministero degli Interni) which contains outcomes for the universe of municipal elections
from 1993 to 2011.29 In Figure 1.2, we plot the number of elections per year. Towns vote
in different years, according to predetermined waves. We distinguish between elections
before and after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. There are almost 5,200
municipalities for which we have data on an election that occurred after program inception
(about 67% of the total number of towns targeted by the program). It is also important to
discuss two institutional reforms that occurred in the time span of our sample. First, in 1993,
the starting year for our election sample, Italian municipal politics were overhauled: a new
electoral law changed the mayoral electoral system from party to individual ballot. It also
introduced a two-term limit. Second, in 2000, the length of the mayoral term was extended
from four to ﬁve years.
In addition to the core data, we collect geographic and socio-economic data at the
municipality level from the Italian National Statistical Ofﬁce. Finally, we use two additional
data sources to test the channels driving the electoral response: town-level government
expenses (from the Ministero degli Interni) and a region-level standardized score to the
question “Do you justify tax cheating?” from the European Values Study.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. Panel A
presents the main variables related to the Ghost Buildings program. Panels B and C include
town-level geographical and socio-economic covariates, respectively. These are measured
prior to the inception of the Ghost Buildings program, mostly in the 2001 Population Census.
Panel D (“Mayor” variables”) summarizes characteristics of the mayor in ofﬁce at the time
of the program inception in the town.30 for each Italian city in our sample. In Panel E,
we summarize the local election panel variables.31 Tables A.1 and A.2 provide a detailed
29The Italian municipal government (Comune) is composed of a mayor (Sindaco), an executive committee
(Giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected city council (Consiglio Comunale).
30Only about a half of mayors are matched to national parties. We therefore choose not to focus on this
variable in our analysis. Including dummies for political alignment among the controls in the regressions does
not affect the results we present later in the paper.
31Given that our main outcome of interest is the probability of reelection, Table 1.1 summarizes the variables
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16description of data sources and variable deﬁnitions.
1.4.2 The Correlates of Tax Evasion
We use data from the Ghost Buildings program to study the correlates of tax evasion
at the town level. Figure ?? presents our measure of ghost building intensity across Italian
towns.32 Tax evasion is more prevalent in Southern Italy, and it is less widespread in the
North. Table 1.2 presents the correlates of ghost building intensity (per 1,000 of land registry
parcels). In Column (1), we ﬁrst study whether geographical factors (altitude, area size
of the municipality, number of land registry parcels) are correlated with tax evasion. In
Column (2), we add socio-economic controls (population, income per-capita, social capital,
number of ﬁrms, urbanization rate). Finally, in Column (3), we show that our results are
unaffected by the inclusion of regional ﬁxed effects.33
We ﬁnd that several geographic characteristics are strongly associated with tax evasion.
In particular, controlling for other variables, tax evasion is higher in more widespread
municipalities. Plausibly, in cities with wide geographical extension, the opportunities for
unregistered buildings are higher as the enforcement of building registration is more difﬁcult
and resource-intensive. However, we cannot decisively interpret this evidence as causal.
Previous literature has shown for example that borders are endogenously determined (see,
among others, Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004); Alesina,
Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)).
Finally, as expected, tax evasion is negatively associated with both social capital and
income. In particular, the ﬁnding on social capital is consistent with Putnam (2001), who
ﬁnds that the percentage of tax evasion, as measured by the Internal Revenue Service,
only for the elections in which the mayor does not face a binding a term limit.
32For presentation purposes, we choose to show the results of this section using a measure of ghost building
intensity obtained by normalizing the number of parcels with ghost buildings (per 1,000 land registry parcels).
33For 3.5% of the towns in our sample we are missing at least one town-level control. In our regressions
throughout the paper, for each control, we include a binary indicator which is equal to one if the control is
missing. In addition, we replace missing values with an arbitrary unique value. The results of our paper are
unchanged when we undo this and just drop observations with missing values for the control variables.
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Notes: In this ﬁgure, Ghost Building Intensity is deﬁned as the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings per thousand of land registry parcels. White areas identify towns for which we do not have data.
Figure 1.3: Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land registry parcels)
19Table 1.2: The Determinants of Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land parcels)
(1) (2) (3)
Town Area Size (sq km) 0.102 0.123 0.098
(0.021) (0.015) (0.012)
Altitude (mt) -0.015 -0.009 -0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) -0.236 -0.328 -0.270
(0.065) (0.070) (0.047)
Population (1,000) 0.020 0.004
(0.016) (0.011)
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) -2.601 -1.223
(0.363) (0.291)
Urbanization Index 5.948 4.407
(1.839) (1.652)
Non-Proﬁt Associations/1,000 pop -0.458 -0.211
(0.144) (0.074)
Number of Firms per capita 56.100 89.945
(20.040) (17.842)
Region FE X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building intensity per thousand of parcels, deﬁned
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of
land registry parcels, multiplied by one thousand. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
20is strongly related to differences in social capital at the state level. Additionally, when
analyzing the DDB Chicago Lifestyles survey, he argues that by far the best predictor of
tax evasion is the number of times in the course of the last year that respondents gave the
“ﬁnger” to another driver.
1.4.3 The Political Determinants of the Ghost Buildings Registration
We now provide more details on the wave of registration of ghost buildings induced by
the program. First, we show that the number of ghost buildings detected by the program
is a good predictor of the number of ghost buildings that were registered in response
to the policy. Figure ?? displays the relation between the number of land parcels with
ghost buildings eventually registered by the April 2011 deadline (“registered ghost building
intensity”) and the number of parcels that were identiﬁed as containing ghost buildings
(“ghost building intensity”), both as a share of the total number of land registry parcels. In
the graph, the x-axis variable is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The scatter plot shows a clear
increasing relation. In a linear regression analysis, an increase of one standard deviation
in the detected intensity of ghost buildings raises the registered ghost building intensity
at April 2011 by approximately 0.75 standard deviations (p < 0.01).34 To summarize, the
program scope at the town-level strongly predicts the actual impact of the program on
tax enforcement. This premise motivates the strategy that we introduce in Section 1.5 to
estimate the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on electoral outcomes.
Second, we analyze the ghost buildings registration rate, deﬁned as the percentage of
ghost building parcels that get registered by the April 2011 deadline. Figure ?? summarizes
the ghost building registration rate and documents a substantial dispersion across towns.
Table 1.3 documents the impact of characteristics of the mayor at the time of the program
inception on this outcome. For a given level of the other covariates, the registration rate is
higher when mayors are male, younger, more educated, or are born in the same city in which
34The relation is basically unchanged when adding town-level controls and regional ﬁxed effects (results
available on request).
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between Registered Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction of land parcels
with ghost buildings that get registered by April 2011) and Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction of land
parcels with ghost buildings identiﬁed by the program). The x-axis is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis
of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of
the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph.
The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure 1.4: Registered Ghost Building Intensity
22they serve as mayor. The correlation between gender and policies in Italian municipality
is potentially consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), who ﬁnd
that female policymakers usually face more difﬁculty in implementing policies when in
ofﬁce. To the extent education can be considered a proxy for politicians’ quality (see, for
example, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011)), this set of results also supports the
view that better policymakers ﬁght tax evasion more. We highlight the correlation between
the mayor’s place of birth and the tax evasion enforcement. One possible explanation
could be that mayors who are born in the same city have access to additional information
that can facilitate tax evasion enforcement. We acknowledge that this evidence relies on
cross-sectional correlation analysis and thus should be interpreted with caution. However,
we also notice that the results are robust to the inclusion of geographical and socio-economic
controls, in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. With these caveats in mind, the ﬁndings
of this section suggest that mayor’s characteristics did have a role in shaping registration
activities across towns.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 The Electoral Response to the Ghost Buildings Program
In this section, we outline our approach to estimate the voter response to the Ghost
Buildings program. We also aim to isolate the channels that drive this response. Our
empirical strategy exploits variation across towns in the program scope to increase tax
enforcement.35 We implement a difference-in-differences approach based on the town-level
ghost building intensity, which we deﬁned above as the ratio between the number of land
registry parcels with ghost buildings and total number of land registry parcels in each town.
In Section 1.4.3, we documented that mayor characteristics, such as age, education, and
35Importantly, the Agenzia del Territorio conducted the detection activities homogeneously throughout the
country. Thus, heterogeneity in the number of detected unregistered buildings captures differences in of actual
levels of non-registration at the time of the aerial photographing as opposed to differential intensity in the
detection activity.
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Figure 1.5: Ghost Building Registration Rate
24Table 1.3: The Determinants of the Ghost Building Registration Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Mayor Age -0.067 -0.068 -0.057
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Mayor Education 0.704 0.630 0.702
(0.265) (0.262) (0.249)
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 1.051 1.145 0.968
(0.424) (0.423) (0.408)
Mayor Term Number -0.174 -0.047 -0.041
(0.362) (0.353) (0.364)
Mayor Woman (0/1) -0.923 -1.246 -1.202
(0.642) (0.626) (0.607)
Geograpic Controls X X
Socio-Economic Controls X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building registration rate,
deﬁned as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings
that get registered by April 2011 and the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings identiﬁed at the beginning of the program. Refer to Table 1.1 for a description
of the Geographic and Socio-Economic Controls. All the regressions include regional
ﬁxed effects and year-of-program-inception ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
gender, predict the registration rate of the detected ghost buildings. In addition, the actual
levels of registration might depend on voter preferences and responsiveness to the program.
Thus, a naive analysis looking at the relationship between actual ghost building registrations
and reelection outcomes will suffer from the standard omitted variable bias. This motivates
our focus on ex ante program scope to increase enforcement.
The rationale for our identiﬁcation approach is that program scope at the town level
predicts the increase in enforcement induced by the Ghost Buildings program, as shown
in Figure ??. Towns with a higher share of parcels with detected ghost buildings also have,
on average, a higher share of parcels with registered ghost buildings, as measured in April
2011.36
36Importantly, we argue that the intensity of ghost buildings is not a valid instrument for actual registration
intensity. In principle, as we discussed in Section 1.1, the program could affect incumbent reelection probability
through other channels besides registration. This would make the standard exclusion restriction required for an
instrumental variable approach invalid.
25Our baseline speciﬁcation is therefore:
Rimet = b0 + b1Postie  Ghost Building Intensityi + hm  Postie + fi + ft + eimet (1.7)
The dependent variable Riret is a dummy that indicates whether the incumbent of municipal-
ity i in macro-area m is re-elected in election e in year t. Observations where the incumbent
cannot be reelected because of a binding term limit are excluded from the regression sample.
The dummy Post is equal to one when election e occurs after the beginning of the Ghost
Buildings program in the town. The coefﬁcients hm capture post-program period ﬁxed
effects that are speciﬁc to the four Italia macro-areas37 m where town i is located. We also
include town ﬁxed effects, fi, and election year ﬁxed effects, ft. Finally, Ghost Building
Intensityi is the intensity of ghost buildings in town i. The coefﬁcient of interest, b1, thus
captures the differential impact of the Ghost Buildings program on incumbent reelection by
ghost building intensity. Throughout the paper, we cluster standard errors at the provincial
level to allow for spatial correlation in the error term.
We adopt a similar regression model to study the impact of the program on other
electoral competitiveness outcomes. We focus on four variables: i) a binary indicator for
whether the incumbent reruns for election; ii) the number of candidates running for the
mayor ofﬁce; iii) the difference in the percentage of votes between the ﬁrst and the second
candidate;38 iv) a binary indicator equal to one if a runoff takes place, which occurs in towns
with more than 15,000 inhabitants when none of the candidates obtain the absolute majority
in the ﬁrst-round.
One potential challenge to our identiﬁcation strategy may arise from the town-speciﬁc
timing of publications of the unauthorized building lists. On the one hand, if local adminis-
trators had inﬂuence over publication date, unpopular mayors in cities with high evasion
rates might lobby to delay the publication. On the other hand, the central government
might push to start the program earlier in those towns where mayors set a lower level of
37North, Center, South, Islands.
38For elections with a runoff, we use the ﬁrst round results.
26tax enforcement. In both these cases, our estimates of the impact of the Ghost Building
program on reelection likelihood might just capture a selection effect. We handle this
concern in several ways. First, as discussed in Section 1.2, we notice that the timing of the
publication was primarily determined at the provincial level by the availability of digital
land registry maps and was highly clustered by province. Figure 1.6 emphasizes the high
level of provincial clustering in the publication years. Only about 7% of the post-program
elections have values for the post-program indicator different from the one they would have
had based on the modal date of publication in the province. To deal with these discrepancies
we implement an instrumental variable approach. We code elections based on whether they
occur before or after the modal date of publication of the unauthorized building lists in
the province. We then instrument the actual Post dummy with this binary indicator at the
provincial level. We adopt this strategy for our main speciﬁcations.39 In addition, in Section
1.6.2, we present robustness checks using an alternative instrument for the post-program
indicator using the national modal program inception year.
As is standard in difference-in-differences estimation, identiﬁcation of the coefﬁcient
of interest relies on two assumptions. The ﬁrst is the absence of contemporary events that
differentially affected towns having higher ghost building intensity. We are not aware of
other policies targeting this form of tax evasion happening concurrently with the Ghost
Buildings program. However, it is still possible that other events, which differ in intensity
by other variables correlated with ghost building intensity, occurred at the same time. We
address the concern by presenting alternative speciﬁcations where we include interactions
between a comprehensive set of geographical, socio-economic, and political controls, all
measured before the beginning of the program, and the post-program binary indicator. The
second assumption is the presence of parallel trends in the outcome variable. We assess this
assumption using several tests and placebo exercises in the next section.
39The towns targeted by the program belonged to 101 provinces.
27Notes: The ﬁgure shows the year of inception of the Ghost Building program (i.e., the year of publication of the
list of ghost buildings) in each town. White areas identify towns for which we do not have data.
Figure 1.6: Ghost Buildings Program Inception Year
281.5.2 Channels
The reduced form approach presented thus far tests whether higher program scope to
increase tax enforcement at the town level affects incumbent reelection likelihood in the
post-program period. We complement this baseline regression with further analysis. First,
we show that it is the registration induced by the program that drives the electoral response,
as opposed to other potential interpretations. For this purpose, we use actual ghost building
registration data. In Section 1.4, we emphasized several important measurement limitations
of these data that warrant caution. With this caveat in mind, we test whether, for a given
intensity of ghost buildings, a higher ghost building registration rate (Registration Rate)
induced by the program has a positive effect on incumbent reelection likelihood:
Rimet = g0 + g1Postie  Ghost Building Intensityi
+ g2Postie  Registration Ratei + zm  Postie + mi + mt + uimet
(1.8)
As we discussed above, an obvious threat to identiﬁcation of g2 in Equation 1.8 arises
from the fact that the registration effort is potentially correlated with many potential town-
level confounders. We ﬁrst check robustness of the results to the inclusion of mayor controls.
In addition, the timing of the program provides a strategy that can alleviate this concern.
Even if the program started in the same year in most of the towns, we can exploit the
variation generated by the fact that Italian municipalities hold elections in different years. A
longer time between the beginning of the program and the election date naturally leads to
more registration activities. This generates variation across towns in the registration rate
achieved prior to the local election date that is plausibly uncorrelated with mayor quality.
We use this instrumental variable strategy to look at the impact of a change in registration
rate on incumbent reelection likelihood.
Second, we shed light on the channels through which the program could affect voters’
political preferences. Consistently with the theoretical framework, we investigate the
interaction among the political returns to an increase in tax enforcement, local government
efﬁciency in delivering public goods, and “tax culture”, the stigma associated to evading
29taxes. We use the speed of public good provision as a proxy for the quality of the delivery at
the municipal level. This indicator is measured as the ratio of paid outlays in the municipal
ﬁnancial report over the total outlays committed in the budget. The intuition is that the
provision of public goods is more effective in places where the actual allocation delivered to
citizens is closer to the amount allocated in the budget.40 The following regression model
tests whether the electoral response to the Ghost Building program varies by speed of public
good provision:
Riret = d0 + d1Postie  Ghost Building Intensityi + d2Postie  Speed Public Good Provisioni
+ d3  Postie  GBi  Speed Public Good Provisioni + xr  Postie + li + lt + niret
(1.9)
where d3 is the coefﬁcient of interest.
We then use data from the European Value Study — the European component of World
Values Survey— to study the role of tax culture. Speciﬁcally, we use the question: “Do
you justify cheating on tax?”. For these data, geographical identiﬁcation of respondents is
available only at the regional level. We thus compute and standardize region-level means.
The regression model to capture heterogeneity by this variable is similar to the one presented
in Equation 1.9.
Finally, we also assess the impact of the program on town-level public expenditures. To
test whether the program scope to increase tax enforcement affected these expenditures,
we adopt a speciﬁcation similar to the one we presented in Equation 1.7, using the natural
logarithm of the local government expenditures as the dependent variable.
40A similar proxy has been used by Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2013) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2013) to measure the quality of public good delivery. For our sample, we compute the speed of public good
provision as the average across two pre-treatment years. The results are similar with alternative deﬁnitions.
Results are available upon request.
30−
.
1
−
.
0
5
0
.
0
5
.
1
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
R
e
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
R
a
t
e
s
 
P
r
e
 
t
o
 
P
o
s
t
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Ghost Building Intensity
Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate between
the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the ratio between the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels). The x-axis
is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the
quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut the
top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The line
plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure 1.7: Difference in reelection rates pre- to post- Ghost Buildings program
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Baseline Results
In this section, we investigate the electoral consequences of the Ghost Buildings program.
Figure 1.7 provides a visual analysis of the relation between ghost building intensity and
changes in the incumbent reelection likelihood — our main outcome variable — after the
beginning of the program. On the x-axis, the ghost building intensity is partitioned into
25 quantiles. The scatter displays a clear increasing relation, with the quantile dots fairly
closed aligned along the ﬁtting line.
Table 1.4 formalizes the analysis above and presents the results of the difference-in-
31differences estimation discussed in Section 1.5. Column (1) reports the basic OLS spec-
iﬁcation (“Reduced Form”) using the provincial post-program indicator. The coefﬁcient
remains stable with the inclusion of ﬁxed effect (Column (2)) and of election year ﬁxed effect
(Column (3)). Starting in Column (4), we instrument the post-program indicator with the
provincial post-program indicator. The coefﬁcient is stable across the different speciﬁcations.
The inclusion of year ﬁxed effects and town ﬁxed effects, in Columns (5) and (6) respectively,
does not change our results. In Column (6) — the baseline speciﬁcation for the rest of the
analysis — the reported coefﬁcient on the interaction between the ghost building intensity
and the post-program indicator is 1.042, signiﬁcant at 1%. This magnitude implies that a one
standard deviation in the town-level program scope to increase enforcement, as measured
by the ghost building intensity, raises the likelihood of reelection of the incumbent by
approximately 2.5 percentage points in post-program elections, relative to pre-program ones
(from a sample mean of 45.4). A back of the envelope calculation suggests that the effect of a
one standard deviation increase in Ghost Buildings program scope on incumbent reelection
probability is on the order of magnitude of i) 6% of the incumbency effect in U.S. House
Elections (Lee (2008)) and ii) the effect of a 5% increase in town government spending in
Brazil municipal elections (Litschig and Morrison (2012)).
We adopt an analogous regression strategy to study the impact of the program on other
measures of election competitiveness as described in Section 1.5. For each of these variables,
we report the speciﬁcation used in Column (6) of Table 1.4. Table 1.5 presents a clear picture.
An increase in ghost building intensity raises the likelihood that the incumbent re-runs, and
decreases competitiveness of the elections. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase
in ghost building intensity reduces the number of candidates by 0.03 standard deviations,
increases the margin of victory by 0.05 standard deviations, though this last result is not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, and reduces the likelihood of a runoff by 15%
of the mean value. This is consistent with the idea that potential entrants in the electoral
competition correctly anticipate stronger incumbent advantage in response to the program.
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341.6.2 Identiﬁcation Validity and Robustness Checks
In this section, we report several auxiliary results that support the validity of our
identiﬁcation strategy. We focus on our main outcome variable: the likelihood of incumbent
reelection.41 Figure ?? presents a placebo version of Figure 1.7. We look only at pre-program
elections and deﬁne a placebo program year in the median year of this restricted sample.
In this exercise, the relation between changes in incumbent reelection likelihood from the
pre- to the post-program periods appears and ghost building intensity is very noisy and, if
anything, negative.
Second, we test whether the inclusion of town-level controls affects our results. Speciﬁ-
cally, we look at three sets of town-level variables that we present in Table 1.1: geographic
features, socio-economic variables, and incumbent mayor characteristics at the time of
the program commencement. We include the interaction between these variables and the
post-program indicator in our regression model (the level is absorbed by the town ﬁxed
effect). If the ﬁndings in Table 1.4 were reﬂecting differential changes in the outcome along
variables correlated to the ghost building intensity, we would expect the coefﬁcient on the
interaction between ghost building intensity and post-program indicator to be substantially
affected by the inclusion of these extra controls. Table 1.6 presents the results of this analysis.
We ﬁnd that the baseline results are very robust to the inclusion of each set of controls both
separately (Columns (2)-(4)) and together (Column (5)).
In Figure ??, we check whether towns with different levels of evasion were on different
trends before the treatment. We report point estimates and conﬁdence intervals on ghost
building intensity for each of the elections pre- and post-program. The ﬁgure shows that,
before the Ghost Buildings program started, the probability of reelection of the incumbent
was independent of tax evasion. None of the pre-program coefﬁcients are either signiﬁcantly
different from zero (the normalized value of the coefﬁcient in the ‚Äú-1‚Äù election, the
omitted group) or signiﬁcantly different from each other. However, after the beginning of
the program there is a statistically and economically signiﬁcant impact. Thus, the coefﬁcient
41We obtain similar results for our auxiliary outcome variables. Results are available on request.
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate between
the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the ratio between the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels). The x-axis
is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in
the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut
the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The
line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model. The placebo subsample of observations used
for this graph only includes election that occurred before the actual program inception. In each town, the year
of the placebo program start is deﬁned as nine years before the actual publication. This roughly divides the
graph sample in two equally sized groups of pre-placebo and post-placebo elections. The domain of the ghost
building intensity is partitioned in 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building
intensity in the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile.
We trim the top 1% of the x-axis values. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The line
plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure 1.8: Difference in reelection rates pre- to post- Placebo Ghost Buildings program
36Table 1.6: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.042 0.850 1.053 1.254 1.096
(0.378) (0.370) (0.410) (0.360) (0.374)
Geographical Controls*Post X X
Socio-Economic Controls*Post X X
Mayor Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected (mean
0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the
election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is deﬁned
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land
registry parcels. Refer to Table 1.1 for a description of the Geographic, Socio-Economic, and Mayor Controls. All
the regressions include town ﬁxed effects, election-year ﬁxed effects and an interaction between macro-areas
ﬁxed effects and Post. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the
incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
pattern in Figure ?? suggests that the common trend assumption holds in our setting.42
Table 1.7 presents several additional robustness checks. Column (1) shows our baseline
speciﬁcation. In Column (2), we show that the results are robust to the inclusion between
regional dummies and post-program indicators. In Column (3), we show that our results
hold if we trim the ghost building intensity at the top 1 percent. If anything, the coefﬁcient
size grows. This suggests that outliers (i.e., cities with an abnormally large fraction of
unregistered buildings) are not driving the results. In Column (4), we check robustness of
the results to dropping small towns with a low number of land registry parcels (we drop
the bottom 10%). One might be concerned that our results are driven by cities with a large
number of non-residents who own a building. If this were the case, mayors would not
pay the electoral cost of enforcing tax evasion. Therefore, we exclude in Column (5) cities
that are classiﬁed as tourist destinations by Ancitel, the Italian Association of Cities.43 The
42Appendix Figure A.1 shows that the parallel trend assumptions hold also for the other political outcome
variables described above.
43Ancitel deﬁnes as tourist destinations those cities with a large percentage of touristic income over the total
city income. As noted by the Italian Association of Real Estate Agents (FIAIP) in their yearly report cities with
touristic activities are usually those with a large number of buildings not owned by residents.
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Figure 1.9: Ghost Building Intensity Coefﬁcient by Election Pre/Post Program
38results are robust to this sample restriction. Column (6) reports an alternative deﬁnition of
the post-program indicator. We instrument the town-level indicator with a binary indicator
that takes value one for the years 2007-2011. This approach treats 2007, the ﬁrst and modal
program start year in the country, as the intended program start year for all the towns. It thus
estimates the Local Average Treatment Effect for those towns that started the program in that
year, which constitutes a different population of compliers relative to the main speciﬁcation.
The coefﬁcient is about one standard-error larger than our baseline speciﬁcation and still
signiﬁcant at 1%. Finally, we report an alternative normalization for our dependent variable.
As the data reported by the Agenzia del Territorio included the number of parcels with
unregistered buildings, we divided this outcome by the total number of land registry parcels
in each municipality in our baseline speciﬁcation. In order to show that this choice does
not affect the result, in Column (7) we estimate our equation using the total number of
buildings recorded in the town as a normalizing factor, rather than the total number of land
registry parcels. We get very similar results. The effect of one standard deviation in this
alternative variable is comparable in magnitude to the one obtained when using our main
ghost building intensity variable.44
1.6.3 Channels
This section elaborates on some of the potential channels through which the anti tax
evasion program could increase voter support for the incumbent. Table 1.8 presents the
results from the estimation of Equation 1.8. This step aims to show that the increase in
tax enforcement induced by the program — the ghost buildings registration — drove the
electoral response.
In Columns (1) and (2), we present the correlation between the registration rate and the
incumbent reelection. We ﬁnd that, controlling for ghost building intensity, a one standard
deviation increase in ghost building registration rate raises reelection likelihood by 1.3
percentage points. The result holds when using both a) the April 2011 registration rate
44Appendix Figure A.2 also shows that the results are robust to changes in the election sample years.
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40with year ﬁxed effects and b) the registration rate reached by the election year computed
as described in Section 1.4. In Column (3), we show that adding the interaction between
town- and mayor-level controls and the post-program indicator does not change the result.
In Column (4), we show that the motivation for the instrumental variable strategy for the
registration rate ﬁnds support in the data: years elapsed since the program start at election
time are a good predictor of the registration rate at that time. In Column (5) we use the
years elapsed since the program start as an instrument for registration rate.45 In the IV
speciﬁcation, a one standard deviation increase in the registration rate (.079) raises the
reelection likelihood by 4 percentage points in post-program elections. In Column (6) we
show that the IV estimate is unchanged when adding town and mayor controls. Finally,
Column (7) shows that an alternative computation of the registration rate imputable to the
incumbent — assuming a constant growth rate of 50% in the registration levels — delivers
similar results.
In Columns (5) and (7), we notice that the IV estimates are larger than the respective OLS
estimates. This is relatively common (see, for example, the returns to schooling literature,
reviewed in Card (2001)), and it can be explained either by OLS attenuation bias due to
measurement error, or by the fact that in the set of cities affected by the IV — that is, cities
where the registration activity depends on program duration — the political returns to
registration might be bigger than in the rest of the cities (i.e., we are estimating a LATE).
Even if our instrument is uncorrelated with any idiosyncratic city-speciﬁc characteristics,
we are not able to rule out the possibility that having the program for longer time has an
independent effect on its impact on the probability of reelection. While we acknowledge
this possibility, we still believe that our instrument does a good job in addressing the main
endogeneity concern for the registration efforts of the mayors (town-speciﬁc characteristics,
such as the mayor’s ability or effort).
45In our IV speciﬁcation we do not control for year ﬁxed effects. Three quarters of the post-program elections
come from cities that started the program in 2007. Thus, we lose statistical signiﬁcance when running this
speciﬁcation, though it is reassuring that the coefﬁcient of interest remains of similar size. Results are available
upon request.
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42We then provide empirical support for two channels affecting the electoral response
to the program. Our simple theoretical framework predicted that this should be higher
in towns where the local government delivers public goods more effectively and where
the non-monetary returns to tax enforcement are higher. We provide evidence about these
hypotheses by estimating Equation 1.9. The coefﬁcient of interest d3 captures the impact
of a standard-deviation increase in the variables measuring either the municipal speed
of public good provision or the tolerance for tax evasion on the electoral response to the
program. Table 1.9 presents the results. In column (1) we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation
increase in the speed of public good provision increases the point estimate of the impact of
ghost buildings on reelection by 0.63, and that this coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at
the ten percent level. We then conﬁrm that this interaction effect does not simply capture
geographical variation in the responsiveness across different parts of Italy by adding triple
interactions across the post-program indicator, the ghost building intensity, and the macro
area dummies. The sign and economic signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient is robust, though
estimated less precisely (p=.137).
We then look at the role of tax culture. We exploit variations across regions in the extent
to which respondents “justify tax cheating” in the European Values Study. These results
provide clear evidence the tax culture matters. In Column (3), we show that a one standard
deviation increase in the tolerance score reduces the point estimate of the impact of ghost
buildings on reelection by .64, (signiﬁcant at the ten percent level). Column (4) shows that
the magnitude of the coefﬁcient is stable, or if anything increases (in absolute value) when
adding the triple interactions with macro-areas dummies. These results provide suggestive
evidence that the positive effect of the Ghost Buildings program on incumbent reelection
likelihood is larger in localities where voters have, on average, stronger preferences for tax
enforcement and where the delivery of public goods is more effective.
Finally, Table 1.10 presents the results of the estimation of the baseline regression model
in Equation 1.7, using the log of town-level government expenditures. Column (1) presents
the reduced-form results, using the post-program indicator based on the provincial mode.
43Table 1.9: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Heterogeneity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.183 1.232 1.063 1.311
(0.394) (0.684) (0.380) (0.668)
...*Speed of Public Good Provision 0.627 0.591
(0.380) (0.398)
...*Justify Tax Cheating -0.639 -0.734
(0.364) (0.404)
GBI*Macro Area*Post No Yes No Yes
Observations 25812 25812 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor
is reelected (mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after
the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province
Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal program inception
year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is deﬁned as the ratio between the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels.
GBI*Macro Area*Post is the triple interaction among macro-areas ﬁxed effect, ghost building
intensity and Post All the regressions include town ﬁxed effects, election-year ﬁxed effects,
interactions between macro-areas ﬁxed effects and Post, and an interaction between the
relevant heterogeneity variable for the column and Post. The regression sample includes
all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face a binding
term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
The point estimate is .436 (signiﬁcant at 10%). The coefﬁcient is stable when instrumenting
the post-program indicator with the provincial one and it is slightly larger when including
interactions among controls and the post-program indicator.46 While the effect of the
program is statistically signiﬁcant, we also note that it is fairly small. A one standard-
deviation increase in ghost-building intensity increases expenditures by about 1%. We
argue that it is unlikely that this effect explains the whole incumbent reelection effect we
documented earlier in the paper. Consistently with the suggestive evidence provided by the
heterogeneity by tax culture, we suggest that non-monetary factors (e.g., the direct utility
non-evaders derive from catching of the shirkers) must play an important role.
46Appendix Figure A.1 shows that government expenditures satisfy the parallel trend assumption, and
pre-program coefﬁcients are not statistically different from zero.
44Table 1.10: Local Government Expenditures
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Ghost Buildings Intensity * Post 0.488 0.607
(0.264) (0.207)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Province 0.436
(0.252)
Extra Controls*Post No No Yes
Observations 74646 74646 74646
The dependent variables is the natural logarithm of town government expenditures.Notes:
Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal
to one if the election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost
Building Intensity is deﬁned as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with
ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. Extra Controls*Post include
Geographic, Socio-Economic, and Mayor Controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table
1.1 for a list of these variables. All the regressions include town ﬁxed effects, election-year
ﬁxed effects and an interaction between macro-areas ﬁxed effects and Post. Standard errors
are clustered at provincial level. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
1.6.4 Alternative Explanations
Finally, we use the entire set of our results to argue that the impact on incumbent
reelection probability arising from the increase in tax enforcement more than offsets several
alternative potential explanations about the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on voter
support for the local incumbent.
According to the ﬁrst of these alternative explanations, the publication of the number
of ghost buildings generates information about the incumbent. We believe this to be both
unlikely and inconsistent with our ﬁndings. First, the set of ghost buildings is a slow moving
stock variable that is likely to have accumulated over decades, rather than a reﬂection of
just the most recent years. Most of the buildings found by the Agenzia del Territorio were
not newly constructed. The existence of a term limit, paired with the fact that the time to
complete a building in Italy is generally longer than most of the other OECD countries,
suggests that most of these buildings could not have been built while the incumbent was in
ofﬁce. Second, we notice that voters who could potentially receive information from the
publication are most likely the ones who were not evading before the program, as evaders
45already knew about their own evasion.
Keeping this premise in mind, our results rule out this alternative explanation. In one
version of this alternative story, voters, after learning about low levels of evasion detected by
the program, reward the current mayor for having properly enforced tax payment in the
past. This hypothesis predicts a negative impact of the detected ghost building intensity on
incumbent reelection in post-program elections, and as such it is obviously inconsistent with
our baseline results. In another version of this alternative explanation, voters reward an
incumbent mayor for having allowed high levels of evasion in the past. First, this contradicts
the intuition that non evaders, rather than those previously evading, are the ones who
are potentially acquiring new information. Second, it is unlikely since the purpose of the
program, and therefore the publication, was to shut down the evasion opportunity. Third, it
is at odds with the fact that the positive impact of program intensity on incumbent reelection
is lower in regions with higher tolerance for tax evasion. Fourth, it is inconsistent with our
results showing that towns with higher registration levels are more likely, rather than less
likely, to reelect an incumbent mayor.
In a second potential alternative explanation, the program gives an incumbent an
electoral rent by allowing her to not register the targeted ghost buildings, for instance
by reporting errors in the results generated by the mapping process.47 If this were the
case, we would expect the positive impact of the program to be stronger in regions with
higher tolerance for tax evasion. We ﬁnd the opposite to be the case. In addition, such an
explanation is inconsistent with the result that a higher share of registered ghost buildings
at the time of a local election increases reelection likelihood. The results of this section
provide strong evidence that it is the additional tax enforcement induced by the program
that drives the increase in the reelection prospects of the incumbent.
47For example, the press agency of one of the mayor of a city in our sample, Capaccio Paestum, explicitly
criticized the “excessive media attention” to the program, indicating how the unregistered buildings in that city
were due to “citizens’ needs” (Comune di Capaccio Paestum, 2010).
461.7 Conclusion
A rapidly growing literature shows that interventions that improve the “technology” of
tax enforcement — third party reporting, cross-checking, or better auditing algorithms — can
substantially reduce tax evasion. Yet, political incentives to adopt these technologies are also
of crucial importance. Policymakers will delay or prevent enforcement policies if they are
bound to lose support from them. In spite of this, little is known about the electoral impact
of ﬁghting tax evasion. This paper provides evidence of a positive interaction between
technological improvements in tax payer monitoring and political incentives. Speciﬁcally,
local incumbents are shown to obtain positive political returns — an increase in their
reelection likelihood — from the Ghost Building program, a nationwide anti tax evasion
policy in Italy which was based on a new enforcement technology.
Underlying tax culture — broadly deﬁned as the individual propensity and social norms
determining evasion for a given level of technology — is another important determinant
of tax compliance. It shapes the enforcement level a government can achieve for a given
enforcement technology. We show that tax culture affects the political returns to undertaking
anti tax evasion policies. The increase in incumbent reelection probabilities in response to
the Ghost Buildings program is larger in areas with lower self-reported tolerance for tax
evasion. Finally, we document that the political returns to enforcement policies are higher
when the government in more efﬁcient in public goods provision.
The ﬁndings of the paper have two important policy implications. First, they provide a
framework for thinking about the political feasibility of policies that increase visibility of
tax evasion, thus lowering the monitoring costs and increasing policymakers’ incentives for
raising enforcement. This has immediate relevance for special interest politics. Concentrated
evader groups might effectively lobby to keep evasion hidden from the public. Yet, they are
unlikely to be able to punish an incumbent who enforces tax compliance after the evasion
becomes broadly visible.
Second, there is potential complementarity among anti tax evasion policies, government
responsiveness, and social preferences for tax compliance. Governments that plan to
47implement novel enforcement policies should concurrently attempt to strengthen their
capabilities, for instance by improving the speed at which they respond to citizen’s needs,
or by increasing social stigma associated with tax evasion. This complementarity will likely
increase the returns politicians obtain from anti tax evasion policies and will thus make
such policies more aligned with political agent incentives.
We are aware that using an identiﬁcation strategy based on a speciﬁc natural experiment
enhances internal validity of our study but might come at the price of lower external validity,
for instance for extrapolating about similar programs in other countries or programs
targeting other taxes. Yet, we speculate that evidence of positive political returns to anti
tax evasion policies in Italy, a country often cited as an example of poor tax culture, will be
a lower bound for other OECD countries. We believe an interesting goal for future work
is to elucidate the potential non-linearity in the relation between tax evasion prevalence
and political returns to enforcement policies. In addition, we believe that complementarity
between enforcement policies and social norms on evasion could potentially be relevant for
policy design in other regions of the world.
Another important dimension of external validity concerns enforcement policies tar-
geting other types of evasion. One of the merits of the Ghost Buildings program is that it
detected the entire stock of evasion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of policies targeting
other tax-concealing activities might vary by the ability of the speciﬁc evader to hide. This
might affect how the public would respond. We hope future work will shed light on the
political returns to other enforcement policies around the world.
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Rural Roads and Intermediated Trade:
Regression Discontinuity Evidence
from Sierra Leone1
2.1 Introduction
In spite of the central relevance of infrastructure in the development policy debate
and in foreign aid, there has been little rigorous research on the role of local infrastructure
investments in developing countries, especially in the context of very poor economies.
Over the last two decades, governments and donors in Sub-Saharan Africa have devoted
considerable resources to rural road construction and rehabilitation, of which a large share
was used to upgrade feeder roads that link up small localities with each other or to larger
roads.2 The rationale behind these investments is that good feeder roads, while expensive,
are central to the integration of markets, primarily because, by reducing transport costs,
1Co-authored with Rachel Glennerster and Tavneet Suri
2Since 2000, major feeder roads rehabilitation programs have been implemented in Cameroon, the DRC,
Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan, among other countries. Carruthers et al. (2010) document
that it would cost about 2% of African GDP every year for ten years to reach some reasonable targets on
improved transportation.
49they improve the access of farmers to markets for their crops. The existing body of research
on the impact of rural feeder roads is plagued by identiﬁcation problems, and usually does
not provide compelling causal evidence on the impact of infrastructure improvement (van
de Walle (2009)).
In addition, the empirical literature on rural roads, for the most part, has not explicitly
dealt with the role of the underlying market structure in shaping the response to these infras-
tructure investments. Agricultural markets throughout Sub-Saharan Africa are characterized
by high levels of fragmentation and poor transport infrastructure, with intermediaries
playing a central role (Fafchamps et al. (2004)). Different models of trader competition and
intermediation generate different predictions about the price response to an improvement in
rural road quality and how this response varies with market characteristics. The empirical
analysis of these price responses can therefore provide a test for competing theoretical
frameworks of the market structure in agricultural trade. Understanding which of these
theoretical frameworks best explains the nature of competition amongst these agricultural
intermediaries can shed light on the impact of other supply chain interventions, such as
subsidies to different agents of the value chain or exporting promotion policies.
In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence on the
impact of rural road rehabilitation on transport costs and rural market prices. We focus
on a speciﬁc program in Sierra Leone where the road selection algorithm allows us to
use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), and we use novel data collection strategies
to measure changes in prices and transport costs. Sierra Leone is an economy with low
population density where feeder roads could potentially have large impacts. Rural markets
in the economy are not well integrated, and farmers and traders both travel long distances to
engage in trade. Transaction costs are extremely high but transport costs are only a part of
these transaction costs. These characteristics are common to many rural African economies
(Fafchamps and Hill (2008), Fafchamps et al (2004)) and other developing countries (World
Bank, 2009). As feeder roads are commonly advocated as a key policy intervention in these
contexts, our ﬁrst objective is to understand their impact. Well identiﬁed measures of feeder
50road impacts are particularly important given the high costs of effectively connecting such
dispersed populations.
As a second contribution, we use our empirical results to test between alternative models
of competition in agricultural markets. We focus on Bertrand oligopsony, bilateral bargaining,
Cournot oligopsony (with and without endogenous entry), and a basic Mortensen (2003)
search model. For each of these frameworks, we derive the equilibrium price in rural markets
and provide comparative statics on the price effects of a change in rural road transport costs.
We then show how this price effect varies by market characteristics, such as the distance
to the main urban centers and the agricultural productivity in the surrounding areas. To
the extent that the four classes of models deliver different predictions on these comparative
statics, we can use our empirical results to test between these models. It is an open question
as to what the relevant model of market structure for traders in agriculture is in developing
economies. As we describe below, market structure is important to understanding what
policies are most effective at improving market access and, more broadly, welfare for farmers
in Sub Saharan Africa.
Our empirical analysis focuses on a feeder road rehabilitation program in Sierra Leone
that was ﬁnanced by the European Union (EU) and implemented in four districts that
cover 27% of the country’s area and 30% of its population.3 Sierra Leone’s infrastructure
is extremely poor: in 2002, at the end of a decade-long civil war, only 8% of the country’s
11,300 km of roads were paved. Agriculture is the country’s largest employer, with 64% of
households farming, of which 87% produce rice, the main staple. The infrastructure network
is generally described as inadequate to support well-integrated agricultural markets.4
The project targeted local dirt feeder roads, measuring 20 km on average, linking local
markets to villages or to a more important road. They did not connect major cities in
different parts of the country together. To structure the use of its funds, the EU created a
priority ranking for each of 47 eligible roads based on an index of quantitative economic
3Sierra Leone National Census (2004).
4See the Agricultural Household Tracking Survey (AHTS) Report (2011) and Pushak and Foster (2011).
51data. The highest-ranked roads were chosen in order until at least as close to a total of 150
km of roads had been assigned to each district. A total of 31 roads were ultimately selected.
This method of fund allocation allows us to use a road-level RDD to study the impacts of
the feeder road improvements.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, the rehabilitation program
did improve road quality on the roads selected. Using data on transport fares and GIS
video stream data collected on the roads, we show that transport costs fell signiﬁcantly.
Second, from trader surveys and monthly price surveys, we ﬁnd that an improvement in
rural road quality leads to a reduction in the prices of rice and cassava (the two main staples
produced domestically) in rural markets along the rehabilitated roads.5 Third, we ﬁnd that
this price reduction is stronger in markets that are farther away from main urban centers
and is weaker in markets that are located in more productive areas.
Which of the standard classes of models best explains these ﬁndings? We look across a set
of simple models which assume the city is a small open economy, traders are homogeneous
and their transport costs are linear. In these models, rural roads can potentially affect
transport costs for both buyers traveling from urban areas (primarily traders) and sellers
(farmers) since both travel to rural marketplaces. In our analysis, we refer to the impact
of the rural road rehabilitation on urban traders as the “demand effect”, and the effect on
producers as the “supply effect", with the former driving up prices in rural markets, and
the latter driving them down. The relative importance of these two effects varies across
the theoretical frameworks we present. In particular, both the Bertrand framework and
the Cournot model with endogenous entry predict that reduced transport costs should be
associated unambiguously with increases in prices in rural markets (i.e. the demand effect
always dominates). However, this is inconsistent with our empirical ﬁndings - we ﬁnd that
improvements in road quality that reduce transport costs on average reduce prices. On the
other hand, the remaining frameworks (bilateral bargaining, Cournot with an exogenous
5Rural markets in our sample are medium-sized marketplaces in which several crops are traded (rice,
cassava, palm oil in particular). In Section 2.3 we describe in detail our sampling strategy for markets and
traders within markets.
52number of traders, and the search frictions framework) predict a role for both demand and
supply effects.
Second, the models have different predictions regarding the heterogeneity in the price
effect of reduced rural transports costs along two dimensions: (i) the distance between
the rural markets and major urban areas, and (ii) farmer productivity. Both the bilateral
bargaining model6 and the Cournot oligopsony case with an exogenous number of traders
predict that market characteristics have no impacts on these price effects, which is incon-
sistent with our results. On the other hand, a basic Mortensen search framework predicts
that the interactions of the price effect with distance and productivity are non-zero because
the magnitude of both the demand and the supply effect varies with these two market
characteristics. Speciﬁcally, for the markets that are further away, or the markets in areas
with lower productivity, the relevance of search costs in determining equilibrium prices is
higher. In turn, this implies that the negative price effects of the improved roads should be
stronger for these sets of markets. Overall, our empirical results are consistent only with a
search framework and inconsistent with other models.
In support of this conclusion, we provide further evidence on search costs using data on
cell phone penetration. We ﬁnd that our price effects are muted in areas where there is better
cell phone penetration, which is what one would expect in the presence of search costs.
In particular, we expect that cell phone penetration lowers search frictions. Therefore, the
prices responses in areas with higher cell phone penetration will be closer to the Bertrand
case, i.e. less negative or even positive. We ﬁnd evidence of this, consistent with the ﬁndings
in Allen (2012), Aker (2010) and Jensen (2007).
These results have important policy-implications. First, the impact of improved road in-
frastructure varies by the characteristics of the road’s location. Features such as productivity
and linkages between urban consumers and traders can affect not just the magnitude of rural
market price responses, but also their sign. This implies that the beneﬁts of improvements
6The bilateral bargaining model represents the case where a given producer is locked into a relationship
with one particular trader. It can also be interpreted as a model with search costs approaching inﬁnity, so that
producers have no outside option, outside of the existing relationship.
53in infrastructure are heterogeneous, which is important for policy makers when deciding
where to make such improvements. As in Suri (2011), where the returns to agricultural
technologies are heterogeneous and some of this heterogeneity arises from differences in
access to the rural road infrastructure network, returns to different road projects will vary
sharply with underlying farmer heterogeneity. Second, the ﬁnding that agricultural inter-
mediary markets in this setting are best characterized by a framework that includes search
frictions has implications for other policies designed to inﬂuence agents in the agricultural
value chain. These policies include price subsidies, agricultural export promotion inter-
ventions, credit-provision policies targeting traders, and more major road projects. Third,
the empirical evidence in support of the presence of search frictions suggests a possible
complementarity between hard infrastructure projects and other interventions aimed at
reducing search costs, such as the introduction of marketing boards or the extension of
mobile phone coverage in rural areas (for example, mobile phone penetration rates are only
36% in Sierra Leone (World Development Indicators, 2012)).
This paper’s ﬁndings are consistent with recent empirical evidence on search frictions
(see, for example, Jensen (2007), Aker (2010) and Goyal (2010)). While these studies focus
on the price impact of a reduction in information frictions, we show that the response to
improved transport infrastructure also depends on the presence of search frictions. From
this standpoint, our approach is similar to that of Allen (2012) who shows that, in the
presence of search costs, the elasticity of trade ﬂows to destination prices depends on
supply parameters, such as producer heterogeneity. In addition, our work draws from
three other strands of literature. First, a small but inﬂuential set of papers has used
rigorous identiﬁcation strategies to shed light on the impact of large transport infrastructure
improvements (examples include Michaels (2008), Donaldson (2012), Datta (2012), Faber
(2012) and Banerjee, Duﬂo and Qian (2012)). We look at rural roads and not highways
- van de Walle (2009) provides a good review of the literature on rural roads.7 Second,
7Examples include Jacoby and Minten (2008), Dorosh et al. (2010), Gibson and Rozelle (2003), Ali (2011),
Khandker, Bakht and Koolwal (2009), Khandker and Koolwal (2011), and Mu and van de Walle (2007).
54a recent growing literature uses micro-data to estimate the degree of price pass-through
internationally and domestically.8 Third, our theory focus is motivated by the recent
emphasis on trade intermediation (for example, Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Tsumagari
(2012), Antràs and Costinot (2011)). In particular, we rely heavily on Chau, Goto and Kanbur
(2009) in our theoretical setup and in the way we model search frictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we outline the theoretical
frameworks and derive the comparative statics of interest. Section 2.3 describes some
background on Sierra Leone, the EU road rehabilitation program and the data sources.
Section 2.4 outlines the empirical strategy and tests the validity of the RDD for our setting.
Section 2.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis, including a comparison of our
results with the theoretical predictions of the different models of competition and results
from a variety of robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Frameworks
In this section, we present four different theories of trade intermediation between
agricultural producers and traders. Traders play a central role in the rural economies of Sub-
Saharan African by channeling product between crop-producing areas in the countryside
and the consumers living in urban areas (Fafchamps et al. (2004)). We focus on rural
markets where traders purchase and sell a number of different crops. Traders are mostly
small scale, traveling from one market to another before transporting crops to the capital
city. We describe these traders in more detail below.
We focus on four broad classes of theoretical models, representing different market
structures: Bertrand competition, bilateral Nash bargaining, Cournot oligopsony (both with
and without endogenous entry) and search frictions à la Mortensen (2003). The Bertrand case
and the search frictions case, as well as the theoretical setup, are based on Chau, Goto and
Kanbur (2009). We adapt their framework in three directions to ﬁt our research questions.
8See, for example, Broda and Weinstein (2008), Burstein and Jaimovich (2009), Gopinath et al. (2011), Borraz
et al (2012) and Atkin and Donaldson (2012).
55First, we explicitly model the role of rural roads in linking producers and traders to rural
market places. Second, we introduce a productivity parameter that varies across villages.
Third, we model two additional cases: a speciﬁc case of bilateral bargaining between traders
and producers and the case of Cournot competition (with and without endogenous entry).
The primary goal is to derive key comparative statics to be tested in our empirical
framework. We focus speciﬁcally on the price effects of an improvement in rural road
infrastructure, and on the heterogeneity in this effect across market characteristics.
2.2.1 Setup
We model the transactions that occur between traders and rural agricultural pro-
ducers in rural markets to which both types of agents travel.9 We make two important
simplifying assumptions here. The ﬁrst is that traders are homogeneous - this seems to be a
reasonable interpretation of our data. For example, 97% of traders are male, 88% are from
two main ethnic groups, 65% have no education, 86% are married, 96% report that they
started trading on their own, 62% own a mobile phone, 96% own a radio and only 19 traders
of local rice own their own mode of transport (motorbike, car or truck - unfortunately the
survey did not distinguish between these). The second assumption we make is that utility is
linear: both farmers and traders maximize their (expected) proﬁts.
Around each market, there is an exogenous number of producers, N, who produce
s units of a certain crop. The opportunity cost of each unit (for instance the utility from
consuming each unit) is c. In order to reach the local market, rural producers use rural roads
to travel distance a. The unit transport cost on the rural road, t, is therefore the inverse of a
measure of road quality. When road quality improves, the unit transport cost on the road
decreases.
City traders travel to the local market to purchase the crop which they can then sell in
9Throughout, we use the term producers to refer to either farmers or “aggregators", where aggregators
refer to larger farmers who aggregate product from other farmers in a village to bring it to the market to sell.
The theoretical models we present below all hold whether it is farmers themselves that come to the market or
aggregators.
56the urban areas at an exogenous price p. The exogeneity of the city price p is based on
the intuition that the city receives the crop from many different markets across the country.
Each market is thus a small open economy and changes in the transport costs between a
given village and the surrounding urban areas are assumed not to affect the city price or
prices in other rural markets. In order to reach the market, the traders bear two types of
transport costs: ﬁrst, a “major road" transport cost, x, and second, a rural road cost bt. The
“net city price" is thus p   x   bt. Throughout, we assume this form of linear transport
costs as well as a separation between the major road and the rural road transport costs for
the trader. The linearity seems a natural assumption for the transport costs since the main
form of transport for traders is renting motorbikes, which price a fare per distance travelled.
The market for transport along these roads (major and rural) is reasonably competitive.
Very few traders actually own a mode of transport - in our trader data only 19 traders
owned any form of transport. There is therefore little scope for a (discrete) investment
that simultaneously affects transport costs on both the main road and the rural road. In
addition, the improvement in the rural roads due to the EU program causes a reduction in
transport costs but not a big enough reduction to allow traders to invest in their own mode
of transport. Finally, this assumption is consistent with Fafchamps et al (2004) who ﬁnd that
there are no returns to scale at this level of traders.
We denote the (endogenous) sale price in the rural market by p. In addition to city
traders, we assume that farmers can sell to local consumers (non-farming rural households)
at cost-recovery price p0 = c + at. Throughout the paper, we assume there are gains from
trade, that is: p   x   bt > c + at. The assumption that there are gains to trade implies
that there is no extensive margin effect of changes in t on traders or producers entering the
market.
Below, we discuss equilibrium prices under four alternative market structures. For each
of these, we are interested in three comparative statics:
1. The equilibrium price change in response to a change in rural road transport costs:
¶p
¶t
2. Heterogeneity in this price response by the distance travelled on the major road, x:
57¶2p
¶t¶x
3. Heterogeneity in this price response by market-level productivity, s:
¶2p
¶t¶s
2.2.2 Bertrand Oligopsony
Bertrand competition is characterized by free entry of city traders into each village
and perfect information. This implies that all the producers are matched to city traders and
that competition drives up the equilibrium price, pB to equalize the net city price:
pB = p   x   bt (2.1)
It is easy to see that producers appropriate all the gains from trade. Looking at the
predictions of the Bertrand model with regards to the three comparative statics of interest,
we obtain:
1.
¶pB
¶t =  b < 0: rural road transport costs enter the equilibrium price only via their
effect on traders’ transport costs.
2.
¶2pB
¶t¶x = 0: as the trader cost function is separable between the rural road and the major
road costs, the price response to rural road costs is not affected by the major road
transport costs.
3.
¶2pB
¶t¶s = 0: productivity, or any other supply characteristic, does not affect the equi-
librium price, and hence does not affect the price response to a reduction in rural
transport costs.
2.2.3 Bilateral Bargaining with Lock In
We now present a simple model of prices under a speciﬁc model of bilateral bargain-
ing in which each producer can only trade with one speciﬁc trader, with an outside option
limited to the cost-recovery price c + at. In this scenario, the transactions equilibrium price,
pN, is assumed to be the generalized Nash-Bargaining solution:
58pN = argmax
p f[s(p   x   bt   p)]g  [s(p   c   at)]1 gg
= g(c + at) + (1  g)(p   x   bt),
(2.2)
where s(p   x   bt   p) is the trader’s surplus, s(p   c   at) is the producer’s surplus,
and g is the bargaining weight for the trader. The Bertrand outcome is a special case of the
Nash Bargaining solution for g = 0. In addition, the bilateral bargaining setup implies that,
in the presence of a positive surplus from trade, all the producers are matched to traders.
The model delivers the following predictions with regards to our three key comparative
statics:
1.
¶pN
¶t = ga   (1  g)b ? 0: with positive a and b, rural road transport costs now enter
prices through their effect both on producers’ and on traders’ costs. The former drives
down prices (what we term the supply effect), while the latter raises prices (what we
term the demand effect).
2.
¶2pN
¶t¶x = 0, as in the Bertrand case.
3.
¶2pN
¶t¶s = 0: the amount transacted, s, does not affect how the price responds to a change
in t, even though s does enter the equilibrium price.
2.2.4 Cournot Oligopsony
The third framework we present is one of Cournot competition. Here, we introduce
an additional assumption to generate an upward sloping supply curve. We assume that the
parameter a (the distance travelled by the producer on the rural feeder road) is a random
variable uniformly distributed over [a   z,a + z]. Producers sell in the market only if the
equilibrium price p is larger than their reservation price: p > c + at. This extensive margin
on selling generates an upward sloping supply curve as only a share F(
p c
t ) =
(p c)/t (a z)
2z
of producers enters the market, where F() is the cdf of the uniform distribution.10
10We also studied the case where farmers are heterogeneous in the opportunity cost, c, instead of being
heterogeneous in the parameter a. Since all the comparative statics for this case collapse to the Bertrand case,
we do not report it here.
59We study two versions of the Cournot model. First, we look at the case with an
exogenous number of traders operating in the market, M. Second, we endogenize the
number of entrants using a free entry condition, where we assume entrants have a ﬁxed
cost of entry K.
We focus on symmetric equilibria. With an exogenous number of traders, each trader
chooses his optimal quantity given other traders’ quantities which enter the proﬁt functions
through the (inverse) supply curve. After imposing symmetry, the equilibrium price, pC is
pC =
c + t(a   z) + M(p   x   bt)
1+ M
(2.3)
The Cournot model with exogenous entry delivers the following results with regards to
our comparative statics of interest:
1.
¶pC
¶t =
a z Mb
1+M ? 0: both the supply and the demand effect of a change in t enter the
derivative of price with respect to transport costs.
2.
¶2pC
¶t¶x = 0: while x shifts the net city price, it does not interact with t in determining the
equilibrium price.
3.
¶2pC
¶t¶s = 0: s does not enter the solution for the equilibrium price, pC.
We now extend the basic Cournot model above to allow for endogenous trader entry.
By equating individual proﬁts with the cost of entry, we ﬁnd the equilibrium number of
traders operating in the economy and then derive the corresponding equilibrium price, pCE:
pCE = p   x   bt  
r
2tK
Nzs
, (2.4)
The comparative statics of interest are now:
1.
¶pCE
¶t =  b  
q
K
2tNzs < 0: t affects pCE through its impact on both demand and
supply. The demand effect operates though b, as before. However, the reduction
in aggregate supply generates a more than proportional reduction in the number
of traders entering the economy. As a result, the price reduction in response to an
increase in t is stronger than in the benchmark Bertrand case. Intuitively, an increase
60in t has two effects. First, it reduces the “net city price", p   x   bt. All else equal,
this leads traders to reduce p. Second, it reduces the elasticity of supply, Q =
sN(p c)
t .
All else equal, this induces traders to increase the mark down, thereby contributing
further to a decrease in price.
2.
¶2pCE
¶t¶x = 0: terms that only enter the net city price do not interact with transport costs
in determining the equilibrium price.
3.
¶2pCE
¶t¶s =
p
K
2s
p
2rNzs > 0: by increasing aggregate supply, s reduces the role of ﬁxed costs
in determining the equilibrium price. An economy with a higher productivity will
be closer to the perfectly competitive case relative to one with a lower s. Thus, an
increase in s implies a smaller in absolute value (i.e. closer to  b) price response to
an increase in t since the impact of t on the elasticity of supply is lower.
Summarizing these results, the Cournot model with exogenous entry cannot be distin-
guished from the bilateral bargaining model based solely on the sign of the comparative
statics. On the other hand, the version with endogenous entry delivers a unique set of
predictions relative to the previous models.
2.2.5 Search Frictions
We now introduce search frictions in the model economy. Empirically, we think
search costs may arise from two potential mechanisms. A ﬁrst potential mechanism for
search costs is that these markets are difﬁcult to reach. Farmers and traders often travel on
motorbikes to these markets and although transport is available, the timing is uncertain.
This generates some search frictions as farmers and traders may not end up in a given rural
market at the same time. There may therefore be waiting costs as well as uncertainty of
what will be available in the market by the time the trader gets there. This is the type of
search cost considered in Fafchamps and Hill (2008).
Second, farmers develop relationships with traders over time. There is a lot of evidence
for such contracts both in Sierra Leone (see Casaburi and Reed (2012) for an example) as
61well as in other developing countries (see Deb and Suri (2012)). These relationships operate
as search frictions in the sense that there are switching costs for farmers to shift across
traders and this can generate market power for the traders. This is one explanation given
by Fafchamps and Minten (2011) as to why a price information intervention did not have
impacts on prices in India. These relational contracts may exist to enforce quality standards
(see Bardhan, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2012)) or due to the existence of trade credit as in
the case of Casaburi and Reed (2012). The existence of such relationships between farmers
and traders would generate search frictions of the sort we model here.
To construct our model, we closely follow Chau, Goto, and Kanbur (2009) and we refer
readers to their paper for detailed derivations of the results. Their paper is in turn based on
the static search framework derived by Mortensen (2003), which provides the key results. We
choose a static framework to facilitate the introduction of search frictions in the previously
described setup.
The interactions between traders and producers now occur in three stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, traders decide whether to enter a certain market. If they enter, they incur an entry
cost, K, which includes bargaining time, travel ﬁxed costs, waiting time and uncertainty. In
the second stage, traders who entered the market choose a price offer. Due to the search
frictions, only one random producer receives the offer. In the third stage, producers take
up the best offer among those received. For a large enough market, the distribution of
offers received by each producer follows a Poisson with mean l  M/N, where M is the
endogenous number of traders entering the market:
Pr(z;l) = e llz
z!
(2.5)
Thus, the cumulative distribution of the highest price offer received by each producer, or
equivalently, from the trader’s perspective, the probability of outbidding the second-best
offer is:
H(p) =
¥
å
z=0
Pr(z;l)F(p)z = exp(1  F(p)) (2.6)
where F(p) is the endogenous cdf of price offers made by the traders.
62The trader’s expected proﬁt maximization implies that no symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium exists. Rather, traders follow a mixed strategy where prices are in the support
[pl, ph], given by:
[c + at,(1  e l)(p   x   bt) + e l(c + at)] (2.7)
and are drawn according to distribution:
F(p) =
1
l
ln

p   x   bt   c   at
p   x   bt   p

(2.8)
Each price in the support leads to an equal expected proﬁt. The free entry condition can
therefore be written as E[p(pl)] = K, which allows us to solve for the equilibrium ratio of
traders to producers, l:
l = ln

p   x   bt   c   at
K/s

(2.9)
We substitute l into the optimal trader’s price offer distribution, F(p), in (8) and solve
for both the expected price for farmers conditional on receiving at least one offer from
traders and for the unconditional expected price, pS. The latter can be written as:
pS = p   x   bt  
K
s

1+ ln(p   x   bt   c   at)   ln

K
s

(2.10)
We focus on the comparative statics from this expected unconditional price equilibrium.
The model delivers the following predictions with respect to our three comparative statics:
1.
¶pS
¶t =  b

1 
(K/s)
p x br c at

+
(K/s)a
p x bt c at ? 0, where the ﬁrst term represents the
demand effect, and the second the supply effect, of a change in transport costs. The
magnitude of the demand effect is lower in absolute value than the demand effect
in the Bertrand case: traders’ market power induced by search frictions implies an
imperfect pass-through of traders’ cost shocks.
2.
¶2pS
¶t¶x =
K(a+b)
s(p x bt c at)2 > 0: in locations that are farther away for the city, a lower
net price induces lower entry, more monopsony power and stronger deviations from
the Bertrand benchmark. Thus, if x is higher, the (negative) price effect of a higher
transport cost for traders is weaker and the (positive) price effect of a higher transport
63cost for producers is stronger.
3.
¶2pS
¶t¶s =  
K(a+b)
s2(p x bt c at) < 0: intuitively, an increase in s lowers the “real" entry cost
K/s, bringing the economy closer to the benchmark competitive Bertrand case. A
higher s therefore moves the equilibrium both toward a stronger (negative) demand
effect and toward a weaker (positive) supply effect of an increase in t.
2.2.6 Summary of Theoretical Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results from the models presented in this section. With
regard to our comparative statics of interest, the models can be differentiated easily in two
ways. First, some models predict that a decrease in t will unambiguously lead to higher
equilibrium prices, while others predict an ambiguous effect. This is due to the fact that
a change in t can induce either a demand effect alone, or both a demand and a supply
effect. Second, the Cournot model with exogenous entry and the search friction frameworks
are the only models predicting that the magnitude of the price response will depend on
the market-speciﬁc features, x and s. In section 2.5, we compare these predictions to our
empirical results. In addition, we will test whether these price effects vary by cell phone
penetration, something we may expect in a world with search frictions.
2.3 Background and Data Sources
2.3.1 The EU Rural Feeder Roads Rehabilitation program
Background and Implementation
The EU feeder roads rehabilitation program was designed to contribute to the
reconstruction of Sierra Leone’s infrastructure in the aftermath of a destructive civil war
(1991-2002). The EU’s program was implemented between 2009 to 2011 at a total cost of EUR
9.5 million (USD 13 million) - approximately EUR 16,000 per kilometer of rehabilitated road.
The program targeted four districts in three different provinces: Kambia and Port Loko
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65(Northern Province), Kenema (Eastern Province) and Pujehun (Southern Province). The
roads in the rehabilitation program primarily connected small towns and markets to one
another or to a major road, rather than linking big cities and regions to one another. Because
these feeder roads do not dramatically alter access to population centers, they are unlikely
to modify migration patterns in the areas surrounding the rehabilitated roads. The roads
are also unlikely to affect agricultural technology adoption because improved technologies
such as fertilizer and improved seeds are rarely available even in urban centers, as reﬂected
in extremely low baseline rates of technology adoption.11 Rehabilitation work began in
mid-2009 and ended by early 2011 for all the roads. In the ﬁnal construction progress report,
dated August 2011, 25 of the 31 roads selected for rehabilitation were described as fully
rehabilitated and 6 roads as partially rehabilitated.12
Program Design
The rehabilitation program was designed in a way that allows for a road-level
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) analysis. In 2003, ﬁeld investigations with local
stakeholders led to the identiﬁcation of a base list of 47 rural roads eligible for rehabilitation,
totaling about 800 km. The task of prioritizing 600 kilometers of roads for rehabilitation
from amongst this larger sample was given to an external consultant, Edward Davies &
Associates (EDA). EDA (2004) provides extensive details of the prioritization process that
was used to decide which of these roads would be rehabilitated. The roads were ranked
according to a score, which was a weighted average of ﬁve components:
11Roughly 5% of farmers use fertilizer nationally (AHTS (2011)) and much of this use is centered around
the capital Freetown and the national agricultural research station. In separate work, Suri (2011) found that
deﬁcient infrastructure and differential access to good infrastructure were among the reasons explaining low
technology adoption rates in Kenya. In our context, the small size of the roads considered makes it reasonable
to assume that the supply of agricultural technology from the main urban centers to the countryside did not
dramatically increase as a result of the program.
12The average completion rate for the six roads partially rehabilitated was 64%. This percentage does not
reﬂect the fraction of the total length of the road that had been rehabilitated. Instead, it illustrates what fraction
of the planned improvements were completed on the road i.e. the average completion across all speciﬁcations of
the work - in many cases, improvements were implemented along the entire length of the road, but not all the
planned improvements were fully completed.
66i) Economic Production per kilometer, deﬁned on the basis of survey measures of the
volume of crops produced, income from economic activities and mode of transportation;
ii) Population per kilometer within the area of inﬂuence of each road;
iii) Road Assessment, a 1 to 5 score measuring the pre-existing condition of the selected
roads, based on seven parameters (culverts, bridges, drainage, pavement surface, vertical
alignment, horizontal alignment, and riding quality);
iv) Social Value, a 1 to 5 score, based on the number of schools, health centers, wells
and toilets in the catchment area of the road;
v) Length.
The data on these components was compiled by EDA. Each component of the score
was normalized by its district-level maximum value. The ﬁnal weighted sum of each of the
ﬁve components had weights of 0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1 and 0.1 for components (i) to (v) above,
respectively.13 The decision rule was that, in each district, roads would be rehabilitated
starting with the highest-priority one (based on the score), following in order of decreasing
score until as close to 150 km of road as possible was allocated to be rehabilitated in each
district. Since th roads could not be split to get exactly 150 km, this means that in some
districts slightly over 150 km of road was rehabilitated, and in some districts just under 150
km was rehabilitated. Following this rule, 30 roads out of the eligible 47 should have been
selected across the four districts. Figure ?? presents maps of the priority roads in the initial
list across the four districts, as well as the connections between these roads and the major
roads in the country.
After collecting data from the EU, EDA, and the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) to
verify that the RDD had been followed, we found evidence of two potential manipulations
that occurred around the cutoff. In the district of Kenema, the ﬁnal list of roads rehabilitated
covered 184 km, while selecting one less road would have brought the total rehabilitated in
this district to 153 km, closer to the approximate desired cutoff of 150 km. One additional
road was therefore rehabilitated although it was not supposed to be. We treat this as a fuzzy
13Appendix B.1 provides the exact formula used to compute the score.
67Figure 2.1: District Maps of Sierra Leone
68RDD where the additional treated road is allocated to the control group. In Kambia District,
two roads had the same score and were ranked exactly at the cutoff point. Only one of the
two roads was rehabilitated to reach the appropriate total, but no rules were established for
how roads should be selected in the case of a tie. In this case, we drop the two roads from
our baseline speciﬁcations, though we check the robustness of our results to their inclusion.
We discuss the implications of these issues for our identiﬁcation strategy in more detail in
Section 4 below.
2.3.2 Data
This section provides an overview of the data used in our empirical framework,
ordered chronologically by collection date.
Baseline Roads Data (2003-2004)
To construct the scoring index, EDA collected data around all 47 eligible roads before
any rehabilitation began. We use this data to check for baseline differences between the
roads above and below the cutoff in our RDD framework. We include all ﬁve components
of the score, as well as a number of road characteristics, such as the number of bridges,
palmlog bridges14 and culverts,15 data for which was provided by the EU. Table 2.2 shows
summary statistics on the baseline condition of the roads considered for rehabilitation. The
average length of the roads was 21 km. In this table we also report the average rescaled
score, which is the value of the index created by the EU, rescaled so that zero is the selection
cutoff score between the ﬁrst road below and the ﬁrst road above in each district.
14A palmlog bridge is a makeshift bridge made from logs of palm trees. Regular cars are usually unable to
cross such bridges, but four-wheel drive vehicles and motorbikes often can, although at times with considerable
risk. During the rainy season, palmlog bridges get ﬂooded, making the wood rot and sometimes causing the
entire bridge to collapse.
15A culvert is a pipe or a drain that lets water ﬂow below a road. Culverts are much smaller than bridges
and are often used to create crossings over small waterways or as a way to improve drainage in locations where
rainy seasons are extremely intense (as they are in Sierra Leone).
69Table 2.2: Baseline Summary Statistics
Mean SD Obs
EA-Level 2004 Census Data
Proportion farming (all individuals over 10 years) 0.68 0.36 1373
Proportion farming (all households) 0.78 0.32 1373
Proportion literate (all individuals over 12 years) 0.31 0.19 1374
Years of education (HH heads) 2.86 2.26 1369
Roads Baseline Data
Log population per km 6.53 0.93 45
Log economic production per km 18.60 1.01 45
Road assessment 17.24 3.81 45
Social value 9.56 2.15 45
Number of bridges (excluding palm logs) 3.21 4.07 45
Number of palm log crossings 2.80 5.01 45
Number of culverts 18.29 17.05 45
Road length (km) 20.61 14.72 45
Score rescaled at midpoint 0.08 0.17 45
Chiefdom-Level AHTS Data
Proportion of HHs selling rice 0.20 0.13 34
Proportion of HHs selling cassava 0.37 0.20 34
Log HH rice harvest (kg) 6.15 0.51 34
Log HH cassava harvest (kg) 7.18 0.53 34
Roads Endline: First Stage
Total travel fare (one way) 16100 12085 45
Travel fare per km (one way) 900 558 45
Average speed (kph) 36.26 10.42 44
Trader Data
Local rice purchase price 774.84 90.08 149
Local rice sale price 931.14 105.46 118
Market-Level Price Survey Data
Price of cassava/gari 339.71 99.92 787
Price of local rice 996.51 143.06 764
Cassava/gari available (proportion of mkts) 0.95 0.21 918
Local rice available (proportion of mkts) 0.84 0.37 918
Number of traders per market (cassava/gari) 9.37 11.31 918
Number of traders per market (local rice) 9.05 9.90 918
Log distance (km) to nearest large town 2.60 1.40 78
Note: All prices are in SLL (Sierra Leonean Leones). The relevant exchange rate was approximately $1=4300
SLL. Total travel fare is for a motorbike ride along the entire distance of the road. Outliers (top 1% of
observations) are removed from price data. All prices are in cups unless otherwise indicated. Conversion
rates are approximately 4 (5) cups of rice (cassava) per kg.
70National Population Census (2004)
To test our RDD assumptions, we use data from the last population census conducted
in Sierra Leone, which was completed in 2004. From the census data, our variables of interest
are the fraction of households involved in crop farming, the fraction of individuals over ten
years old involved in crop farming, the literacy rate and the years of education completed
by household heads.
Agricultural Households Tracking Survey (2010)
To identify areas of high productivity or high surplus for different crops, we use
measures of agricultural production at the road level, computed from the Agricultural
Households Tracking Survey (AHTS). The AHTS was a nationally representative agricultural
survey conducted in March-April 2010 with a sample of 8,803 farming households. Since
the AHTS was potentially administered concurrently with the implementation of the EU
program, we do not use it as baseline data. Instead we only use the household-level data to
compute measures of local production around the markets for rice and cassava. We also use
measures of the fractions of households selling rice and cassava as well as household cell
phone ownership. We compute chiefdom-level averages, as discussed in more detail below.
Endline Roads Data (2011)
We designed novel GIS data collection strategies to verify whether the roads had
indeed been rehabilitated, and to collect objective measures of transport costs. First, we
drove a sport utility vehicle with a geo-referenced camera secured to the hood along each
road. This exercise was completed for 46 out of the 47 eligible roads in November 2011.16
The camera recorded the GPS position and speed of the vehicle every second, as well as
collected a continuous stream of video along all roads. In the analysis presented below, we
use average speed on the roads traveled as one of our outcomes of interest.
16One road was missed as part of this exercise because it could not be located. The road is 2.6 km long and
was not selected for rehabilitation.
71In another effort to gather evidence of the impact of the roads on transport, we collected
data on transport fares along all 47 roads. We negotiated with motorbike taxi riders (locally
known as okadas) for a route fare on every road,17 and travelled with the okada on a random
subset of these roads. Okadas are the most commonly available type of public transportation
in rural Sierra Leone, for both people and goods, and unlike buses they can travel on most
roads all year round. These data give us a measure of actual transport costs and freight
rates on the sample of roads in the study.
We show summary statistics on these transport variables in Table 2.2. The average speed
on the roads was about 21 km per hour and the motorbike fare was an average of 16,000
Leones per road ($3.72). Since the roads are of different lengths we report the fare per km
travelled, which is about 900 Leones ($0.21) per km.
Trader Surveys (2011-2012)
To understand the effects of these road improvements on prices, we use data from
two waves of a nationwide survey targeting rice traders in rural markets. The ﬁrst wave,
conducted in February/March 2011, targeted all the markets located within ﬁve kilometers
of the 35 roads that were closest to the rehabilitation threshold in each of the four districts.
In addition, random sampling of the remaining markets located in the rest of the country
led to a sample of 54 markets located within 11 kilometers of the 47 roads. The second
wave, conducted in January/February 2012, included the universe of markets (82) located
within 11 kilometers of any of the 47 roads, including the 54 markets sampled for the ﬁrst
wave.18 Within each market, we ﬁrst listed all traders of local rice, then randomly sampled
two traders to participate in the survey (or surveyed the unique trader when only one trader
was present).
17This exercise was designed so that the surveyor bargaining with the taxi was the residual claimant.
18The threshold of 11km was deﬁned before the second wave of the survey to maximize the number of
markets surveyed under tight survey budget constraints. Within our sampling frame of markets, 54 were located
within 5 kilometers of the nearest road, 78 were located within 10 kilometers, and 86 within 11 kilometers.
Out of the 86 markets visited, 4 had no rice trader at the time of the survey, leading to the ﬁnal number of 82
markets.
72Table 2.2 shows summary statistics from these trader surveys. Sale prices from traders’
most recent sales transactions are presented for local rice, but not for cassava, which was
not covered by this particular survey. We report prices in cups, as this is the standard unit
across all our price data.19 The trader surveys were conducted during the harvest season
(February/March), a period when local rice is plentiful and the price of local rice is lower
than its annual average.
The GPS coordinates of the markets are used to compute as-the-crow-ﬂies distances
between rural markets and larger towns or urban centers in Sierra Leone. We deﬁne a large
town to be either one of the six largest towns in the country based on the 2004 census (these
towns were Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu, Waterloo and Lunsar, with a median
population across these towns of 81,000 individuals) or any district headquarter town across
all the 13 districts in the country. This gives us a total of 14 unique large towns, however,
our markets only match to a subset of nine of those towns.
High Frequency Price Surveys (2011-2012)
Finally, between May 2011 and July 2012, we targeted the markets included in the
trader survey sample to collect monthly price data via phone surveys. We think of the
prices collected as the average price in the market for that month. The respondents were
individuals identiﬁed as focal points for the markets during the data collection of the trader
surveys. The number of markets for which we sought monthly pricing data increased after
the tenth wave of calls to include the 28 additional markets targeted by the second wave of
the trader survey. We focus on two main crops in our analysis of the high frequency data:
local rice and a common type of processed cassava known locally as gari.20 Table 2 shows
summary statistics on the prices of these two crops, again reported in cups. The price of a
19There are roughly four cups of local rice per kilogram. Two varieties of local rice are sold by traders -
parboiled and milled. These varieties are nearly identical to each other. We averaged these prices to obtain one
local rice price.
20Gari is a form of processed cassava similar in aspect to kuskus or bulghur, common throughout most of
West Africa. Gari is obtained from peeling and grating cassava tubers often using manual equipment.
73cup of gari is about 340 Leones ($0.08) and that of a cup of rice about 1,000 Leones ($0.23).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
The design of the EU program allows us to use an RDD21 to identify the causal effect
of rural road rehabilitation on transport costs and rural market prices.22 We have a small
number of clusters for the RDD, though a large number of observations, especially when
using the high frequency price survey data. This RDD therefore resembles the geographic
or boundary RDD studies (for example, see Dell (2010)). Later, we also conduct a number of
robustness checks to deal with the limitations on the number of clusters.
In what follows, we describe the identiﬁcation problem using the standard Rubin
(1974) potential outcomes framework. Deﬁne yi(1) as the potential outcome for road
i when the matched road is rehabilitated by the EU program and yi(0) when it is not
rehabilitated. Then the (sub) population parameter of interest is D = E[yi(1)   yi(0)],
the average treatment effect (ATE). The basic identiﬁcation problem arises because the
econometrician only observes the realized outcome based on the actual rehabilitation status
Ti of the road:
yi = Ti  yi(1) + (1  Ti)  yi(0) (2.11)
An OLS framework would lead to an inconsistent estimate of D in the presence of
unobservable covariates that are correlated both with the outcome and with the rehabilitation
21We refer the reader to Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for extensive reviews of the
RDD.
22Our main outcomes of interest are measured either at the road level (transport costs) or at the market level
(market prices). In addition, since we do not have baseline (pre-intervention) data for market prices, we use
instead road level data collected from household surveys in Enumeration Area (EAs) around the project roads
during the 2004 Census. We also use Chiefdom level data collected from an agricultural household survey for
the heterogeneous treatment effects analysis. For the sake of clarity, in this section we only refer to our outcomes
as being road-level or market-level. However, the reader should bear in mind that some of the variables used
for baseline checks were actually collected at the household level and appropriately aggregated.
74status. With multiple rounds of data, a difference-in-difference estimator would be biased
if changes in the rehabilitation status are correlated with changes in other unobservable
variables.23
Our RDD relies on the comparison between roads “just above" and roads “just below”
the rehabilitation cutoff. In the case of perfect correspondence between the rehabilitation
plan and the actual rehabilitation status, this empirical strategy would identify the average
treatment effect (ATE) around the cutoff. This ATE is local in the sense that results around
the treatment effect at the cutoff cannot be generalized to other points in the domain of the
forcing variable. In the context of this study, we argue that our empirical design identiﬁes the
marginal effect of a program expansion, which is a policy relevant local average treatment
effect.
We deﬁne SN
i as the road score, normalized to zero at the mid-point between the ﬁrst
road below the cutoff and the ﬁrst road above the cutoff.24 Our empirical analysis starts
with a graphical approach. For each of the variables of interest, we plot the bin level means
of the outcome and include a linear ﬁt of all the underlying data. We restrict the graphs to
be within our chosen main speciﬁcation bandwidth (see below) so that the graphs are easily
comparable to the parametric results. For the parametric estimation, we restrict our attention
to roads that are “close" to the cutoff, i.e. the sample of roads whose score is within h points
from the cutoff (SN 2 [ h,h]). We use one main bandwidth as our preferred speciﬁcation,
h = 0.15, which delivers a subsample of 31 roads. This bandwidth of h = 0.15 is close to
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) optimal bandwidth across a range of our outcomes at
the road-level. As Lee and Lemieux (2010) mention, optimal bandwidth algorithms may
suggest bandwidths that are larger than the rule of thumbs used by many researchers. Since
we have a small sample size, we choose the optimal IK bandwidth as our main speciﬁcation.
We also report results in our main tables for two additional bandwidths, (h = 0.075 and
23Studies using a differences-in-differences approach include Ali (2011), Bakht, Khandker and Koolwal (2009),
Khandker and Koolwal (2011), Bell and van Dillen (2012), and Mu and Van de Walle (2007)).
24Our results are similar if we normalize the cutoff to be at the ﬁrst treated road in each district. These
results are available upon request.
75h = 0.3) which span half and double the preferred bandwidth, and deliver subsamples of 18
and 38 roads, respectively. For our transport cost variables, where our outcomes are at the
road level, we do not report results for the h = 0.075 bandiwdth as these speciﬁcations only
have 18 observations and are therefore not particularly meaningful.
For the preferred bandwidth and the two alternatives, we run a local-linear regression of
the form:
yik = g0 + gTi + gRTi  SN
i + gL(1  Ti)  SN
i + dk + eik (2.12)
where yik is a road-level outcome, i denotes the road and k the district. We control for
district ﬁxed effects in the road level speciﬁcations and present heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors.
For market-level outcomes (prices), the regression model is:
yijkt = g0 + gTi + gRTi  SN
i + gL(1  Ti)  SN
i + dk + mt + eijkt (2.13)
where i denotes the road that the market is close to, j is the market, k is the district (we
control for both the district in which the road is located as well as for the district the market
is in, if different) and t is the survey round. For the trader survey, our regressions are at the
trader level and we have multiple traders per market.
In addition to the local-linear regressions, we use the full sample of 47 roads and include
a third-order polynomial approximation in SN
i . We use third order polynomials though we
also show robustness to this.
When running the market-level regressions, we adjust our standard errors for two way
clustering, allowing for clustering at the road level as well as at the market level. This is
important since some markets match to multiple roads. There are 82 unique markets in
our surveys. On average, we have about 6 markets matching to each road. Approximately
48% of markets match to just one road. The others match to two or more roads, with the
average being about 2.8 roads per market. We also weight the regressions by the inverse of
the distance between the road and the market in question.
76We look not only at the treatment effects of the improved roads but also the heterogeneity
in these effects along four speciﬁc dimensions: distance between the market and the closest
town, harvest of the relevant crop (rice or cassava), the fraction of households selling the
relevant crop and cell phone penetration. For the heterogeneity analysis we use a dummy
variable for whether the market is above the median value for the relevant variable. We
therefore report results from these speciﬁcations as well as speciﬁcations where we control
for these heterogeneity variables.
2.4.2 Testing the Validity of the Identiﬁcation Strategy
The above RDD relies on the assumption that there is no manipulation of the theo-
retical rehabilitation status around the threshold. One potential challenge to identiﬁcation
therefore comes from the following two compliance issues brieﬂy discussed in Section 2.3.1:
1. In Kenema district, there is a discrepancy between the rehabilitation plan and the
actual status - an additional road was treated. This implies that the average treatment
effect of the actual rehabilitation status cannot be estimated. Instead, we present the
(local) Intent-To-Treat (ITT) estimator.25
2. In Kambia district, the same score was assigned to two roads, but only one road was
rehabilitated without a clear rule for the event of a tie break. To complicate matters,
across the whole sample, these are the two roads closest to the cutoff on either side,
giving them the highest weight in a classic RDD. Since we lack a clear ranking protocol
for this speciﬁc case, we present results after dropping these two roads from the
sample.26
In addition, we adopt two standard strategies to test for the presence of manipulation.
First, we test for discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable (McCrary (2008)). Second,
25LATE results are available on request.
26This is akin to the recent donut RDD (see, for example, Barreca et al. (2011)). Notice that we include these
roads in one of the robustness checks later in Section 2.5.2.
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Figure 2.2: McCrary (2008) Density Test
we inspect whether baseline covariates show discontinuities around the score cuttoff. Figure
?? presents the results of the McCrary test.27 The observed discontinuity is well within the
conﬁdence interval. In addition, if anything, the jump is downward while any manipulation
would predict a jump upward. Finally, given the low number of observations at the extreme
values or tails, the density is not well estimated at these tails. Our density test is, therefore,
likely to have low power.
The analysis of covariate balance at the cutoff relies on three data sources. For a subset
of variables (the most relevant ones), we also show graphical results. Table 2.3 focuses on
variables collected by the EU as part of their baseline assessment of the roads and directly
entering the scoring index. We look at just the population per km graphically - see Figure
??. Both the ﬁgure and Table 2.3 show no signiﬁcant discontinuity at the cutoff (only one
27For our test we use a binsize of 0.025 and a bandwidth of 0.15. Our estimate of discontinuity at the cutoff
is -0.325 with a standard error of 0.684.
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Figure 2.3: Baseline Analysis
coefﬁcient of the twenty is signiﬁcant).
Table 2.4 presents other baseline characteristics of the roads, including variables collected
by EDA during the prioritization process that do not enter the score, and the agricultural and
education variables collected during the 2004 Census. Unfortunately, the census has limited
agricultural information but we present results for the available variables - the fraction
of households involved in agriculture, the fraction of individuals involved in agriculture,
literacy and education of the household head. We keep EAs within 2 km of the roads and
we aggregate the data to the road level for these tests. We also graphically show results for
the fraction of individuals in farming and the education of the household head in Figure ??.
Neither the ﬁgures nor the regressions show evidence of discontinuities at the cutoff - in
Table 2.4, none of the 28 coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant.
79Table 2.3: Pre-Rehabilitation Analysis: Score Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population Production Road Social Value Road Length
per km per km Assessment
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment -0.537 0.342 -0.072 -1.008 15.694
[0.409] [0.328] [2.264] [1.599] [17.433]
Mean for Control 5.977 17.863 17.143 8.857 23.199
Observations 31 31 31 31 31
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment -1.578 0.006 2.897 -0.229 11.099
[0.430] [0.553] [3.310] [3.038] [28.657]
Mean for Control 5.958 17.681 18.667 9.444 22.943
Observations 18 18 18 18 18
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment -0.213 0.232 1.641 -0.457 4.988
[0.314] [0.223] [1.644] [1.137] [10.770]
Mean for Control 5.967 17.902 17.067 8.733 22.306
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment -0.789 0.085 0.862 -1.065 24.238
[0.530] [0.488] [2.929] [2.356] [23.118]
Mean for Control 5.935 17.889 16.750 8.750 21.074
Observations 45 45 45 45 45
Note: Road assessment is a 1-5 score assigned by EDA that measures the pre-existing condition of the
selected road based on seven parameters (culverts, bridges, drainage, pavement surface, vertical/
horizontal alignment, and riding quality).
Social value is a 1-5 score assigned by EDA based on the conditions of schools, health centers,
wells and toilets in the catchment area of the road.
LLR is short for local linear regression.
All speciﬁcations include district ﬁxed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in brackets.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
80Table 2.4: Pre-Rehabilitation Analysis: Road Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Number of Number of Prop of Prop of Literate HH Head
Bridges Palmlog Culverts HHs Crop Indiv Crop HH Head Years of
Bridges Farming Farming Dummy Education
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment 2.801 -2.242 4.647 -0.036 0.003 0.040 0.284
[5.263] [4.466] [11.778] [0.097] [0.125] [0.059] [0.582]
Mean for Control 3.857 4.552 15.430 0.880 0.794 0.239 2.056
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment 0.578 -5.051 -9.375 0.100 0.190 -0.059 -0.249
[11.257] [4.421] [9.420] [0.136] [0.172] [0.067] [0.694]
Mean for Control 4.778 3.525 14.336 0.890 0.790 0.240 2.008
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment 0.130 -3.645 2.613 -0.003 0.001 0.033 0.212
[3.499] [3.427] [8.724] [0.070] [0.090] [0.039] [0.398]
Mean for Control 3.800 4.248 15.735 0.886 0.804 0.238 2.035
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment 2.287 3.863 -0.263 -0.065 -0.001 0.038 0.640
[7.704] [6.487] [15.785] [0.149] [0.185] [0.090] [0.880]
Mean for Control 3.563 3.983 15.001 0.890 0.810 0.237 2.021
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Note: Columns (4)-(7) based on 2004 Census data. A culvert is a pipe or drain allowing water to ﬂow
under a road.LLR is short for local linear regression. All speciﬁcations include district ﬁxed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
81In Table 2.5, we focus on the variables used for the heterogeneity analysis. This includes
four variables collected during the AHTS in early 2010 as proxies of s, the distance from
the market to the closest urban town (as a proxy for x in the heterogeneity analysis) and a
measure of cell phone penetration, also from the AHTS. As proxies of s, we use the average
rice and cassava harvests per household and the fractions of households selling rice and
cassava.28 Although these variables were not collected at baseline in the strict sense, the
harvest variables can be considered predetermined as the relevant farmer decisions (such as
acreage planted and input use) were made the previous year, prior to any road rehabilitation.
Because harvest data may be noisy, we also look at the extensive margin sale choice as a
proxy for s. Since the majority of the population relies on subsistence farming for the staple
crops, the share of producers who enter the market economy is a reasonable measure of
the average surplus of rice. As a measure of cell phone penetration, we use the fraction of
households that own a cell phone. We use chiefdom-level averages of the agricultural and
ell phone variables for the chiefdom in which a given market is located. Chiefdom-level
data are less subject to endogeneity concerns since the roads typically considered affect a
small fraction of the population of each chiefdom.29
Table 2.5 reports the results. In general, we do not ﬁnd much evidence of discontinuities
in these variables. For three of the six variables, one speciﬁcation shows an effect that is
both economically and statistically signiﬁcant (for example, in the tight bandwidth linear
speciﬁcation, the fraction of households selling cassava is more than 50% lower in the
treatment group than in the control group). The polynomial speciﬁcation is responsible for
two of the three problematic coefﬁcients. Due to the small sample size in these cells, we
think that the polynomial is not a good approximation to the data as it overﬁts leading to
an overestimate of the magnitude of the coefﬁcients. Graphically, Figure ?? shows results
for the fraction of households selling rice with little evidence of a discontinuity.
28For this table, we use the continuous version of these variables. In the heterogeneity analysis, we use
dummies for whether the value of the variable is above or below the median, as described later in the paper.
29Chiefdoms are the third-level administrative unit in Sierra Leone, coming after provinces and districts.
There are 149 chiefdoms throughout the country.
82Table 2.5: Pre-Rehabilitation Analysis: Farming Activity and Harvests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Market Chiefdom Chiefdom Log Rice Log Cassava Chiefdom
Distance to Frac of HHs Frac of HHs Harvest Harvest Phone
Big Town Selling Rice Selling Cassava Access
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment -0.518 -0.031 -0.063 -0.005 0.166 -0.062
[0.341] [0.027] [0.061] [0.168] [0.112] [0.054]
Mean for Control 9.707 0.218 0.389 6.197 7.307 0.353
Observations 104 65 65 65 65 65
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment -0.670 0.007 -0.256 -0.197 0.060 -0.059
[0.623] [0.054] [0.067] [0.219] [0.280] [0.104]
Mean for Control 9.857 0.223 0.405 6.202 7.253 0.360
Observations 64 41 41 41 41 41
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment -0.702 -0.027 -0.016 -0.040 0.081 -0.029
[0.365] [0.021] [0.045] [0.157] [0.103] [0.033]
Mean for Control 9.707 0.218 0.389 6.197 7.307 0.353
Observations 129 77 77 77 77 77
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment -2.292 -0.018 -0.165 -0.727 -0.314 -0.066
[1.058] [0.036] [0.168] [0.285] [0.322] [0.091]
Mean for Control 9.707 0.218 0.389 6.197 7.307 0.353
Observations 156 91 91 91 91 91
Note: All data is from the 2010 AHTS.
Distance data (km) is at the market-road level. Harvest data (kg) is at the chiefdom-road level.
LLR is short for local linear regression.
All speciﬁcations include road-district and market-district ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors two-way clustered by road and market reported in brackets in column (1).
Standard errors two-way clustered by road and chiefdom reported in brackets in columns (2)-(5).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
832.5 Results
We now discuss our empirical results. We ﬁrst present estimates of the effects of the
road improvements on transport costs and speed, and then for the comparative statics for
rural market prices that we derived in Section 2.2. The comparative statics presented in
the theory section focus on a change in crop prices with respect to a change in t, the rural
transport costs. The empirical results are for an improvement in road quality that reduces
rural transport costs.
2.5.1 Speed and Transport Costs
Figure ?? presents a graphical analysis of the impact of the program on our two
primary measures of transport costs: travel speed and (log) travel fares per km. As
mentioned above, for the graphs, we show the data within the main bandwidth, h = 0.15 -
we show bin level means for the data and a linear ﬁt of all the data. Table 2.6 shows the
results from the parametric regressions on these variables according to the speciﬁcations
outlined in Section 2.4. However, the results from the h = 0.075 bandwidth for these road
level outcomes are not meaningful as the sample size is too small and given the number of
controls for the RDD speciﬁcation, we are left with too few degrees of freedom. Looking
at the impact of road quality improvements on speed, the bin means show a jump at the
discontinuity (see Figure ??), but the ﬂexible polynomial speciﬁcation is driven up at the
left of the discontinuity. This is due to the fact that the last road on the left of the cutoff
was rehabilitated even though it should not have been. The parametric analysis in Table 4
conﬁrms this intuition: the wide (h = 0.3) bandwidth local linear speciﬁcations point at an
increase in speed across the cutoff. The results are also robust to the inclusion of controls
we later use for the heterogeneity analysis. The polynomial is less robust, but is likely to be
overﬁtting the data. The discontinuity in transport fares is visible (though noisy) in Figure
?? and in Table 2.6: an improvement in road quality has a signiﬁcantly negative impact
on fares. In the local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth (h = 0.15), the road
improvements lead to a 59% reduction in transport costs per km.
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The scatter represents bin−level means of the outcome (bin size is .025).
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Figure 2.4: Transport Costs Analysis: Motorbike Fares and Road Speed
85Table 2.6: Transport Costs Analysis: Motorbike Fares and Road Speed
Average Speed (kph) Log Fare/km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment 12.085 12.769 -0.594 -0.610
[5.345] [5.282] [0.236] [0.203]
Mean for Control 26.196 26.196 6.729 6.729
Heterogeneity Controls X X
Observations 31 31 31 31
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment 16.122 16.350 -0.149 -0.178
[4.881] [4.704] [0.214] [0.215]
Mean for Control 26.732 26.732 6.789 6.789
Heterogeneity Controls X X
Observations 38 37 38 37
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment -4.274 -3.674 -0.836 -0.980
[8.509] [8.498] [0.325] [0.419]
Mean for Control 26.732 26.732 6.805 6.805
Heterogeneity Controls X X
Observations 44 43 45 44
Note: Fares are one-way motorbike fares in SLL (Sierra Leonean Leones).
The relevant exchange rate was roughly $1=4300 SLL.
Average speed measured in kilometers per hour along the entire road.
Heterogeneity controls include cassava/rice sales indicators/harvests
measured for EAs within 2km of the roads.
LLR is short for local linear regression.
All speciﬁcations include district ﬁxed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in brackets.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
862.5.2 Rural Market Prices
Basic Price Effects
We now look at the effect of the road improvements on crop prices. First, we relate
our empirical approach to the theoretical framework above. The impact of rural road
rehabilitation corresponds to the ﬁrst comparative static of interest we presented in Section
2.2,
¶pS
¶t , in Table 1. Since the theoretical models derive predictions with respect to transport
costs (not road quality), a negative
¶pS
¶t implies that improvements in road quality have a
positive effect on prices, and vice versa. If our empirical results are consistent with any
given model, the sign of our regression coefﬁcients should be the opposite of the theoretical
predictions.
Our price results focus on the two main staple crops produced domestically, rice and
cassava. In our data, rice and cassava are available 85% and 96% of the time, respectively,
and both crops are sold in all markets at some point during the year. Before looking at
prices, we ﬁrst analyze the effects of the road improvement program on the extensive margin
of crop availability in markets. The RDD treatment effect on availability of local rice is
-0.10 with a standard error of 0.07. For cassava, the effect is -0.04 with a standard error of
0.06 (detailed results available upon request). We interpret this as evidence that market
availability on the extensive margin was not different across treatment and control roads,
although we do not have data on quantities traded that would allow us to further test this.
Figure ?? and Table 2.7 (columns (1) and (2)) show that road rehabilitation leads to a
substantial reduction in the price of rice in the trader data. The graphical analysis shows a
discontinuity in the price of rice at the cutoff. The price decrease is signiﬁcant across all
speciﬁcations (columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.7). In the rice price data from the high frequency
surveys, evidence for a treatment effect in the form of a price reduction is much weaker (see
Figure ?? and Table 2.7, columns (3)-(4)). While still negative in the tight bandwidth, the
point estimates in these regressions are much smaller and mostly not signiﬁcant. The results
for rice from the high frequency data are different to those in the trader survey. One reason
for this may be the difference in timing of the two surveys. The trader survey is conducted
876
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Figure 2.5: Trader Survey: Log Price of Local Rice
just after harvest, while the high frequency surveys are collected every month. We do not
have enough sample size to look at just the harvest period in the high frequency data as
we only have one year (hence one harvest season) of data. For cassava there is no speciﬁc
harvest season. Cassava can remain in the ground for multiple seasons, can be harvested
any time and is usually only harvested for immediate consumption or sale (it has to be
processed immediately it is harvested).
Figure ?? and Table 2.7 (columns (5) and (6)) show price effects for cassava, based on the
monthly price surveys only as the trader surveys did not cover cassava. Table 2.7 shows a
large price drop in cassava. In the optimal bandwidth speciﬁcation (top panel in column
(5)), the road rehabilitation signiﬁcantly reduces prices of cassava by 17.8%. This result is
robust to different bandwidths, a polynomial speciﬁcation, and to the inclusion of controls.
The effect on cassava prices is larger than the effect on rice prices. We expect this to be the
886
.
8
6
.
8
5
6
.
9
6
.
9
5
7
L
o
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
r
i
c
e
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Scoring Index
The solid line is a linear fit of the data at the road−market level.
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Figure 2.6: High Frequency Price Survey: Log Price of Local Rice
89Table 2.7: Effects on Prices from Trader and High Frequency Surveys
Log Local Rice Price Log Local Rice Price Log Cassava Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment -0.116 -0.105 0.006 0.005 -0.178 -0.141
[0.058] [0.029] [0.029] [0.016] [0.086] [0.058]
Mean for Control 6.831 6.831 6.889 6.889 5.703 5.703
Heterogeneity Controls X X X
Observations 190 188 896 883 918 906
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment -0.178 -0.174 -0.030 -0.059 -0.227 -0.254
[0.066] [0.047] [0.048] [0.027] [0.125] [0.074]
Mean for Control 6.843 6.843 6.887 6.887 5.728 5.728
Heterogeneity Controls X X X
Observations 124 122 599 586 595 583
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment -0.074 -0.069 0.005 -0.004 -0.159 -0.099
[0.045] [0.031] [0.021] [0.021] [0.089] [0.052]
Mean for Control 6.831 6.831 6.889 6.889 5.703 5.703
Heterogeneity Controls X X X
Observations 237 233 1099 1073 1112 1088
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment -0.165 -0.168 -0.000 -0.058 -0.403 -0.341
[0.058] [0.044] [0.055] [0.052] [0.170] [0.063]
Mean for Control 6.831 6.831 6.889 6.889 5.703 5.703
Heterogeneity Controls X X X
Observations 298 292 1314 1275 1338 1302
Note: Annual trader data (cols (1)-(2)); monthly high frequency price data (cols (3)-(6)). All prices in SLL
(Sierra Leonean Leones) per cup. Heterogeneity controls include log distance to the nearest major town,
and rice and cassava sales fractions and harvest amount medians. LLR is short for local linear regression.
All speciﬁcations include round, road-district, and market-district ﬁxed effects. Standard errors two-way
clustered by road and market reported in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 2.7: High Frequency Price Survey: Log Price of Cassava (Gari)
case as cassava is usually processed at the market site rather than on the farm,30 and raw
cassava is more expensive to transport than unprocessed (husk or threshed) rice.31 Hence,
cassava prices should be more responsive to changes in road infrastructure.
In summary, Table 2.7 provides evidence of price reductions for both rice and cassava in
response to the road improvements. We interpret this as evidence that the improvements in
infrastructure have primarily facilitated access to rural markets for producers, as opposed to
30In the AHTS (2011), only 2% of households and 8% of villages reported being equipped with at least one
cassava grater; 0.05% of households and 8% of villages were equipped with a mechanized rice mill.
31We do not have accurate data on the transport cost of unprocessed cassava. However, raw cassava tubers
are more voluminous, and hence more expensive, holding volume constant to transport than most other crops.
In addition the processing rate to transform raw cassava into gari is low: 1 unit of unprocessed cassava yields
0.36 units of gari based on the AHTS (2011) data, while the typical milling rate for rice is 0.5. In other words,
producers must transport larger volumes of raw cassava than rice to the marketplace to sell the same volume of
the processed crop.
91reducing transport costs on rural roads for traders. More formally, using the notation from
our theoretical setup, these results imply that, in our sample, a > b, which is consistent
with the qualitative evidence that, on average, city traders’ transport costs are primarily
determined by the quality of the major roads, as opposed to rural roads. In our earlier
terminology, the supply effect prevails over the demand effect. This importance of the
supply effect (versus the demand effect) is inconsistent with a basic model of Bertrand
competition. In the Bertrand framework, a change in transport costs affects the equilibrium
price only through b, the costs for the trader. Similarly, the Cournot case with endogenous
entry predicts that a reduction in transport costs would unambiguously increase prices.
These predictions are not borne out in the empirics.
Heterogeneous Price Effects
We now focus on the heterogeneity in these price responses to the road improvements.
The sign of the heterogeneity in these effects can shed light on the underlying market
structure and allow us to empirically test between different classes of models. Using insights
from the theory, our analysis of heterogeneous effects focuses on two market characteristics:
the distance between the rural market and the closest urban center (the variable x in the
theory) and crop-speciﬁc productivity around the markets (the variable s in the theory). We
proxy the latter with Chiefdom level measures of havests and sales. For this analysis, we
work with dummy variables that indicate whether a certain market is above or below the
median value of each of our heterogeneity variables. Using these binary indicators allows
us to present the results in an intuitive way and to quantify the economic magnitude of the
interactions easily.
In Table 2.8 (columns (1) and (2)), we present our heterogeneity analysis of price effects
for based on the distance between markets and the nearest large town. The price reductions
induced by road quality improvements are always stronger (i.e., more negative) for markets
that are further away from large towns. The sign of the interaction term of treatment and
the dummy indicating the market is far from urban centers is negative and statistically
92signiﬁcant in all four speciﬁcations for rice, and all but the wide-bandwidth local linear
regression for cassava. By contrast, the sign of the treatment coefﬁcient is always positive,
and signiﬁcant in all cases for rice, but never for cassava. Based on this hypothesis, we also
report one-sided p-values on the treatment interaction coefﬁcient in each panel, all eight of
which are signiﬁcant at the 10% level (and seven are signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Next, we examine the heterogeneous impacts on crop prices by the chiefdom-level
average household harvest as a proxy for productivity (columns (3) and (4)). For rice, we ﬁnd
that the treatment effect is negative in low-productivity areas, and in fact positive in the high-
productivity areas, indicating a stronger demand effect in these areas. With respect to rice,
the coefﬁcient of treatment interacted with high-productivity areas is statistically signiﬁcant
in the optimal and tight bandwidths, but not signiﬁcant in the other two speciﬁcations. We
ﬁnd similar results for cassava, with a strongly negative treatment effect in low-productivity
markets (signiﬁcant in the tight bandwidth and polynomial speciﬁcations) and a coefﬁcient
that is positive and statistically different from zero in two speciﬁcations in the high-harvest
areas. The one-sided p values are signiﬁcant in four of the eight speciﬁcations.
In columns (5) and (6), we present evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity by our
second proxy of farmer productivity, the share of farmers selling any of their harvest. The
price reduction induced by the improvements in road quality is signiﬁcantly weaker in
markets with a higher density of sellers. For rice, in markets with a high density of sellers,
the price effects are positive. For both crops, the difference in the percentage effect is
economically sizable, although it is larger for cassava. The signiﬁcance of the interaction
term, as well as the one-sided p-values, indicate that the effects across low and high seller
density markets are signiﬁcantly different from each other for all speciﬁcations for cassava,
and all except the wide-bandwidth speciﬁcation for rice.
Summarizing these results, we ﬁnd evidence that market-speciﬁc characteristics, both on
the demand side (distance from major market centers) and on the supply side (productivity),
signiﬁcantly affect the magnitude and the direction of the price effects of improvements in
rural road infrastructure. Turning to the models presented in Section 2.2, these ﬁndings
93Table 2.8: Heterogeneity by Access to Towns, Agricultural Production and Density of Rice Sellers Near Roads
Distance Harvest Seller Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rice Log Cassava Log Rice Log Cassava Log Rice Log Cassava
Price Price Price Price Price Price
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment 0.085 0.002 -0.022 -0.115 -0.040 -0.275
[0.024] [0.033] [0.036] [0.071] [0.040] [0.108]
Treat * Above Median -0.162 -0.345 0.065 0.064 0.095 0.236
[0.047] [0.104] [0.039] [0.080] [0.039] [0.113]
One-sided p-value 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.212 0.008 0.018
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703
Observations 896 918 883 906 883 906
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment 0.107 0.051 -0.138 -0.404 -0.121 -0.476
[0.040] [0.068] [0.070] [0.178] [0.072] [0.115]
Treat * Above Median -0.210 -0.535 0.178 0.410 0.176 0.490
[0.073] [0.129] [0.076] [0.188] [0.078] [0.132]
One-sided p-value 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.000
Mean for Control 6.887 5.728 6.887 5.728 6.887 5.728
Observations 599 595 586 583 586 583
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment 0.072 0.002 -0.008 -0.254 -0.007 -0.278
[0.022] [0.023] [0.036] [0.185] [0.034] [0.102]
Treat * Above Median -0.128 -0.186 0.019 0.219 0.040 0.308
[0.037] [0.136] [0.040] [0.191] [0.037] [0.117]
One-sided p-value 0.000 0.086 0.318 0.126 0.136 0.004
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703
Observations 1099 1112 1073 1088 1073 1088
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment 0.135 0.107 -0.053 -0.362 -0.138 -0.584
[0.055] [0.075] [0.065] [0.095] [0.033] [0.101]
Treat * Above Median -0.242 -0.552 0.065 0.420 0.205 0.556
[0.092] [0.089] [0.063] [0.134] [0.049] [0.123]
One-sided p-value 0.004 0.000 0.151 0.001 0.000 0.000
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703 6.889 5.703
Observations 1314 1338 1275 1302 1275 1302
Note: All data is from high frequency price surveys. All prices in SLL (Sierra Leonean Leones) per cup. LLR
is short for local linear regression. All speciﬁcations include round, road-district, and market-district ﬁxed
effects. One sided p-values are calculated on the interaction term (>0 for distance, <0 for harvest and seller
density). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all narrow bandwidth (h=.075) regressions. Standard
errors two-way clustered by road and market for cassava price regressions, except the h=.075 speciﬁcation.
For rice price (distance heterogeneity) regressions, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as there
are too few clusters to allow for two-way clustering. Standard one-way clustering at either the road level or
market level produces standard errors that are uniformly smaller than those reported. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
94are inconsistent with the bilateral bargaining framework and the Cournot model with
an exogenous number of traders.32 In the bilateral bargaining setting, the productivity
parameter affects the size of the surplus but does not affect the optimal solution to the
bargaining problem. In addition, the distance between the rural market and the urban
center, x, affects the outside option of the city-traders but does not affect the impact of rural
road quality on the bargaining solution. The Cournot model with an exogenous number
of traders also predicts that neither x nor s affect the price derivative with respect to rural
transport costs.
Our empirical ﬁndings are therefore only consistent with a model with search frictions,
as formalized by Chau, Goto and Kanbur (2009). In this framework, a reduction in rural
road transport costs has both demand and supply effects on prices. It also predicts that more
isolated markets have lower entry and hence more imperfect pass-through and that markets
with higher producer productivity have lower real search frictions and hence stronger
demand effects. We ﬁnd evidence of both forms of heterogeneity and in the directions
predicted by a search framework.
Additional Evidence in Support of Search Costs
To look more directly at search costs, we present additional results that make use of
data on cell phone access. To measure access to cell phones, we use the average cell phone
ownership in the Chiefdom in which the market is located. As with the earlier heterogeneity
results, we use a dummy for whether the market has below or above median cell phone
ownership. The intuition here is to test whether there is heterogeneity in our price effects
by this measure of cell phone penetration. Cell phones would allow farmers and traders
to gather information in prices, to coordinate on times to meet, and to generally explore
outside options more easily. Therefore, we expect that higher cell phone prevalence would
be associated with lower search costs and hence that our price effects would be muted or
32The Bertrand model and the Cournot model with an endogenous number of traders were ruled out on the
basis of our main price effects in Table 2.7.
95less negative in areas with better cell phone penetration.
These results are reported in Table 2.9. As a framework with search costs would predict,
we ﬁnd that the price effects are less negative (and in some cases even positive) in areas
with better cell phone penetration, since the coefﬁcients on the interaction are positive. We
ﬁnd this across speciﬁcations for cassava prices but less robustly across speciﬁcations for
rice prices.
Robustness Checks
Given our small sample size and empirical design, we report three different sets of
robustness checks on our main results: alternative speciﬁcations, alternative samples, and a
small sample correction. We report all robustness check results for the main price effects in
Table 2.10 (both with and without the heterogeneity controls) and for the heterogeneous
effects in Table 2.11.
In Panel A of Tables 2.10 and 2.11, we present results from three additional speciﬁcations:
(i) one that controls for second-order polynomials in the score, (ii) one that uses a triangle
weight in the local linear regression (i.e., a weight that places less emphasis on observations
further from the cutoff), and (iii) one that uses continuous heterogeneity variables (reported
only in Table 9) instead of the ‘greater than median’ dummies we use in Table 2.8. As Panel
A in each of Tables 2.10 and 2.11 shows, our main results are robust to these alternative
speciﬁcations. In some cases we lose precision in our estimates, but the coefﬁcients do not
change signiﬁcantly.
With respect to alternative samples, we present results from four additional speciﬁcations:
(i) one that includes the two roads at the cutoff in Kambia District, (ii) one that restricts the
sample to the closest market to each road and therefore has no weights, (iii) one that restricts
the sample to markets within 5km of each road and does not weight by the market-distance
to the road, (iv) one that excludes markets that are in more urban areas, and (v) one that
excludes markets that match to more than four roads. Once again, looking at Panel B in
Tables 8 and 9, we see that our results are robust across all these alternative samples though
96Table 2.9: Heterogeneity by Mobile Phone Penetration
(1) (2)
Log Rice Price Log Cassava Price
Preferred LLR (h=.15)
Treatment -0.038 -0.233
[0.033] [0.091]
Treat * Above Median 0.084 0.242
[0.040] [0.106]
One-sided p-value 0.019 0.011
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703
Observations 883 906
LLR (h=.075)
Treatment -0.082 -0.386
[0.061] [0.099]
Treat * Above Median -0.069 0.675
[0.091] [0.178]
One-sided p-value
Mean for Control
Observations 586 583
LLR (h=.3)
Treatment -0.027 -0.238
[0.024] [0.087]
Treat * Above Median 0.036 0.346
[0.045] [0.116]
One-sided p-value 0.210 0.001
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703
Observations 1073 1088
3rd Order Polynomial
Treatment -0.071 -0.451
[0.056] [0.145]
Treat * Above Median -0.131 1.297
[0.193] [0.442]
One-sided p-value 0.751 0.002
Mean for Control 6.889 5.703
Observations 1275 1302
Note: All data is from high frequency price surveys. All prices in SLL (Sierra Leonean
Leones) per cup. LLR is short for local linear regression. All speciﬁcations include
round, road-district, and market-district ﬁxed effects. One sided p-values are cal-
culated on the interaction term (>0 for distance, <0 for harvest and seller density).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all narrow bandwidth (h=.075) regres-
sions. Standard errors two-way clustered by road and market for cassava price
regressions, except the h=.075 speciﬁcation. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
97Table 2.10: Robustness Checks: Main Effects on Prices
Log Local Rice Price Log Local Rice Price Log Cassava Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Het Basic Het Basic Het
Controls Controls Controls
A: Alternative Speciﬁcations
Paper Spec: 2nd Poly
Treatment -0.140 -0.120 0.005 -0.020 -0.218 -0.113
[0.066] [0.044] [0.036] [0.039] [0.135] [0.074]
Observations 298 292 1314 1275 1338 1302
Triangle Weight
Treatment -0.082 -0.074 0.027 0.033 -0.079 -0.077
[0.050] [0.028] [0.032] [0.016] [0.067] [0.036]
Observations 190 188 896 883 918 906
B: Alternative Samples
All Roads
Treatment -0.100 -0.073 0.015 0.024 -0.169 -0.095
[0.048] [0.031] [0.023] [0.016] [0.063] [0.050]
Observations 203 201 970 957 995 983
Closest Market (unw)
Treatment -0.123 -0.179 0.030 0.027 -0.179 -0.161
[0.074] [0.073] [0.026] [0.027] [0.077] [0.061]
Observations 56 56 282 282 284 284
Markets w/in 5km (unw)
Treatment -0.085 -0.063 0.032 0.018 -0.122 -0.080
[0.061] [0.033] [0.028] [0.027] [0.073] [0.061]
Observations 82 82 438 438 459 459
Drop Town Markets
Treatment -0.131 -0.127 -0.002 -0.000 -0.198 -0.172
[0.056] [0.022] [0.030] [0.018] [0.091] [0.052]
Observations 163 161 733 720 753 741
Drop Multimatch (>4) Markets
Treatment -0.131 -0.127 0.001 0.010 -0.168 -0.132
[0.056] [0.022] [0.029] [0.016] [0.092] [0.058]
Observations 163 161 778 765 780 768
C: Small Sample Corrections
One-way Cluster (Road)
Treatment -0.116 -0.105 0.006 0.015 -0.178 -0.126
[0.051] [0.027] [0.028] [0.018] [0.080] [0.053]
Wild Bootstrap Coeff 95% CI -0.21, -0.04 -0.15, -0.06 -0.05, 0.06 -0.02, 0.05 -0.33, -0.03 -0.23, -0.02
Observations 190 188 896 883 918 906
Note: All speciﬁcations are local linear regressions at the preferred (h=.15) bandwidth unless otherwise
indicated.Wild bootstrap coefﬁcient conﬁdence intervals based on 400 iterations.
98Table 2.11: Robustness Checks: Heterogeneity
Distance Harvest Seller Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rice Cassava Rice Cassava Rice Cassava
Price Price Price Price Price Price
A: Alternative Speciﬁcations
Paper Spec: 2nd Poly
Treat * Above Median -0.156 -0.369 0.088 0.466 0.101 0.564
[0.057] [0.149] [0.056] [0.277] [0.060] [0.126]
Triangle Weight
Treat * Above Median -0.160 -0.266 0.073 0.019 0.101 0.173
[0.042] [0.086] [0.031] [0.045] [0.039] [0.089]
Continuous Het Vars
Treatment Interaction -0.019 -0.121 -0.047 0.123 0.085 s 0.505
[0.014] [0.056] [0.035] [0.035] [0.165] [0.287]
B: Alternative Samples
All Roads
Treat * Above Median -0.148 -0.304 0.023 0.007 0.080 0.189
[0.044] [0.099] [0.045] [0.070] [0.042] [0.108]
Closest Market (unw)
Treat * Above Median -0.096 -0.252 0.035 0.139 0.023 0.181
[0.059] [0.121] [0.063] [0.322] [0.065] [0.109]
Markets w/in 5km (unw)
Treat * Above Median -0.183 -0.369 0.154 0.126 0.135 0.220
[0.050] [0.118] [0.018] [0.070] [0.031] [0.105]
Drop Town Markets
Treat * Above Median -0.165 -0.352 0.054 0.136 0.084 0.273
[0.051] [0.108] [0.036] [0.076] [0.039] [0.105]
Drop Multimatch (>4) Markets
Treat * Above Median -0.177 -0.431 0.053 0.088 0.082 0.261
[0.054] [0.066] [0.046] [0.078] [0.041] [0.114]
C: Small Sample Corrections
One-way Cluster (Road)
Treat * Above Median -0.162 -0.345 0.065 0.064 0.095 0.236
[0.047] [0.088] [0.038] [0.086] [0.042] [0.102]
Wild Bootstrap Coeff 95% CI (Lower) -0.21, -0.12 -0.51, -0.19 -0.01, 0.14 -0.11, 0.23 0.02, 0.17 0.05, 0.41
Note: All speciﬁcations are local linear regressions at the preferred (h=.15) bandwidth unless otherwise
indicated. Two-way clustered standard errors except rice price/distance heterogeneity regressions and
one-way cluster spec. All one-sided p-values are for the interaction term (>0 for distance, <0 for harvest
and seller density). Wild bootstrap interaction coefﬁcient conﬁdence intervals based on 400 iterations.
99we lose power in the speciﬁcations with low sample sizes.
Finally, Panel C in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 includes a robustness check to address the sample
size and low number of clusters. Only 47 roads were considered for rehabilitation, but since
we have market-level data, our results are two-way clustered by market and road. Our
concern is the road-level clustering. From the applied literature (see Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2008) and Angrist and Pischke (2008)), it seems that 47 clusters is not small
enough to be a concern, and neither is 31 (the number of roads in our preferred bandwidth
speciﬁcation). However, as a check, we implement the wild bootstrap - Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2008) propose this for small numbers of lusters. Since our concern is clustering
at the road-level, as a preliminary step, we show that one-way clustering by road does not
change our results for the preferred bandwidth speciﬁcation (see Panel C of Tables 8 and
9). We then report the 95% conﬁdence interval from a wild bootstrap routine based on
clustering by road only. The wild bootstrap conﬁdence bands support our main results.
2.6 Conclusion
Road infrastructure projects represent a large share of current foreign aid and
government expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Promoters of these investments argue
that enhancing market access is a prerequisite for agricultural development and economic
growth. As such, the assessment of the impact of local improvements in rural road quality
has immediate policy relevance. In addition, any empirical study focusing on these policies
should explicitly assess the role of market structure and hence the heterogeneity in impacts
across markets with different characteristics, such as the proximity of the market to urban
centers, agricultural productivity and cell phone access.
In this paper, we make two contributions relative to the existing literature. First, we
use the speciﬁc design of a rural road rehabilitation program in Sierra Leone to estimate
the causal impact of road quality on rural market prices of rice and cassava, the two most
important staple crops in the country. We also estimate how this response varies with speciﬁc
market characteristics. Second, we use these empirical ﬁndings to test between alternative
100stylized frameworks of intermediated trade which describe the interaction between rural
producers, intermediaries and ﬁnal consumers. Speciﬁcally, we model responses to a
change in rural road transport costs under the following four settings: (i) Bertrand traders’
oligopsony, which leads to perfect competition outcomes; (ii) bilateral bargaining, which
models the case of rural monopsonies; (iii) Cournot oligopsony, both with and without an
endogenous number of traders; and (iv) a basic search framework à la Mortensen (2003).
We show that these frameworks deliver different predictions on how prices respond to a
reduction in rural transport costs. The predictions for how these price effects vary also
differ. Comparing these theoretical predictions to our empirical ﬁndings, we ﬁnd support
for the model with search frictions but not for the other frameworks of trader competition.
In addition, we present additional evidence in support of search costs using data on cell
phone penetration.
The evidence on search frictions is consistent with a recent literature on the effects of
information on prices (see Jensen (2007), Aker (2010), and Goyal (2010)). However, relative
to this literature, we show that search frictions which determine the nature of traders’
competition also have an effect on how the local economy responds to improvements in
infrastructure. More generally, we point out that the structure of the market for agricul-
tural commodities will affect the direction and the magnitude of price response to such
investments, thus affecting the size of the gains for different types of agents. We believe our
results could inform the decisions of policymakers considering similar improvements in
infrastructure as well as a wide range of other policies that would impact agricultural trade,
such as price subsidies, agricultural export promotion interventions, credit-provision policies
targeting traders, and more major road projects. In addition, ﬁnding evidence consistent
with the presence of search frictions implies that there may be strong complementarity
between roads (or other infrastructure projects) and policy interventions that may reduce
search frictions, such as the expansion of mobile phone coverage.
Possible extensions of this research would look at the longer-term effects of the rural
roads improvements. Our study focused on the short-term impacts of these improvements
101since our surveys were conducted between one and two years after the completion of the
rehabilitation program. Given the characteristics of these roads, i.e. that they are small dirt
roads, we potentially expect the infrastructure to degrade over time and hence the impact of
the rehabilitation to be more limited as this degradation occurs.
102Chapter 3
Interlinked Transactions and
Pass-Through: Experimental Evidence
from Sierra Leone1
3.1 Introduction
Rural areas of developing economies often lack formal ﬁnancial institutions. In their
absence, agents in the rural supply chain have emerged as a substitute source of credit for
producers and households. For instance, an intermediary buying agricultural produce for a
wholesaler may provide payment in advance to the farmer for output, allowing the farmer
to smooth consumption.2 A long tradition in development economics has emphasized that
relationships such as these lead to transactions that are interlinked: the price at which output
is purchased is determined jointly with the terms of the credit contract, and vice versa (e.g.
Bardhan, 1980, Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982, Bell, 1988, Grosh, 1994, Deb and Suri, 2012).
A corollary to this observation is that product market conditions may affect the supply of
1Co-authored with Tristan Reed
2It has been observed more generally in the ﬁnance literature that a particular form of credit given through
the supply chain—trade credit—becomes more prominent when ﬁnancial institutions are weak (e.g. Petersen
and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 2003).
103credit. If the wholesale value of produce for the intermediary rises, so might the credit
supplied to the farmer.
The presence of such interlinkages complicates our understanding of how prices pass
through the supply chain. The rate of pass-through is an important parameter, as it is output
prices, along with costs, that ultimately determine a farmer’s investment and the decision to
adopt technologies; the beneﬁt to growth offered by trade liberalization, for instance, may
be attenuated to the extent that international price signals fail to reach domestic producers.
If intermediaries pass through some of the value of world prices in credit, however, there
may be in fact more transmission of incentives than would be observed if one only looked at
farm gate prices. A large literature in international economics (for a review see Burstein and
Gopinath, 2012) explains low price pass-through alternatively with price rigidity, imperfect
competition, and distribution costs. The presence of interlinkages may provide another
important explanation, particularly in remote areas of developing economies, where a
low rate of price pass-through has been observed (Fafchamps and Hill, 2008; Atkin and
Donaldson, 2013; Mitra et al.,2013).3
Building on these observations, our paper makes three contributions. First, we discuss
the results of a randomized experiment in a set of agricultural markets in sub-Saharan
Africa designed to elucidate the separate margins of pass through. The experiment is
set in the cocoa industry of Sierra Leone where interlinked transactions such as the one
described above are common. We pay a treatment group of intermediaries a per-unit bonus
for delivering cocoa (above a certain quality standard) to wholesalers. Using detailed data
on the prices and credit supplied to farmers, we show that although average pass-through
of the bonus is small in terms of prices, it is substantial in terms of credit outlay. The
experiment conﬁrms the two conjectures above: product market conditions faced by the
intermediary affect substantially the supply of credit to farmers, and the total pass through
of the cocoa’s value is masked when one only observes the price at which the cocoa is
3It has been alleged, correctly or not, that in the wake of cocoa and coffee market liberalization, intermediaries
have exerted market power over farmers, dampening the transmission of price signals, and muting their
incentives to invest (Oxfam, 2002).
104transacted.
Second, we develop a simple theoretical model that illustrates this point. In our model,
changes in the price paid to intermediaries for output shift the share of producers engaged
in interlinked transactions as opposed to simply selling on a spot market. In the interlinked
transaction, intermediaries pay the producer in advance for the good, a form of forward
credit that the producers use to smooth consumption.4 This credit is paid back in the form of
a lower output price. The average rate of price pass-through is determined by the measure
of producers who endogenously switch into (or out of) interlinked transactions. In response
to an increase in the price they receive from wholesalers, intermediaries may choose to give
credit to more producers. As these producers move from the spot market to the interlinked
transaction, the observed price they receive falls; indeed they have already been paid in
advance. While farmers beneﬁt from credit provision, this switching between contracts
drives down the average rate of price pass-through further than the rate that would obtain
if the intermediary were simply an oligopsonist on the spot market. We test empirically
the core prediction of the model, that across markets, price and credit pass-through are
substitutes. Using an analysis of heterogeneous treatments effects in our experiment, we
show that those markets that experience a stronger credit response show a lower rate of
price pass-through. The markets in which the credit response is stronger and the price
response weaker are precisely those markets in which interlinked transactions were more
common in the baseline.
Third, we calibrate our model and show that a model that focuses only on price pass-
through will substantially underestimate the change in producer welfare derived from an
increase in the buyer price relative to one that accounts for interlinkages. The result is
robust to a wide range of parameter values. This insight also speaks to recent literature
that uses the price pass-through rate as a tool to infer the shares of surplus captured
4Intermediaries have also been observed to write contracts that transfer risk from farmers to traders,
providing insurance against adverse price and productivity shocks that may affect the farmer. While we
acknowledge this is another important margin on which intermediaries may pass through value to farmers, it is
not common in our setting, and we leave it to be studied in others.
105by producers, consumers, and intermediaries in the economy (Fabinger and Weyl, 2013;
Atkin and Donaldson, 2012). In the presence of interlinked credit and output markets,
welfare analysis needs to be based on “credit pass-through", as well as the standard price
pass-through.
The presence of many layers of intermediation is a deﬁning characteristic of agricultural
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bauer, 1954; Fafchamps, 2004). Besides simply transporting
goods, intermediaries also provide services such as information, insurance, and, as in our
context, credit. While the literature has acknowledged this role, there is little quantitative
evidence about how traders’ own incentives affect the level of service provision. This
paper shows they do, and that the magnitude of this effect can be substantial. Our work
then supports a view of intermediaries as productive members of the supply chain who
undertake value-enhancing investments, as opposed to a view in which they are simply
arbitrageurs. In this sense our work is related to that of Rubenstein and Wolinsky (1987)
and Antras and Costinot (2012), who develop models in which traders provide a service to
the market by alleviating search frictions. It is also related to the work on micro-ﬁnance by
Maitra, Mitra, Mookherjee, Motta, and Visaria (2012) who identify another way in which
traders may add value. The authors argue that given the strength of traders’ relationships
with clients, traders may have more information about default risk and be able higher
quality clients to ﬁnancial institutions.
Given the context, our work also contributes to the extensive literature on agricultural
traders in Africa in particular, initiated by Bauer (1954) and Hill (1961) and continued by
Fafchamps (2004), Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten (2005), Osborne (2005), Fafchamps
and Hill (2008) and Casaburi, Glennerster and Suri (2012), among others. More broadly, we
also add to the literature studying the importance of inter-ﬁrm relationships in developing
countries (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2000, and Macchiavello and
Morjaria 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.2 we describe our experiment and provide
summary statistics on traders and the markets used in the study. Section 3.3 discusses
106our experimental results. In section 3.4 we present a model of pass-through in interlinked
transactions. Section 3.5 tests further implications of the model and presents a calibration
and a discussion of its welfare implications. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 An Experiment in the Sierra Leone Cocoa Industry
In order to elucidate the multiple margins through which intermediaries may pass value
to producers in response to a change in their price incentives, we run an experiment in a
set of African agricultural markets in which interlinked transactions including credit are
common, within the cocoa industry of Sierra Leone.5 As the summary statistics presented
below will show, the provision of loans by traders to farmers is a deﬁning characteristic of
this industry, making the context similar to those in other developing economies discussed
in the papers cited in the introduction. In the course of an ongoing business relationship,
traders will offer farmers credit, and then allow farmers to repay the loan in cocoa, by
accepting from the trader a below market price for subsequent sales until the loan has been
repaid. This credit could be productive, and allow the farmer to invest in post-harvesting
quality-enhancing processing, or could be simply a payment advance that the farmer uses
for consumption.
We paid a bonus of 150 Leones—5.6% of the average wholesale price—for high quality
cocoa to randomly selected traders, who themselves buy directly from farmers. We then
measure how this bonus affects prices and credit delivered to farmers across the different
villages in which the traders operate. By estimating heterogeneous treatment effects across
villages, we will be able to test a core prediction of our model, that price and credit
pass-through are substitutes from the perspective of the trader.
The bonus in our experiment was designed to model ﬂuctuations in the market price
5West Africa produces two-thirds of the world cocoa supply. Though given its small size Sierra Leone
accounts for only a small share of this total, cocoa is important nationally. The crop comprised 8.6% of exports in
2009, and is by far the country’s largest export crop by value, according to the UN COMTRADE database. The
industry has also grown tremendously in the last decade, with the value of exports growing ten-fold between
2009 and 2001, when the country’s decade long civil war came to an end.
107received by traders, who themselves sell to wholesalers. The within-country cocoa trade in
Sierra Leone is highly fragmented across many traders, and the supply chain has many links,
similar to other agricultural markets in developing countries (for examples in Africa see
Fafchamps, et. al. 2005 and Osborne 2005).6 Farmers sell to traders, who sell to wholesalers
in small towns, who in turn sell to exporters in larger towns, who in turn sell to buyers at
the port. While the study of pass-through is surely relevant at each of these links in the
supply chain, we focus on the ﬁnal link closest to production, and leave the examination of
other levels for future research. Working at this level is not only the most feasible from a
cost-effectiveness perspective, but it also allows us to examine heterogeneity in pass-through
across many different locations. As one moves further down the supply chain, the number
of origin locations for cocoa necessarily falls quite quickly.
The cocoa season in Sierra Leone lasts from the beginning of the rainy season in June
until February. Our experiment covers the months of September-December of 2011. The
experimental approach allows us to exploit price variation across traders throughout the
study time span. Prices also vary because of international market ﬂuctuations. However,
these changes are infrequent, making it difﬁcult to estimate an effect of pass-through
unconfounded by other seasonal variables that may affect supply. This concern motivates
an experiment in preference to an observational study. In the following two subsections
we discuss respectively the traders and the villages they operate in. Throughout both we
discuss the experimental design, the data collected, and summary statistics from these data.
3.2.1 Traders and the Treatment
We developed our experiment in partnership with ﬁve privately owned wholesalers
in Sierra Leone’s Eastern cocoa producing district, three in the town of Segbwema, and
6Though Sierra Leone does have an ofﬁcial marketing board, the organization has been defunct since the
war, and the government is responsible for a negligible share of purchases. The discussion in Gilbert (2009)
suggests that Sierra Leone’s market is similar to those in Nigeria, Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, all of which
liberalized during the 1990s, and became similarly fragmented. A potential explanation for the lack of vertical
integration in the market in the absence of a strong marketing board are the stringent legal restrictions on the
transaction of land discussed in Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2013). These, along with weak legal institutions
more broadly, would make vertical integration of the supply chain difﬁcult, if not impossible.
108one each in the towns Pendembu and Kailahun.7 These wholesalers collect cocoa in their
warehouses, and then sell it on to exporters in the provincial capital of Kenema. Our sample
of 80 traders, henceforth study traders, comprise almost the complete set of traders who do
business regularly with these wholesalers.8
Treatment and Random Assignment
Treatment traders were paid a bonus of 150 Leones per pound of Grade A cocoa. Though
this bonus was only a 5.6% share of the price traders received before the treatment, it was
a large, approximately 60% increase over average baseline margins. Traders were not told
when the treatment price increase would end, though some certainty was given by our
research team that it would last for at least a few months.
As emphasized by Atkin and Donaldson (2012), it is important to measure pass-through
only for narrowly deﬁned homogenous goods, as one must not conﬂate pass-through and
changes in the composition of quality. The quality of cocoa is indeed heterogeneous, and
market prices depend on a variety of characteristics including moisture content, mold,
germination, lack of fermentation and a discoloration known as slate. Though there is
no ofﬁcial measure of quality in the market, wholesalers and traders agree on broad
determinants of quality that are consistent with international standards (see CABISCO,
2002). In order to measure pass-through for given classes of quality, we worked with
wholesalers to develop a quality grade that correlates well with baseline prices. When
traders arrive at the warehouse, inspectors hired by the research team sampled 50 beans
7These towns are now quite remote, accessible only by unpaved roads that can become impassible in the
rainy season. During the colonial period, however, Pendembu was a prosperous trading town and the ﬁnal stop
on the Sierra Leone Railroad, which was dismantled and sold by the government of Siaka Stevens in the 1970s.
The decline in the country’s cocoa industry since then can be observed at the massive abandoned produce
warehouse where the end of the tracks once lay. Exporters we visited in 2011 joked with some cynicism that the
cocoa stocks of the largest wholesalers in Pendembu could not come close to ﬁlling it.
8In a census of regular business partners of the wholesalers, we counted originally 84 traders. Two
were outliers with respect to baseline quantity. They were not matched and thus de facto dropped from the
randomization. One other trader was lost due to attrition–he did not return after the census and no follow up
data on either credit or prices could be collected. Since all of the analysis is done within matched pairs, his pair
is also dropped from the analysis. Given the pairwise randomization, this attrition is not a threat to the internal
validity of our study.
109from each bag, and used them to create an index of quality—grades A, B or C—which was
then applied to each bag. In Appendix C.1, we discuss in greater detail the construction of
the grades, and their relationship to wholesale prices and international standards of cocoa
quality.
To improve the statistical power of our experiment, we follow a pairwise randomization
strategy (for a review, see Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). We ﬁrst match traders within
wholesalers according to a self-reported estimate of the number of grade A bags that
they had sold since the beginning of the cocoa season, a plausible proxy for the scale of
their business. We felt this a useful proxy for similarity in capacity for price and credit
pass-through, since the ability to give credit will be a function of the total wealth of the
trader, which, given constant or increasing margins, should rise with the scale of business.
Having matched the traders, we assigned treatment and control within pairs using a random
number generator.
Trader Data and Summary Statistics
Over the course of the experiment we collect a variety of data from traders. Summary
statistics are presented in Table 3.1. At baseline, we interviewed each trader about their
experience in the industry, and basic demographic indicators. These results are presented in
Panel A of Table 3.1. Traders operate at a small scale in terms of value. At average cocoa
prices and 2011 exchange rates, the self-estimate of bags sold reports sales per trader at since
the beginning of the season (at that point about half completed) at approximately $4,360.9
Traders are experienced, with an average of 8.5 years in the industry and 6.5 years selling to
the wholesaler. Their average age is 38. 58% have a cement or tile ﬂoor (as opposed to dirt
or thatch) in their and 92% own a mobile phone versus 8% in the same survey. 83% have
access to a storage facility. The third column of Table 3.1 shows that treatment and control
are balanced on all trader-level covariates.
9This is calculated as the control group’s average number of bags, 30.3, times the approximate pounds
per bag, 180 times the average dollar price of cocoa over this period, Le. 3,200, divided by 4,000, the nominal
exchange rate.
110Table 3.1: Trader summary statistics
Covariate Treatment Control Treatment -
Control
Panel A: Baseline Interview
Self-estimate bags sold in 2011 32.8 30.3 2.5
(6.7)
Self-estimate grade A bags sold in 2011 20.0 18.6 1.4
(5.4)
Age, years 38.2 36.9 1.3
(2.1)
Years trading cocoa 8.1 8.9 -0.8
(1.2)
Years selling to study wholesaler 5.7 7.3 -1.4
(1.1)
Cement or tile ﬂoor in house 2 f0,1g 0.53 0.62 -0.09
(0.1)
Mobile phone owner 2 f0,1g 0.90 0.93 -0.03
(0.06)
Access to storage facility 2 f0,1g 0.88 0.78 0.10
(0.09)
Panel B: Pre-treatment shipment data
Cocoa (pounds) sold during pre-treatment 2940 3180 -240
(750)
Per pound farmer price for Grade A (Leones)a 3,121.7 3,121.1 -0.6
(47.6)
Per pound farmer price for Grades B or C (Leones)b 3,045.6 3,040.3 -5.3
(32.2)
Panel C: Baseline farmer listing
Villages operating in 4.3 4.9 -0.6
(0.4)
Number of farmers buying from 23.3 28.4 -5.1
(3.5)
Mean number of farmers per village 5.8 5.6 0.2
(0.8)
Share of farmers given credit since March 0.72 0.68 0.04
(0.07)
Number of observations 40 40
Notes: Standard errors allowing for unequal variance between groups in parenthesis. Treatment
and control assigned randomly within pair of matched on self-estimates of grade A bags sold in
2011. a There are only 22 treatment observations of the grade A price in pre-treatment shipments,
and 24 control. b There are only 30 treatment observations of a grade B or C price in pre-treatment
shipments, and 34 control.
111During the experiment, when traders arrived at the warehouse, our inspectors measured
the quality of their shipment and, if the trader had been assigned to the treatment group, he
or she was paid a bonus for grade A. Bags were then weighted and quantities recorded. We
collected these data for three weeks before treatment assignments were announced. Panel
B of Table 3.1 shows deliveries from this period. These results conﬁrm that treatment and
control traders are balanced on the volume of their business: treatment traders sold on
average 2,940 pounds and control traders sold 3,180.
In these shipment data, we also collect the price per pound paid to farmers, and the
name of the village in which the cocoa was purchased. Traders typically mix cocoa from
different farmers of the same village in the same bag. Questions about which farmers
in these villages the bags were purchased from would have been too time consuming to
collect, and so farmer prices reported are the average purchase per unit purchase price in a
village. Given concerns about measurement error in the farmer per pound price, we also
collected information on the total amount paid to farmers for a given bag. Dividing this
by its weight, we create an alternative measure of the per unit price for use in our results
on price pass-through. Farmer prices reported in baseline in Panel B show that traders in
treatment and control were balanced on the prices they paid to farmers, and conﬁrm that
average prices of grade A cocoa are larger than for grades B and C: in the control group the
average price paid for grade A is Le. 3,121 and the average price paid for B or C is Le. 3,040.
Finally, in the baseline we asked traders to list each farmer they buy from and all of
the villages in which they buy. For each farmer, we asked whether they had given the
trader had given the farmer a loan. These results are shown in Panel C. The average trader
operates in 4.6 villages, and buys from 25.9 farmers, on average 5.7 per village. Importantly,
traders have given at least one loan to on average 70% of their clients since the beginning of
the season. We repeated this listing exercise one and two months after the treatment began,
in the ﬁnal round asking the amount of the last loan. We will use these data to estimate our
treatment effects on credit supply.
1123.2.2 Villages
Study traders reported ever purchasing cocoa in 165 villages. Of these villages, 80 are
used in the analysis, because these are the ones for which we have at least one observation of
the grade A during the study period. Figure 3.1 presents a map of these villages along with
the major towns, and the road network, which is unpaved. Panel A of Table 3.2 presents
summary statistics from this sample of villages. On average, each village has 3.2 study
traders, and 1.5 treatment traders. 34 of our 80 sample villages have at least one treatment
and one control trader. This merits concern about spillover effects between treatment and
control. We address this in Section 3.3.
As shown in Figure 3.1 the average road distance from a village to the nearest town is
9.6 miles using Dijsktra’s minimum distance algorithm along the road network. Importantly,
over all study traders, on average 65% of farmers selling to study traders have been given
credit by at least one trader over the last year, highlighting the importance of interlinked
transactions in this industry. Traders have multiple clients (famers) within each village,
on average 6.2, and on average 18.7 clients per village. The population of these villages,
calculated using the 2004 census, is substantially greater, at 494 people on average, with a
large standard deviation of 753. Though we lack a direct measure of market share sizes,
markets appear not to be greatly concentrated. In the baseline, study traders report having
on average 5.7 regular competitors in a village. Randomization across traders randomly
allocates treatment traders to sets of villages conditional on the number of study traders
in the village. Since we will estimate heterogeneous treatment effects across villages, it
is important to check whether villages are balanced in the composition of treatment and
control traders. Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the coefﬁcients of a regression of a village
level covariate on the number of treatment traders and number of study traders as a test
of balance. In all cases, the coefﬁcient on the number of treatment traders is statistically
insigniﬁcant at standard levels.
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Figure 3.1: Map of study villages
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1153.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the average treatment effect results from our experiment. We
ﬁrst document the negligible effect of the bonus on prices paid to farmers and show that the
lack of price pass-through cannot be explained by increasing marginal costs of transport. We
then show that the traders respond to the bonus by increasing credit provision to farmers.
In section 5, we complement these results with an analysis of heterogeneous treatments
across villages motivated by the theoretical framework we develop in section 4. Throughout
the paper, the standard errors we report are robust to heteroskedasticity and are estimated
with two non-nested clusters that allow for arbitrary correlation across observations from a
given village, and across observations from a given trader.10
3.3.1 Price Pass-Through
To estimate pass-through in prices, we run the following regression, where an observation
is a shipment k delivered by trader i of pair p, from village v in week t:
ykipvt = aip + tt + qp(Bonusi) + X0
ibx + W0
vbw + ekiptv (3.1)
The term aip is a ﬁxed effect for each matched pair in the randomization. Since pairs were
matched within wholesalers, this effectively controls for the town in which the trader sells
his cocoa. The term tt is a week ﬁxed effect, to capture time varying factors in supply, such
as weather, as well as any variation in the expectation of the wholesaler price generated by
the international market. The vector X0
i, used in some speciﬁcations, includes the trader-level
covariates of age, years working with wholesaler and dummies for ownership of a mobile
phone and a concrete ﬂoor. The latter term is a useful proxy for wealth in our context. The
vector W0
v includes the village-level covariates of minimum road distance to nearest town,
number of study traders, number of other treatment traders, and baseline share of farmers
having ever received credit from a study trader. Bonusi is a dummy equal to one if trader i
10This clustering approach follows Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006).
116is assigned to treatment, and so qP is the average treatment effect. The term eiptv is an error.
Pairwise randomization motivates the assumption that E[ekiptvjBonusi,aip,tt,X0
i,W0
v] = 0.
The term qp is the coefﬁcient of interest. We will pick ykipvt to be the level of prices so if
qp = 150, we have perfect pass-through, as the treatment traders will have increased the
price paid to farmers by the full amount of the bonus. Table 3.3 presents estimates of qp.
In the basic speciﬁcation in column 1, with no village or trader covariates, pass-through
is statistically indistinguishable from zero with a point estimate of qp =  5.4 (s.e. = 14.9).
Even at the upper bound of a 95% conﬁdence interval, pass-through would be just 24 Leones,
less than one ﬁfth of the amount of the bonus, 150 Leones. This extremely low level of
pass-through to farmgate prices is consistent with evidence from West Bengal in Mitra et. al
(2013).
Given that some villages contain both treatment and control traders, we are concerned
about spillovers between groups. It may be that Bertrand competition between treatment and
control traders drives up the price offered by control traders, so that there is no difference
between the prices offered by both groups. We test for this by adding the number of other
study traders and other treatment traders in column 2. This is a speciﬁcation similar to
the one developed to test for externalities by Kremer and Miguel (2004). The number of
other treatment traders in the market does not signiﬁcantly affect the price paid to farmers.
This is conﬁrmed by column 3, where we interact the two market-level variables with the
treatment status of the trader. We ﬁnd some evidence that treatment traders pay a higher
price when there are other treated competitors in the market, but the coefﬁcient on the
interaction is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Column 4 conﬁrms the results using
the entire vector of village-level and individual-level controls. Column 5 presents the same
regression using as our outcome an alternative measure of price taken by dividing a trader’s
total expenditure by its weight. We can again reject perfect pass-through and cannot reject
that pass-through is equal to zero. This provides reassurance that our price results are not
driven by measurement error in prices. In columns 6 and 7, we also present results for
grade B and C cocoa. For grade B, in column 6, pass-through is positive and statistically
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118signiﬁcant at 1 percent, with qp = 49.41 (s.e. = 11.76). At ﬁrst pass this is surprising. How
could pass-through for grade A be zero, and pass-through for grade B be so much higher?
We argue that this is consistent with Type I error on the part of traders, who observe quality
imperfectly. The bonus has increased the expected price for grade A quality cocoa relative to
grade B. Even if pass-through is zero for a given quality, if quality is imperfectly observable
traders will now be more willing to pay the grade A price premium for cocoa that has some
probability of being grade A. That in column 7 we see pass-through is again reduced for
grade C, which is much less likely to be mistaken for grade A, conﬁrms this intuition.
In a perfectly competitive model of spatial arbitrage, the difference in price between
two locations that trade will equal the marginal cost of transport. Thus, our lack of pass-
through could be explained by the fact that marginal costs of transport are increasing rapidly
among treatment traders, who now bring more cocoa per shipment. Table 3.4 presents
estimates of equation (3.1), with outcomes related to cost in the place of yipvt, using all
grades of cocoa shipped. Columns 1 and 2 show that the weight per shipment—scale—is
increasing signiﬁcantly by the treatment. In the preferred speciﬁcation with village and
trader controls we have that treatment traders increase their shipment volume by 8.20 (s.e.
= 2.37). In columns 3 and 4, we see that unit costs reported by the trader are also falling.
When shipments arrived, we recorded the total cost of transporting of that shipment to the
wholesaler. Unit costs are obtained by dividing this by weight. In the preferred speciﬁcation
with village and trader controls we have that the treatment effect is -11.38 Leones (s.e. =
2.38). This implies that in addition to the bonus of 150 Leones per unit, traders also received
a gain in the form of 11 Leones lower transport costs per pound shipped. Finally column 5,
which amounts to a linear probability model in which the outcome variable is a dummy
indicating that a truck and not a motorcycle was used to transport the cocoa, shows that
this cost result is being driven by a change in transport technology. As shown in Figure
3.2, which plots unit cost by transport technology, trucks have consistently lower per unit
costs. It is our understanding from conversations with traders that trucks are easier to hire
if one has a larger total shipment size, as the truck driver himself must amortize the ﬁxed
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Figure 3.2: Declining unit costs by transport technology
cost of driving to the pick up location. These results show that the lack of pass-through
cannot be explained by increasing marginal costs. They also conﬁrm those of Fafchamps et.
al. (2005) for Africa, who ﬁnd evidence of increasing returns to scale in transport in Malawi
and Madagascar, though not in Benin.
3.3.2 Credit
To investigate the effects of the bonus on credit, we estimate the following regression,
which is a modiﬁed version of (3.1):
yfipv = aip + qc(Bonusi) + X0
ibx + W0
vbw + ˚ ﬁpv (3.2)
120Table 3.4: Transport cost and technology choice response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pounds per Pounds per Unit Unit Truck use
shipment shipment cost cost 2 f0,1g
Bonus 2 f0,1g 7.75*** 8.20*** -10.26*** -11.38*** 0.21***
(2.18) (2.37) (2.58) (2.38) (0.05)
R2 0.21 0.22 0.44 0.47 0.46
Number of observations 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837
Trader Controls NO YES NO YES YES
Village Controls NO YES NO YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors allowing for two-way clustering at the village and trader
level are shown in parenthesis. An observation is a shipment delivered to a wholesaler.
All speciﬁcations include calendar week and randomization pair ﬁxed effects. Village
controls include minimum road distance to nearest town, number of study traders,
number of other treatment traders, and baseline share of farmers having ever received
credit from a study trader. Trader controls are age, years working with wholesaler, and
dummies for ownership of a mobile phone and a concrete ﬂoor. The control mean of
pounds per shipment is 178 (s.d. = 36), Leones unit cost, 45 (s.d. = 27), and likelihood of
truck use, 0.34. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
121This is a farmer-level regression. Speciﬁcally, yfipv is an indicator of whether farmer f in
village v was given credit by trader i of pair p. The term qc is the treatment effect estimator,
and nfipv is an error term. All other terms are as in (3.1), except that we have removed the
week ﬁxed effect, since we only observe the outcome variable in one cross section. Pairwise
randomization again motivates the assumption that E[nfipvjBonusi,aip,X0
i,W0
v] = 0.
Table 3.5 presents estimates of the qc in equation (3.2). The treatment effect on credit
is substantial: in the month before the interview, farmers reported as regular suppliers
by treatment traders in the baseline listing are 14 percentage points more likely to receive
credit from these traders relative to a control mean of 11 percentage points. In column 1
we run a linear probability model where the outcome is a dummy equal to one if credit
was provided to a farmer in the last month. Columns 2 and 3 control again for potential
spillovers. In particular, in column 3, the coefﬁcient qc captures the difference between
the credit provision likelihood between a treatment and a control trader, in a market with
no other competitor. Column 4 shows that the results are robust when adding trader and
village controls. In column 5 we see this in terms of Leones. Here, traders were asked after
two months of treatment the amount of the loan last given to the farmer, if any was given in
the past month. Those that did not give any were set equal to zero. We see that traders are
more than doubling their credit outlay, with qc = Le. 9.771 (s.e. = 5,209), off a control group
mean of Le. 18,908.
3.4 A Model of Pass-through in Interlinked Transactions
In this section, we develop a simple model of interlinked transactions between interme-
diaries and producers, who we will call traders and farmers to match the context of our
experiment. We derive the equilibrium output prices paid to farmers and the level of credit
provision. We show how these variables respond to an increase in the wholesale price—the
price at which traders resell their purchases—and conclude by studying the average welfare
effects of such a change on farmer welfare in this model. We contrast them with those
derived from a benchmark model that does not account for interlinkages.
122Table 3.5: Credit response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Lent Lent Lent Lent Loan
2 f0,1g 2 f0,1g 2 f0,1g 2 f0,1g Amount
Bonus 2 {0,1} 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11* 0.12*** 9,771*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (5,209)
# Other Bonus Traders -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Bonus  # Other Bonus Study Traders -0.01
(0.02)
# Other Study Traders 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bonus  # Other Study Traders 0.01
(0.02)
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 1
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541
Trader Controls NO NO NO YES NO
Village Controls NO NO NO YES NO
Control Mean 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 18908
Notes: Robust standard errors allowing for two-way clustering at the village and trader level
are shown in parenthesis. An observation is a farmer listed by the trader in the baseline. The
dependent variable in columns 1 - 4 is an indicator for whether the trader had lent to the farmer
since the treatment began, asked a month after the treatment began. The control mean of this
dummy was 0.12. The dependent variable in column 5 is the amount of money lent in the past
month. The control mean of this amount was 18,908 (s.d. = 52,597). All speciﬁcations include
randomization pair ﬁxed effects. Village controls include minimum road distance to nearest town,
number of study traders, number of other treatment traders, and baseline share of farmers having
ever received credit from a study trader. Trader controls are age, years working with wholesaler,
and dummies for ownership of a mobile phone, and a concrete ﬂoor. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
1233.4.1 Environment
The economy is composed of M isolated markets. Each market m is populated by Im
farmers and Jm traders. Interactions between the two agents can occur under two alternative
contracts. In spot markets, the trader and farmer transact only at harvest time. This contract
can be viewed as the benchmark model, with no interlinkages. In interlinked transactions
(ILT), a trader provides credit before harvest and then purchases output from the farmer at
harvest, unless the farmer chooses to default.
Traders are homogeneous. Farmer i in market m is endowed with an amount of land li.
This varies across farmers. If the farmer does not receive credit, the land produces quantity
qim, which we will write as qi to reduce notation. If the farmer receives credit, the land is
assumed to produce qi(1+ r). We can also interpret qi as quality-adjusted quantity. In this
case, which is particularly relevant for our setting, credit allow farmers to improve quality
of their output, through post-harvesting processing. We assume farmers and traders are
risk-neutral and maximize their (expected) proﬁts. We now discuss the payoff structure
under the two tyes of contracts
Spot Markets
Spot market prices in market m, pS
m, are equal to the wholesale price over a constant
markdown,
pS
m =
wm
m
, m  1 (3.3)
The mark down is a reduced form capturing both trading costs proportional to value and
any market power the trader may have. The utility of farmer i farmer transacting on the
spot market is:
uS
im = pSqi =
wm
m
qi (3.4)
On the spot market, we assume that each trader has an equal probability to secure cocoa
from a given farmer in market m equal to 1/Jm. Therefore, the expected utility for trader j
124transacting with farmer i in market m is:
vS
jim =
1
Jm
(wm   pS
m)qi =
1
Jm
m   1
m
wmqi (3.5)
Interlinked Transactions
In interlinked transactions, a trader provides credit before harvest, and subsequently
purchases output at a pre-determined price. We assume that traders and farmers are
randomly matched and that only one trader can offer credit to a given farmer.11 In order
to provide credit, the trader incurs a ﬁxed cost f. This can be interpreted as the minimum
amount of screening and monitoring that trader needs to undertake, independent of the
amount of credit outlay (for a review of these issues, see Banerjee, 2002). We assume that
if the two parties enter an interlinked transaction, the trader provides a ﬁxed amount of
credit per each bag denoted by c. As we mentioned above, this raises the farmer output by
a factor (1+ r).
In addition to the impact of credit on production levels, we assume that the farmer
marginal utility from consuming (part of the) loan c before harvest is cF = l  c, with
l  1. This is a reduced form for the increased utility of the farmer from extra pre-
harvest consumption, which is assumed to be weakly larger than the trader’s utility cost of
disbursing the loan. One way to think about this is that the farmer experiences a higher
marginal utility per unit of income relative to the trader in the pre-harvest season.
After receiving credit, the farmer decides whether to stick to the terms of the contract or
to undertake a strategic default. If the farmer respects the contract, he receives a farmer-
speciﬁc contract price pC
im. We describe how this price is determined in equilibrium in
section 3.4.2. When he does not default, the utility of farmer i under ILT is
uCN
im = (pC
im(1+ r) + cF)qi (3.6)
11This is consistent with anecdotal evidence in our setting that farmers mostly receive advances from one
trader. However, we note that the static nature of the game obviously neglects the relational component of
credit provision, which is potentially very relevant for our setting.
125and the utility for trader j in an ILT contract with farmer i is
vCN
jim = ((wm   pC
im)(1+ r)   c)qi   f (3.7)
Note here that the trader’s utility no longer includes the term 1/Jm, since in the interlinked
transaction contract, he is now certain to get the farmer’s output (if the contract is enforced).
The beneﬁt of strategic default for the farmer depends on the underlying contracting
institutions in market m. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, if the farmer defaults, he loses a share
gim of his output. He then sells (1 gim)qi(1+r) on the spot market. The parameter gim is a
reduced form measure of contracting institutions capturing market characteristics that could
shape the cost of default, including trader monitoring costs, proximity to law enforcement,
and social norms speciﬁc to farmer i. Thus, another beneﬁt of the credit provision for the
trader, in addition to the higher quantity to purchase, is that the credit contract “locks in"
the farmer’s supply by imposing a penalty g to the farmer if he side-sells to other traders.12
In the strategic default scenario, the utility of farmer i in the ILT contract is
uCD
im =

pS
m(1  gim)(1+ r) + cF

qi =

wm
m
(1  gim)(1+ r) + cF

qi, (3.8)
while the utility of trader j is
vCD
jim =  c  qi   f (3.9)
3.4.2 The Equilibrium Contract
In this subsection, we describe the conditions under which farmers and traders will opt
to transact on the spot market or in an ILT, and the conditions under which ILT will persist
as a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium. The timing of the game is as follows: in the ﬁrst
stage, the trader is randomly matched to the farmer, and decides whether to offer credit.
He also decides the terms of the contract—the contract price at which output will be sold
after harvest, pC
im. If the trader does not offer credit they transact on the spot market. If the
12The main insights of the framework hold if g is modeled as a constant loss, as opposed to a proportion of
the output.
126trader does offer credit, they proceed to the second stage and the farmer decides whether to
accept or not. In the third stage, the farmer decides whether to default or not, conditional
on having accepted the ILT. We solve the model by backwards induction. In the third stage,
the farmer decides not to default if
uCN
im  uCD
im ) pC
im 
wm
m
(1  gim). (3.10)
This is the farmer’s incentive compatibility constraint. In order not to induce default, the
trader must offer a large enough contract price to satisfy it.
In the second stage, if the trader offers credit and a contract price in the ﬁrst stage, the
farmer must decide whether to accept it. The farmer accepts credit if
max

uCN
im (pC
im),uCD
im

 uS
im, (3.11)
which highlights the fact that the decision to participate in credit depends on the proposed
contract price, pC
im. In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that the farmer always
prefers to accept a contract and default than to reject a credit offer. This amounts to assuming
that g < r
1+r +
cFm
w  gA. We argue that the case where contracting institution quality are
low enough — relative to the consumption smoothing and productive role of credit — is
the relevant one for our setting.13
In the ﬁrst stage, the trader decides whether to offer credit and, if so, the contract price
to offer. For simplicity, we focus on the equilibrium where the trader extracts all the ex-post
surplus from the relation by setting a price such that the farmer’s incentive compatibility
constraint (3.10) binds with equality.14 Thus, the price of the ILT contract is:
pC
im =
wm
m
(1  gim), (3.12)
which is decreasing in the quality of contracting institutions. Given this optimal price, he
13The insights from the comparative static analysis hold when we look at the case of g > gA
14The main comparative statics results described in Section 3.4.3 do not depend on this particular equilibrium
selection criterion
127decides to offer credit to farmer i if
vCN
jim(pC
im)  vS
jim (3.13)
Therefore, interlinked transaction contracts arise as the equilibrium contractual form if
the inequality in equation 3.13 holds. The equilibrium price in the interlinked transaction
contract is described by Equation 3.12.
To build intuition for our empirical results, we consider the case where farmers vary
by their production-level under the no-credit case, qi, while contract institutions vary only
at the market level, denoted gm, and the spot-market markdown, m, is constant across
markets. In this case, farmer i and trader j in market m enter an ILT arrangement if: i)
qi  q
m 
f Jmm
wm(J(1+r) 1)(m 1)+J(1+r)gwm cJmm; ii) g >
cJm (J(1+r) 1)w(m 1)
J(1+r)w Intuitively, traders
provide credit only to those farmers whose quantities are large enough that the increase in
revenues for the traders to provide credit more than offset the ﬁxed cost of credit provision
f. In addition, observe that, under the parameter restriction on gm imposed by (ii) above, the
minimum production volume a farmer needs to produce to access credit is decreasing in Jm
and gm, and increasing in f. Intuitively, credit provision increases when the relative beneﬁt
for the trader from interlinked transactions increases. This occurs when: a) the number of
competitors increases (and thus the expected proﬁt from spot market interactions decreases);
b) the quality of contracting institutions increases (and thus the contract price the trader has
to offer to induce no-default falls); c) the ﬁxed cost from credit provision decreases. The
equilibrium contractual form determines the price each farmer faces. Farmers on the spot
market sell at pi = pS
m. Farmers in an ILT arrangement sell at pi = pC
im
3.4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we study the impact of an increase in the wholesale price at which the
trader can resell the output bought from farmer, w. The difference between the trader proﬁt
under interlinked transaction and spot markets, vCN
jim   vS
jim, is easily shown to be increasing
in wm. Those farmer-trader pairs for which the difference changes from negative to positive,
128Figure 3.3: The impact of a change the wholesale price on credit provision. Red indicates negative values, blue
positive.
will switch from spot market to interlinked transactions
We consider again the case where qi is the only parameter varying across farmers in a
given market. The threshold level of production required for the farmer to receive credit in
a given village, q
m, decreases in response to an increase in wm. As wm increases, a greater
share of farmers switch to ILT. Figure 3.3 shows the increase in credit status in response to a
discrete increase in the wholesale price, as a function of g and q.
We now consider how pi changes in response to a change in wm from w0
m to wm = w0
m +D,
where D is some constant. Observe that the direction and the magnitude of the change
depends on whether the farmers are on the spot market, in an ILT, or whether they switch
into ILT in response to the change in wm. First, farmers who remain on the spot market
experience an increase in their price, pS
m, of D
m. Second, farmers who were in ILT contracts
both before and after the change in wm experience an increase in their contract price, pC
im, of
D(1 gm)
m . Third, farmers who enter an ILT contract in response to the increase in wm face the
following change in price:
D(1 gm) gmw0
m
m . The last result shows that farmers switching into
129Figure 3.4: The impact of a change in the wholesale price on farmer prices. Red indicates negative values, blue
positive.
ILT in response to the change experience a decrease in price, since they switch from the spot
price to the contract. They are however still better off, because they are now receiving credit.
Figure 3.4 summarizes the price response for different combinations of g and q. The
graph points at the main result from the theory. The credit and pricing pass-through in
response to a change in the wholesale prices are substitutes. Those pairs (g,q) that switch
into ILT are exactly the ones experiencing a decrease in output prices. For the remaining
pairs, who stay in the same contract form, the price goes up.
3.4.4 Welfare Analysis under Interlinked Transactions
In this section we use our model to measure the effect of a change in wholesale prices
on average farmer welfare and compare this estimate to that of a benchmark model without
interlinked transactions. We simplify the exposition by assuming contract institutions are
ﬁxed across farmers at the market level, gm, and that qim, the farmer-level output produced
if the farmer does not receive credit, is distributed with cumulative distribution function G(qim)
130deﬁned over the support [qLm,qHm]. Thus there exists a q
m(wm) which represents the
production volume threshold above which farmers enter ILT contracts in market m. The
insights of the analysis are similar when we relax the assumption of a constant gm in the
market. Below, we consider a single market and simplify notation by omitting the subscript
m.
The average farmer welfare in the market is equal to:
WILT =
Z q
qL
q
w
m
g(q)dq +
Z qH
q q

(1+ r)(1  g)w
m
+ cF

g(q)dq, (3.14)
which is simply a weighted average of the welfare of farmers under the spot market and ILT
contracts. The ﬁrst term represents the welfare of farmers transacting on the spot market
and the second is the welfare for farmers who are in ILT contracts. To ﬁnd the average
welfare effects of an increase in the wholesale price w, we apply Leibniz’s rule to obtain
dWILT
dw
= G(q)E[qjq < q]
1
m
+ (1  G(q))E[qjq  q]
(1+ r)(1  g)
m
 

cF + (r(1  g)   g)
w
m

qg(q)
dq
dw
(3.15)
Intuitively, the change in welfare is the sum of three terms: i) the average change in welfare
for farmers on the spot market, weighted by the share of farmers on the spot market; ii) the
average change in welfare for farmers on ILT contracts, weighted by the share of farmers in
ILT; iii) the change in welfare for farmers that switch into ILT in response to the change in
welfare. Notice that
dq
dw < 0, and so the last term is positive.
We compare these welfare results with those of a benchmark model, where farmers only
transact on the spot market. In this benchmark case average welfare is
WS =
Z qH
qL
q
w
m
g(q)dq, (3.16)
and the change in average welfare in response to a change in wholesale price is
dWS
dw
= E[q]
1
m
(3.17)
Equation (3.17) shows that, in the absence of credit provision, price pass through is the key
131variable that shapes predicted welfare changes. This simple result obviously relies on the
assumption of perfectly inelastic supply at the farmer level, and our constant markdown, m.
A more general model would have additional predictions about how the welfare response
to an increase in the wholesale price varies with the supply elasticity.
3.5 Model Testing and Calibration
3.5.1 The Substitutability of Price and Credit Pass-through
The core testable prediction of our model is that price pass-through and credit pass-
through (on the extensive margin: the share of farmers receiving credit) are substitutes
across markets. In this section we provide evidence on this substitutability using data from
the markets in our experiment. A key result will be that while price pass-through is positive
in some markets, it is low and even negative in others. This heterogeneity is driven by
the baseline intensity with which interlinked transactions are used in these markets. This
ﬁnding emphasizes the core result of our paper, that price-pass-through is diminished in the
presence of interlinked transactions. An increase in the wholesale price leads to a reduction
in farmer prices for those farmers who switch into interlinked transactions as a result of the
increase. We conclude this section with a welfare calibration of our model, showing that the
effects of ignoring the margin of credit pass-through can be substantial for welfare analysis.
First, we document that several predictions of the model are supported by baseline
correlations in the data. Table 3.6 presents these results. Each column shows a regression
of the village outcome on the proxies listed in the rows and a constant. These indicators
come from the pre-treatment period, when our inspectors were collecting data on quantity,
prices, and quality of cocoa delivered to wholesalers, but treatments had not been assigned.
Our model predicts a negative cross-sectional correlation between the level of prices and
the supply of credit at the village level. This is conﬁrmed in column 1 of Table 3.6. Moving
from zero credit share to full credit share decreases the price paid in the cross section by
4.2 percent (s.e. = 2.3). In column 2, we present a regression where the outcome variable
132Table 3.6: Substitutability, baseline correlations
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Baseline ln(Price of Share of
Credit Share grade A) grade A
Quantity Cocoa/Farmers 0.077***
(0.027)
Number of Study Traders in Village 0.024* -0.001 -0.025*
(0.013) (0.002) (0.014)
Number of Study Traders -0.005 -0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
Baseline Credit Share -0.042* 0.339**
(0.023) (0.139)
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.11
Observations 80 44 75
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations in columns
are limited by the number of villages in which we observe one price in
the pre-treatment period, and include those villages for which we did
not observe prices post-treatment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
is the village-level share of farmers receiving credit from study traders. This outcome is
positively correlated with the total quantity supplied to traders, which is calculated as total
quantity supplied in baseline, divided by the number of study traders. This conﬁrms the
model’s insight that traders are more likely to extend credit to villages from which they can
get higher volumes of cocoa. In addition, village-level credit share is also positively (and
signiﬁcantly) correlated with the number of traders in the economy, conﬁrming another
prediction of our model that markets with more traders, and thus a greater threat of loosing
output to a competitor, are related to more intensive use of interlinked transactions. Finally,
column 3 shows that the ratio between the volume of a high quality cocoa and the total
volume of cocoa produced in the village is increasing in the level of credit provision. This is
consistent with the model insight that loans from traders can be used to increase the value
of output through quality-enhancing post-processing activities.
We then test the prediction that price and credit pass-through are substitutes across
markets by studying across-village heterogeneous treatment effects of the experiment. We
133modify equations (3.1) and (3.2) respectively to allow for heterogeneous treatment effects
across villages by specifying the two regression equations
ykipvt = aip + tt + qP(Bonusi) + (Bonusi  W0
v)qP
w + W0
vbw + X0
ibx + ekiptv (3.18)
yfipv = aip + qC(Bonusi) + (Bonusi  W0
v)qC
w + W0
vbw + X0
ibx + ˚ ﬁpv (3.19)
where W0
v is some vector of village covariates as before. For any village v then we have an
estimator for the pass-through in that village given by
ˆ rs = W0
vqs
w + qs (3.20)
where s 2 fP,Cg, price or credit. Our model predicts that ˆ P = Corr(ˆ rP, ˆ rC) < 0 across
villages with different market size, the level of competition, and the ease of enforcing
contracts.
The most natural starting point for an element of W0
v is a baseline measure of credit sup-
ply at the village level, which proxies directly for the prevalence of interlinked transactions
in a given market. As discussed above, we are able to generate such a measure from our
baseline survey of traders. For all the farmers listed by study traders in the baseline, we
calculate the within-village share of farmers that has been given credit by a study trader
since March, shortly before the cocoa season begins. As shown in Table 3.2, the mean of
this variable across study villages is 65%, with a standard deviation of 29 percentage points.
To gain more variation we will add to W0
v the minimum road distance to the nearest town,
a proxy for ease of enforcement of contracts, as well as factors that may affect per unit
transport costs, and the number of study traders in the village, a proxy for market size.
We proceed to estimate to estimate (3.18) and (3.19) using seven different speciﬁcations
of W0
v, and to report ˆ Pr = Corr(ˆ rP
r , ˆ rC
r ) for each speciﬁcation r. The regression coefﬁcients
qs
w and qs for each model are presented in Table 3.7, and the estimates of ˆ Pr are presented
in Table 3.8. Standard errors for each ˆ Pr are constructed by resampling with replacement
both the price and credit sample 500 times, each time reestimating (3.18) and (3.19). For
each iteration, we estimate ˆ rs
r for each s, and hold the correlation in memory. The standard
134error is the standard deviation of these correlations, and the test statistic is the ˆ Pr divided
by its standard error.
The models, or different speciﬁcations of W0
v, are as follows. Model A includes only
baseline credit share. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 we see that the interaction terms
have the opposite sign, as expected. In markets with higher baseline credit share, price
pass-through is lower, though not signiﬁcantly so, and credit pass-through is higher, and
signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Since there is only one variable in this model, the correlation
coefﬁcient presented in Table 3.8 is necessarily -1.0. Model B is our baseline linear model,
including interactions terms with baseline credit share, the number of study traders, the
number of treatment traders and minimum distance to the nearest town. Again, the signs
on baseline credit share are the opposite sign, as expected. The correlation coefﬁcient across
villages generated by this model is -0.88. With a standard error of 0.24, this is signiﬁcant
at 1%. A scatter plot and best ﬁt line indicating the relation between the two predicted
treatment effects is presented in Figure ??. The negative relationship is clear. Model C
includes the same covariates, but includes quadratic and cubic terms for each to allow for
non-linearity in the treatment effects as they vary with the covariates. In this model, the
correlation coefﬁcient is smaller, at -0.44, but still signiﬁcant at 6 percent with a standard
error of 0.23. Adding the quadratic and cubic terms increases the variance of the overall
predicted effects, but does not change the overall pattern.
We note that the slope of the graph is quite consistent with the baseline correlation
between prices and village-level share of farmers who receive credit. Speciﬁcally, a one-tenth
increase in the treatment effect on the share of credit provision reduces the treatment effect
on cocoa prices by about twenty Leones. The baseline correlation, based on pre-experiment
data, would predict that such an increase in credit share should reduce prices by about
ﬁfteen Leones.
The rest of the models drop covariates other than baseline credit share to show the
robustness of the relationship. Model D includes only baseline credit share and minimum
road distance, and model E includes these variables with quadratic and cubic terms. Again
135-
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137Table 3.8: Substitutability, predicted treatment effect correlations
Model A B C D E F G
ˆ P -1.0 -0.88 -0.44 -0.99 -0.68 -0.78 -0.25
– (0.24) (0.23) (0.33) (0.23) (0.29) (0.25)
Test Statistic -2.27 -3.56 -1.93 -3.03 -2.95 -2.68 -0.93
Notes: ˆ P gives the correlation coefﬁcient between the predicted treatment
effect on price and on credit for each model estimated using weights equal
to the inverse number of observations per village. Bootstrapped standard
errors estimating using 500 iterations, resampling price and credit samples
with replacement, are in parenthesis. The test statistic is ˆ P divided by
its standard error. Model A includes only baseline credit share; Model
B includes baseline credit share, number of study traders, number of
treatment traders, and minimum road distance to nearest town. Model
D includes only baseline credit share and minimum road distance, and
Model F includes only baseline credit share, number of study traders and
number of study traders. Model C includes a cubic for all terms in B, E
includes a cubic for all terms in D, and G includes a cubic for all terms in
F.
the coefﬁcients remain negative, at -0.99 (s.e. = 0.33) and -0.68 (0.23) respectively. Model F
includes only baseline credit share, number of study traders and number of study traders,
and model G includes these in addition to quadratic and cubic terms as before. Here the
relationship is negative, at -0.78 (s.e. = 0.29) and -0.25 (s.e. = 0.25) respectively in each
model, though it is not signiﬁcant at standard levels in model G. The best ﬁt lines for these
models are summarized in Figure ??. In sum, the results show a robust and strong negative
relationship between credit and price pass-through across markets.
3.5.2 Calibration and Welfare Analysis
Our results emphasize that a focus only on prices may obscure the total value passed
through to farmers. A calibration of our model provides an illustration of the extent to
which not accounting for interlinked credit transactions may underestimate the effect of a
change in the wholesale price of output on the average farmer’s welfare, and under which
parameter values the bias will be most severe. These calculations rely heavily on the model,
which makes several simplifying functional form assumptions, and the precise magnitudes
138-
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Figure 3.6: Substitutability, best linear ﬁt between price and credit treatment effects estimated from each
model A-G.
of our results should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we believe that this exercise
is useful, and helps illustrate the point that the inferences one draws about welfare from
low pass-through in a market with interlinked transactions can be substantially different
from those one would draw using a standard pass-through model.
We analyze the change in welfare with respect to a marginal increase in the wholesale
price in a benchmark model without interlinkages and in our model. In the benchmark
model, the change is given by (3.17). Since farmers receive 1/m of the wholesale price, the
markdown is equal their welfare change per unit sold. We multiply by the average farm
size to obtain an estimate of the change in average welfare in the economy.
In our model of interlinked transactions, the effect on welfare of a price is a weighted
average of three terms, the effect on those who still receive no credit, those who still receive
credit after the change and those who switch into the interlinked transaction. This result is
summarized by (3.15), restated here:
dWILT
dw
= G(q)E[qjq < q]
1
m
+ (1  G(q))E[qjq  q]
(1  g)
m
  (cF   g
w
m
)qg(q)
dq
dw
In our calibration we will estimate all terms except m and g from the data, and then compare
139(3.17) and (3.15) for different values of the two parameters. It remains then to obtain values
for G(q), E[qjq < q], E[qjq > q], cF, w, q, and g(q)
dq
dw.
We begin with cF, the utility gain to the farmer from the credit relation per unit sold.
A natural starting point is the cash value of the average loan given to farmers, divided
by the average quantity sold by a farmer. Our data on loan size come from the endline
survey, asked in late December, 2011. Traders were asked if they had given a loan in the last
thirty days, and if so, how much. The average loan size was Le. 177,297 (s.d. = 143,594),
approximately 45 US dollars. To arrive at a per unit quantity, we must assume a period over
which the loan was amortized. To be conservative, we will choose two months. Choosing
a shorter period would make our estimates of the marginal utility from a loan higher. To
calculate per farmer quantity sold during that period, we calculate total quantity of grade A
purchased by all traders in each village in the month before the question was asked. We
then divide this by the number of suppliers in the village, and take the average, arriving at
96 pounds. Assuming that the trader, when giving the loan expected to receive this ﬂow
for four months, the implicit per unit credit outlay is 923 Leones. We assume that l, the
marginal utility for the farmer of a one-dollar credit provision, valued at the time of the
harvest sale, is 1.3,15 so we have cF = 1,201. Current prices at this time are Le. 2,666 per
pound so we take that to equal W0. Finally, in the calibration exercise, we conservatively
assume that r, the return of credit on production quantity/quality, is zero. Thus, our
estimates will be a lower bound on the impact of a change in trades resale price on farmer
welfare.
We then estimate the share of farmers in the credit relation, and those who are not. Since
the data on credit provision were collected referencing the last month, we will use this same
time frame to estimate the share of farmers currently in an interlinked transaction. This is
just then the control group’s share of people who have received credit in the last month,
12%. We use this value for G(q). To estimate the expected farmer loan size for traders in
15This is a conservative estimate. Several studies on similar populations ﬁnd weekly discount factors around
0.75 (e.g. Schaner, 2013)
140and out of the credit relation, we return to baseline data on quantities sold by each village
to all of our study traders, so that our estimates of quantities are not inﬂuenced by the
treatment. We use the baseline share of farmers who have received credit in that village
since the beginning of the season as our proxy for the level of the credit in that village. The
median value of this variable across villages is 63%. We code villages above this median as
being in the credit relation, and those below this median as being outside of it, and then
calculate average baseline quantity sold during the 4 pre-treatment weeks of the experiment
per farmer in the village for the two groups. From this we arrive at E[qjq < q] = 36 and
E[qjq > q] = 95. For the value of q, we simply take expected per farmer quantity for the
median village with respect to the credit share, getting q = 67.
Finally, we require a term for g(q)
¶q
¶W, the change in the threshold value of q times
its density. This we can estimate from our treatment effects. If each unit of q represents
a farmer, a decrease in q is just the negative of the change in the share of people getting
credit. If we assume this term is constant, it is just equal to the negative of the slope of our
treatment effect on credit with respect to the increase the bonus, or  0.12/150 =  0.0008.
Finally, to estimate the change in the standard model, we just require expected quantity per
farmer, which in the baseline equals 66 pounds.
Figure ?? summarizes the results of our calibration of the welfare impact of the experi-
ment with and without accounting for the credit margin. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure shows the
ratio between the average welfare changes estimated using the interlinked transaction model
(3.15) and using the benchmark framework (3.17), for a range of values of g and m, and the
calibrated values discussed above. The ratio is larger than one in most of the examined
range. Intuitively, the inclusion of the credit channel raises the estimated welfare impact of a
change in trader prices relatively more when i) m is high, since a higher markdown reduces
the price pass-through, which is the sole driver of welfare change in the benchmark model;
ii) g is low, since better contract enforcement institutions increase the amount of rent traders
can extract from farmers when they provide them with credit. In conclusion, the exercise
shows that neglecting the role of interlinkages can substantially affect the estimation of the
141Figure 3.7: A welfare change in response to a marginal change in the intermediaries price in the ILT model
relative to in the benchmark model.
welfare consequences of a change in wholesale prices.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The theory and evidence presented in the paper show that, in the presence of interlinked
transactions, low price pass-through may obscure other channels through which value
is passed from end-buyers to producers. Price pass-through and credit pass-through are
shown to be substitutes across markets in an agricultural setting in sub-Saharan Africa that
has similarities to markets in other developing economies. This ﬁnding is shown to have
substantial implications for the analysis of the impact of changes in downstream prices
on farmer welfare. Indeed, in our context, low price pass-through can result from high
responsiveness of interlinked rural capital markets, as well as from intermediaries’ market
power.
Our study complements existing work on the welfare implications. Interlinked trans-
actions along the value chain are common in developing economies and we expect our
framework to be particularly valuable in these settings. More broadly, interlinkages play a
role in a wide range of transactions. For instance, trade credit is a major source of ﬁnance
142for ﬁrms in industrialized countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 2003) and
cash-in-advance plays an important role in international trade contracts (Antràs and Foley,
2011). Our argument that, in the presence of interlinked transactions, one needs to assess
the multiple margins through which value passes-through the value chain is thus a general
one.
While our empirical work studies pass-through at the level of the intermediary buying
from a producers, the issues described here naturally extend to other links in the supply
chain, for instance from international buyers to exporters. We thus believe the question of
how interlinkages affect the transmission of price signals through entire supply chains is an
exciting one for future research.
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Figure A.1: Ghost Building Intensity Coefﬁcient by Election Pre/Post Program
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Formula for Road Score
The score of road i in district k is given by:
scorei = 0.4
epi
ep_maxk
+ 0.2
pdi
pd_maxk
+ 0.2
rai
ra_maxk
+ 0.1
svi
sv_maxk
+ 0.1
li
l_maxk
(B.1)
where:
epi is economic productivity per kilometer of road i,
ep_maxk is the maximum economic productivity in district k,
pdi is population density around road i,
pd_maxk is the maximum population density in dsitrict k,
rai is the baseline road condition assessment of road i,
ra_maxk is the maximum baseline road condition in district k,
svi is the social value indicator of road i,
sv_maxk is the maximum social value in district k,
li is the length of road i,
l_maxk is the maximum road length in district k.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Cocoa Quality
Both international and local cocoa prices vary with quality. Factors contributing to poor quality cocoa are
high moisture content, mold, germination, a lack of fermentation and slate, a discoloration signaling poor ﬂavor.
There is wide agreement on these standards internationally. For a discussion see CAOBISCO (2002) and for a
manual speciﬁc to West Africa on how to improve cocoa at the farm level see Sonii (2005). Other dimensions of
quality affecting price on the international market are various fair-trade and environmental certiﬁcations. Such
certiﬁcation generally requires that beans can be veriﬁably traced to individual producers. In our market, there
is not yet the infrastructure to do such tracing, and so this quality dimension does not apply.
Table C.1 shows the average quality and wholesale prices of cocoa bags from the experiment, before the
November fall in the international price. As can be seen, moisture content has the highest price elasticity—price
falls by 0.32% with a one percentage point increase in moisture. Moisture is an important variable in our market,
because wet cocoa rots in storage, destroying value. At an average 11% moisture content, cocoa in our market is
substantially wetter than export grade, which requires a maximum moisture content of 7%. For this reason,
many exporters maintain large drying facilities. There is an efﬁciency cost to this organizational structure, as
some cocoa that is not dried at the farm gate will be lost to rot in transport.
In our grading system, members of our research team stayed in the warehouses of wholesalers and tested a
sample of 50 beans from each bag of cocoa as it arrived. Moisture was measured using Dickey John MiniGAC
moisture meters, two of which were generously donated by the manufacturer. Other defects were spotted by
eye, after cracking beans open with a knife. Grade A beans have no more than average 11.5% moisture, no more
than 2% mold (1 bean of 50), and no less than 72% beans with no defect (36 beans of 50). Grade B beans have
no more than 22% moisture, 4% mold (2 beans of 50) and no less than 52% good beans (27 beans of 50). Grade
161Table C.1: Appendix, Cocoa Quality
Average per pound price
by tercile of defect (Le.)
Defect Average per Price 1 2 3
shipment elasticity
Moisture Content 11% -0.32% 3,384 3,297 3,263
Mold 2% -0.02% 3,308 3,353 3,241
Germinated 3% -0.01% 3,309 3,313 3,298
Under-fermented 15% -0.02% 3,345 3,333 3,228
Slate 7% -0.01% 3,323 3,304 3,279
Notes: Data from 916 treatment and control transactions observed before
the November decrease in the international price. Elasiticty gives the
percentage reduction in price for a 1 percentage point increase in the
defect.
C applies to any bean failing to be grade A or B. At baseline, quantities supplied by traders were approximately
one third of each.
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